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ARMS CONTROL

Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force

By T. C. SCHELLING

THIS article proposes that there be discussed with the Russians the establishment (for each of us, separately, and perhaps for other countries) of a *Special Surveillance Force*. Its function would be to observe the enemy's behavior, at the enemy's invitation, and to report home instantly through authentic channels. The purpose is to help tranquilize crises that threaten to erupt into general war, particularly crises aggravated by the instability of strategic deterrence—by the urgency, if general war seems imminent, of starting it before the enemy does.

The special feature of such a force would be its readiness, through advance preparation, to take advantage of motives and political circumstances as they might be in a sudden crisis, rather than as they are during the normal ups and downs of the cold war. It should be prepared to do, with the sudden acquiescence of the enemy (host), things that the latter might never dream of permitting except in extraordinary circumstances, when some kind of arms control—even if only a temporary monitoring of some synchronized withdrawal or relaxation—becomes urgently required as an alternative to war or to the rapid deterioration of a strategic crisis. The attributes of the force should be readiness, speed, reliability, self-sufficiency, versatility, and ability to improvise.

UNDERLYING PREMISES

This suggestion rests on two premises.

The first is that any real stimulus to arms-control or arms-tranquilization measures would likely come in an unforeseen crisis that developed rapidly. There is not now a powerful belief in arms control as a necessary alternative to general war; but events could occur—technological events or political events—that would make the balance of deterrence much more unstable than it is now, or that would cause a drastic reappraisal of the instability that has existed all along—events that would make "measures to safeguard against surprise attack" (to use the current terminology) needed instantly as an alternative to war. At such a moment the motives for arms control, the political feasibility

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of various control measures, the willingness to incur costs, to break precedent, and to infringe the rights of other countries, might be strikingly different than in the circumstances of the cold war. In other words, the demand for disarmament may come suddenly when it comes, and not be able to wait. Advance intellectual preparation, and material and personnel preparation, may be essential to meet that contingency.

The second premise is that there are things that the United States and the USSR might do co-operatively in anticipation of a possible sudden need to meet unforeseen emergencies. In the course of such emergencies the ability of each side to see reliably, with its own eyes, and with authentic capabilities for communicating home, certain things that either are going on or are not going on in the other country may be essential to the avoidance of misunderstanding or to the negotiation of practical arrangements—even very temporary arrangements—that would help to stabilize mutual deterrence. (The possibility of a nuclear accident, or of nuclear mischief by some third party, suggests one type of situation for which stand-by observation teams of a versatile and flexible sort could be useful in the process of mutual reassurance.)

NATURE OF THE CONTINGENCY

In considering the crises that may arise, and how they may arise, we should distinguish between (1) the crises that we should anticipate unilaterally and (2) those whose possibility or likelihood we can acknowledge to the Russians and discuss with them as mutual problems susceptible of co-operative preparations.

For example, we can think unilaterally about the "crisis" that would occur if we received evidence that the Russians were preparing to launch an attack on American strategic forces. Just what to do under the circumstances, particularly if the evidence is ambiguous, and especially if our capability to forestall it by a surprise blow of our own is not terribly reassuring at the time, is not obvious. As an important possibility, one might consider some kind of disarmament ultimatum, a demand for "measures to safeguard against surprise attack" of a potency and rigor suggested by the term "preventive disarmament."

Whether there would be any military restraint or sacrifice that the Russians and we could undertake and that we could adequately monitor under the demanding time schedule, of a sufficiently irreversible and advantageous form to satisfy us and yet not intolerably susceptible of double cross from the Russian point of view, is a vital technical question. The answer will depend, among other things, on the facilities

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for monitoring compliance—Soviet compliance and United States compliance—with whatever arrangements can be negotiated. Facilities and personnel may be needed instantly and continuously so that there is no lapse, even a momentary one, in the synchronized process of withdrawal, tranquilization, redeployment, submission to inspection, disarmament, or whatever we call the arrangement. This particular contingency, however, is not the kind that we would discuss with the Russians or make a basis for overt co-operation prior to the event.

In contrast, certain contingencies are suggested by the notion of "accidental war," particularly in its more mechanical and psychological connotations. This is the possibility of a war that might result from the triggering effect of an accident or error in the literal sense, or from electronic and other false alarms, or from the calculated mischief of a strategically irresponsible third party.[1] There may be a legitimate basis for considering with the Russians the possibility that we and they might want to respond co-operatively in the face of certain events, certain uncertainties, certain "crises." At least this may be true of those contingencies in which there is a strong presumption that neither side is on the verge of premeditated war. It may be important to each side to reassure itself of this fact and to provide reassurance to the other side, which might otherwise be tempted to respond explosively to the uncertain potentialities of the situation.

In between would be crises of the kind that could occur in the course of a violent limited war, or in a political crisis where the piling up of strategic threats had gotten both sides so committed that withdrawal without submissiveness seemed impossible, and in which general war began to seem imminent. (An unimaginative way to project such a crisis may be to translate the Suez-Hungarian crisis into the context of Berlin or Formosa.) If it were part of the strategy of each side to reassure the other that it was not about to launch all-out war momentarily, on condition that it could satisfy itself that the other was not about to do so either, it might be possible to specify a sufficient set of actions to be taken and actions to be abstained from to constitute such reassurance—on condition that they could be instantly, continuously, and reliably observed, with the observers reporting through channels known to be authentic. This might be the kind of crisis that, while not readily susceptible of overt acknowledgment and discussion between us and

[1] Regarding the possibility of "accidental war," and its deterrence, see T. C. Schelling, "Meteors, Mischief, and War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVI, No. 7 (September 1960), pp. 292ff.

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the Russians, could be in the backs of our minds as we talked or negotiated about some of the less sensitive contingencies.

PRE-EMPTIVE INSTABILITY

This whole notion rests on a single premise about the character of the strategic problem: that there is likely to be, during most of the foreseeable future, an enormous advantage in striking first in the event that war occurs, and that each side will not only be conscious of this but be conscious of the other's preoccupation with it. In any circumstances in which the likelihood of early or immediate war rises above a certain threshold, the urge to pre-empt, to pre-empt the other's pre-emption (and to pre-empt his attempt to pre-empt our pre-emption, and so on *ad infinitum*) may become a dominant motive. This implies that crises could develop very suddenly. And when they do, both sides may fervently wish that the premium on first strike did not exist; both sides may recognize that they are both trapped by the unstable technology of attack and defense; both may recognize that each is, from its own point of view, tempted to attack first in "self-defense"; and both may wish that there were adequate co-operative measures to be taken ("measures to safeguard against surprise attack") to tranquilize the situation.

AGGRAVATING FACTORS

There are some special technical considerations here. One is that the things that each side does to make its own strategic force more secure—to be more alert, to be less vulnerable to surprise, and to be better able to strike quickly if that is the way the decision goes—are likely to be the kinds of actions that can be interpreted as preparations for attack. They are likely to be actions that increase the danger of "false alarm" on both sides and that could lead to a succession of decisions aggravating each side's perception of the need to pre-empt. Thus the things that each side does in the face of uncertainty and instability may, by mutual feedback, aggravate the instability.

A second consideration is that each side may take extraordinary measures in a crisis that could not be maintained indefinitely. Sooner or later there comes a need to withdraw, recuperate, disalert, or otherwise respond to the "fatigue" produced in the strategic force by the crisis itself. It may be that each side could much more readily relax into something like normal alert status if there were a means available for monitoring a synchronized relaxation on both sides. It would be exceedingly difficult to work out a reasonable plan for a synchronized relaxation of that sort; but it may be more than difficult—it may be

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impossible—to monitor compliance within the time available unless certain ingredients of the inspection system are prepared and pre-positioned before the crisis.

IRREVERSIBLE DESTABILIZATION

Once we imagine crises that might require some kind of *temporary* strategic co-operation, it is not much farther to the notion of a crisis that *irreversibly* changes the basic political premise that we and the Russians work on. At the present time our mutual deterrence probably gets some stability from our both working on the premise that general war, though terribly possible, is rather unlikely; that we will both try hard to prevent it; that we are both deterred by the "mutual suicide" possibilities; and that neither of us has yet come demonstrably close to triggering the other's pre-emptive decision. It is possible, of course, that today's (relative) tranquility reflects only that the enemy has taken the decision to launch an attack, has computed that his advantage will be greatest at a date still in the future, and is lulling us in the interim. But the contrary judgment seems to prevail. If, however, we really get to the brink of all-out strategic war; if we display to ourselves and to the Russians our willingness to take extraordinary risks; if the Russians demonstrate the same; and particularly if the crisis is one that leads us to readjust our estimate of how likely general war has been all along, then we may at that point revise our basic operating premise and expect the Russians to do the same. We may have to stop relying on *inertia* as a supplement to mutual deterrence, and plan to live on the brink of general war. At such a point we might decide that nothing the Russians could ever do would reassure us, since efforts to reassure us would naturally be associated with definite plans to attack us; we might also conclude that no *moderate* arms-control measures could be of any significance. At that point drastic disarmament, negotiated under the threat of immediate general war, with drastic implications for the political balance of the world and without regard to the sensitivities of neutrals and allies, may suddenly be recognized as the alternative to war.

"CRASH DISARMAMENT"

It would be a shame if in such a contingency, in spite of powerful and unprecedented motives on both sides to negotiate drastic disarmament as an alternative to war, the possibility were precluded by the sheer technical inability of both sides to monitor, instantly and continuously, each side's compliance with whatever arrangement for synchronized crash disarmament could be worked out. It would be particularly dis-

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graceful if the possibility were precluded by the failure of both sides to think seriously and imaginatively about such contingencies in advance and to make certain basic and flexible preparations for them, such as procurement, training, pre-positioning, and the establishment of a degree of co-ordination with each other.

The notion of "crash disarmament," suddenly motivated and demanding facilities for negotiation, observation, and communication on a time schedule wholly different from that of normal cold-war disarmament discussions, may seem strange and unreal, implausible and unrealistic, unprecedented and improbable. But any idea of general war between the United States and the USSR is somewhat strange and unreal, implausible and unprecedented; any idea of disarmament that goes beyond the most innocuous sort of diplomacy seems politically unrealistic. Perhaps a few concepts like massive retaliation or limited war have come to seem real, plausible, and consistent with the motives of one or both sides only because we have gained more familiarity with such ideas during the last several years. Thus the need for a technical capability to engage in sudden disarmament is not to be judged for its plausibility or probability in the ordinary sense of historical familiarity; it is to be judged for its relative likelihood in comparison with the drastic and unprecedented, strange, and unreal contingencies that are involved in any discussion of our strategic relation to the Russians in the years to come, such as war itself.

UNILATERAL ACTIONS

Unilaterally, there are a number of implications that flow from such a contingency if we take it seriously. One is to *design our own strategic forces*, and to deploy them and to control them, and to provide them with an operating doctrine, in a manner consistent with the *need to endure crises*, and with emphasis on their potential strategic role of *policing disarmament* (in addition to their strategic role of deterring attack or fighting a war). A second is the need to think about, to plan for, and to war-game in detail the question of what we should (could) demand of the Soviets if we did reach the point where, in the interest of averting imminent war, we were willing to use the threat of imminent war to support a disarmament ultimatum (including one that might put the Soviets at a real disadvantage). A third is to think about the problem of actually negotiating with the Russians in such a crisis, and making preparations for communication and inspection, not only so that we can monitor their compliance but so that—equally essential to the success of a negotiation—they can monitor ours. And

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a fourth is the question of what we might, in advance of any such crisis, talk about with the Russians, and do with them, either by way of reaching understandings with them or by way of exchanging facilities and practicing their use. It is mainly the fourth and, to a lesser extent, the third that relate to our bilateral negotiation with the Russians ahead of time.

THE POSITIVE-EVIDENCE CONCEPT

In considering the kind of surveillance scheme that could be mounted in a hurry, and especially in considering what could be accomplished by a small but adaptable elite group of potential inspectors and communicators, it is necessary to keep in mind the motives that would be brought to bear on the kind of crisis being discussed. There is only one premise about these motives that can make sense of the scheme discussed in this article: that is, that both sides would be emphatically eager, desperately eager, to convey the truth if in fact the truth were reassuring, and to behave in ways that facilitate observation of the truth. In a crash scheme of disarmament, or arms restraint, or mutual withdrawal and tranquilization, both sides would require *positive evidence* of compliance, rather than just an absence of evidence that the other is cheating. In these contingencies the inspectors would not look for evidence about what the other side was not doing; they would demand to see what it *was* doing.

As mentioned elsewhere,[2] there are two quite distinct criteria for judging an inspection system. One is how well the system gets at the truth in spite of the subject's best efforts to conceal it; the other is how well it helps the subject to display the truth when it is in his interest to do so. (The difference is a little like that between a scheme for discovering the guilty and a scheme for permitting the innocent to establish their innocence.)

To give an artificial illustration, if the Russians told us that a particular submarine was not within a thousand miles of the United States, and we did not know where the submarine was, it would be looking for a needle in a haystack to discover whether they were lying. But if *in fact* the submarine is not within a thousand miles of the United States and the Russians wish to prove it, they always have the option of producing the submarine for us to take a look at.

I am not trying to propose in a simple-minded way that the truth is easy to document if only the motive is there, or that in a crisis each

[2] T. C. Schelling, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security*, Princeton, N.J., 1959, pp. 176-208.

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side's sole interest will be to convey the truth and there is no need to worry about cheating. I am simply saying that while cheating and deception are problems even in the best of circumstances, and while authentic evidence of the truth may be difficult to convey even if one wants to, there is nevertheless an enormous difference between discovering the truth in spite of the enemy's best efforts to conceal it, and creating facilities for his provision of satisfactory evidence on the assumption that he is powerfully motivated to reassure us and knows that we can be reassured only if we are presented with overwhelming evidence that passes our most skeptical scrutiny.

Take a case that involves less military technology and tactics than the submarine, the question of where Khrushchev and other important members of the Russian government are at any moment. If they have just gone deep underground in Siberia, or on a sustained airborne alert, or have taken some other action that might suggest they were preserving their command and saving their skins in preparation for general war, and if they alleged that they were doing no such thing but were minding their own ordinary business somewhere in the USSR, it could be nearly impossible to discover the truth. We could not know with certainty everywhere they were not, in order to deduce (or prove) where they momentarily were. But if in fact they have not absented themselves, and badly want to prove it, all they have to do is to produce Khrushchev—if we have somebody available who can recognize him on sight and report home instantly through authentic channels.

What I am trying to emphasize is that the ways they could prove to our complete satisfaction the *truth* about something they *are* doing, when in fact they are doing it and badly want us to know it, are much simpler than the ways that we would have to discover the falsehood of the same proposition if in fact it were false and we had to search for our own evidence. I emphasize this point not because it makes the problem easy, but because it may keep the problem from being utterly insoluble.

NATURE OF THE ARMS CONTROL

Ordinarily arms control is thought to depend on some minimum of mutual trust; and it could be argued that co-operation between enemies on the brink of war is out of the question because mutual trust would be nil. But any scheme of negotiated behavior would have to rest on the premise of absolute mistrust. In fact, it seems certain that unless thoroughgoing distrust were acknowledged on both sides, no under-

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standing could be reached. The sheer intellectual clarity required to recognize the nature of the common interest would be incompatible with the pretense that there was any basis for mutual trust. Commitments would have to be entirely physical, not verbal or legal or moral. Each side must *do things* in an observable way, simultaneously with the other's doing corresponding things in an equally observable way, according to a sufficiently synchronized plan that neither acquires an attractive opportunity to double cross the other.

In the case for which I have used terms like "withdrawal from the brink," "relaxation," or other words suggesting return to the *status quo ante*, the negotiated scheme may have a limited horizon. The scheme succeeds in a matter of days, if not hours, or at most in a few weeks, or it fails altogether. But in the case of a crisis that irreversibly aggravates strategic instability, permanently changing each side's expectations about the other, and in which the *status quo ante* is militarily intolerable to both sides or at least to one of them, a more heroic negotiation is involved; and the requirements for surveillance are more varied.

To fix ideas, consider an extreme case. Suppose we get evidence that the Russians have decided to launch a surprise attack either when a good opportunity occurs or on some specified planning date. Suppose the circumstances—the ambiguity of the evidence, the motives we ascribe to the Russians (including their fear that we might attack first someday if they do not do it first), and the military balance between us—make it not only intolerable just to sit still and wait but unattractive to pre-empt ourselves, and not altogether satisfying just to announce to them that we know what they are up to and are prepared for it. It is conceivable that one alternative course available to us, one worth considering seriously, would be an ultimatum demanding that the Russians instantly begin to disarm themselves sufficiently, in conjunction with measures for our observation of what they are doing, so that they could not at any time (with good prospects of success) attack us by surprise. Suppose that, in the interest of making this course succeed, we consider certain similar (not necessarily equivalent) concessions that we might make in order to reduce Soviet vulnerability to a surprise attack by us while preserving or even enhancing the security and potency of our retaliatory forces. In other words, suppose that we decided that drastic and "permanent" disarmament of some sort (aimed mainly, but not necessarily exclusively, at the surprise-attack problem) would be our objective and that we would seek it through the threat of all-out war. ("Permanent" means, I suppose, not that we or they or both of us would be physically incapable of rearming, but that neither

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could take steps to rearm or to evade the scheme in other ways except through a time-consuming process that would give the other side sufficient warning for it to take heroic measures for the security of its own retaliatory forces or to initiate war quickly on terms corresponding to those existing under the disarmament scheme.)

Under these circumstances, it is apparently necessary to negotiate under extreme duress, and very quickly, a drastic permanent readjustment of the world military situation, of such a sort that both sides can move by stages from something exceedingly temporary to something slightly less temporary and so on by degrees into something reasonably durable. Presumably one adopts suddenly the most extraordinary alert and readiness posture, delivering the ultimatum that (hopefully) initiates negotiation; the enemy does the same as he sends his response; and what is now required is to withdraw from the very brink of general war by some synchronized process that not only avoids instant war but leads by degrees into a durable system, with each side recognizing that if the synchronized process fails to work, or if no satisfactory solution can be discovered, each side will be tempted to initiate war if only because it expects the other to do so. And all of this has to be monitored!

The near-hopelessness of such an attempt to divert the course of history might justify the reader's giving up the article at this point, if it were not for two attenuating considerations, one hopeful and the other not. The first is that the very gravity of the situation, the heroic nature of the accommodations required, the unprecedented seriousness of the moment, might make certain courses of action feasible that ordinarily would not seem to be, by making leaders on both sides aware of the demands of the situation, of the risks in not trying as well as in trying, and of the enemy's seriousness in seeking a conservative outcome. The second consideration is that, however modest the prospects of finding a solution on the brink of war, the gravity of the problem suggests that we should do what we can to keep open the possibility.

THE SCHEME AND THE RESOURCES REQUIRED

If the philosophy is accepted, the next question is what can be done. The internal answer is, first of all, that we should think about it seriously; second, that we should work out articulate, detailed, sequential descriptions of such kinds of crises as we can imagine and experiment with them to see what personnel and material ingredients might be required ahead of time in the event that we wished, in a crisis, to pull out the plan and examine it as a basis for action. The most impor-

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tant preparation is intellectual; and if the things we might wish to do involve human and material prerequisites, and we can foresee to some extent what they are, we can begin to provide them. If in addition the likely success of any scheme would depend on some prior understanding, formal or informal, tacit or explicit, vague or precise, that we had worked out with our enemies, we should think about the best way to concert with them in advance at least on the kinds of communication that we might need for a sudden negotiation, and on some of the concepts and ideas that it would be good for us to share in the event we had to reach agreement on a crash scheme in a hurry. This is a tall order, and implies research within our own government, and, ultimately, some kind of formal or informal communication with the Russians.

There is then the question of what we might begin to do now, in co-operation with the Russians, to prepare for some of these eventualities, and particularly for those eventualities that can bear to be acknowledged and talked about. I suggest that we consider the general idea of two versatile, flexible, adaptable observation and communication forces, one for each side and each located in the other's country, whose main function is to be available to meet whatever demands are placed on them in a crisis—recognizing that in a crisis improvisation will be needed, and that improvisation may be enormously facilitated by the instant availability of some adaptable resources or ingredients physically located near the points on the earth where they will be required.[8]

In trying to imagine what would go into these versatile emergency forces, there are at least three lines of inquiry that may be helpful. One is to think about some of the *tasks* they might be called on to perform in an emergency. A second is to think about the *capabilities* they need, whatever their tasks may be. And a third is to think, in a practical way, about what they can be doing meanwhile, about what current excuses there are for bringing them into existence, about the tasks they could be used on *in the interim* for purposes of practice and as a means of supplementing the justification for their existence.

The last point is a sufficiently important one to deserve a moment's emphasis. If anything makes a force "adaptable," "resourceful," "versatile," and so forth, it is probably exercise—doing novel jobs, meeting

[8] There is a prerequisite that, if not now provided, should come at the head of this proposal. It is that facilities and arrangements, of a mobile and versatile sort, for communication between the Soviet and American governments be worked out and in some way concerted on, and that each side have adequate communication and other arrangements within its own government and military services to make sudden negotiation possible in the circumstances that would surround a crisis of this sort.

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unforeseen situations, being continually tested and, most important of all, doing this as serious work and not in the form of make believe. Any inspection-observation-communication force that might be established with a view to its potential usefulness in unforeseeable contingencies should if possible have operating functions during the interim. Thus an important criterion, perhaps the most important in thinking about the creation of resourceful facilities, is what is currently going on, or can be initiated, that would yield as a by-product adaptable teams and facilities so located as to be useful in an emergency.

For example, in the event that there is some formal agreement on nuclear-test suspension or a jointly monitored nuclear-test program, there will be required teams of observers with equipment for inspection and for communication home, of a kind that could be exploited in an emergency. Their location may be useful; some of their communication equipment may be useful; the transportation they have available may be useful; their mobility, their knowledge of the terrain, and the operating procedures they will have worked out for themselves and with the host country could be enormously helpful if they were called on to do something of an analogous sort in the approximate area where they were. Thus one promising line of approach is to inquire how we can design and deploy and operate our nuclear-test surveillance forces, and give them experience, and test their competence, and increase their resourcefulness, with the deliberate idea that they may, in unforeseen contingencies, be the best means we have for letting home governments see with their own eyes certain things that the host government may want them to see.

Take an example. To avoid technical or classified-information difficulties, consider a non-military aspect of an effort by the Russians to reassure us that they were not about to attack us, on an occasion when we thought (or they thought that we thought) that they might be about to. Suppose they wanted to claim (among other things) that they were not evacuating cities. How would we substantiate this claim?

The idea is that they might, in case of our attack, save lives by getting people out of the target area, particularly if fall-out protection were available in the countryside; so the people still in cities and unable to get out before our attack amount to "hostages" in our hands. Depending on the city, on whether the city would be attacked by aircraft or missiles, and so forth, the time for evacuation might be anywhere from a fraction of an hour to a few hours. And we would like to know, to within the nearest fifteen minutes, whether or not the Russians had begun to evacuate most of their cities.

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They say they have not; how do we find out? To make it interesting, suppose that the crisis is one in which both sides have taken security measures and ordinary communication is cut off between the United States and various newspaper correspondents and officials in Russia. In Moscow it may be only necessary for somebody in the Embassy to look out the window; but even he will not necessarily see all of Moscow, nor under the circumstances would he necessarily be permitted to travel around Moscow in a special car equipped with its own electric generator and transmitting equipment. Nor could he necessarily recognize evacuation if he saw a sample of it, given the confusion of the crisis already postulated. It may take some analysis, and advance thinking, to discern what is going on. Outside of Moscow, we might not have, on thirty-minute availability, observers who could authentically report reliable information about the evacuation of Soviet cities. But suppose we had mobile observers available at widely dispersed spots in Russia, whose loyalty and reliability to the United States were beyond question, who could communicate authentically to us, identifying themselves beyond question through cryptographic or other devices, who could in fact proceed to various Soviet cities and observe what was going on and let us know within a very few minutes. In that case, if the Russians in fact were not evacuating their cities and badly wanted us to know that they were not, they could take advantage of the resources we had available in Russia by asking us to dispatch our people to cities of our choice, providing our observers with police escort, helicopters or the right to use their own, and anything else that would facilitate the job.

(This illustration, incidentally, may be a good example of a principle that can often be applied to positive-evidence schemes—to schemes where there is a presumption that the enemy will comply or that his failure to comply settles the question—namely, the use of random sampling. Ordinary probability theory suggests that if the Russians tell us that they are not evacuating any of their cities, and out of 200 cities that we might be interested in we can select a dozen at random, and if we find that of the dozen we examine none shows signs of evacuation, the odds are exceedingly small that the Russians are evacuating more than an insignificant number of their cities; and the risks to the Russians of cheating are high.)

So much for the example, which the reader can elaborate from here as well as I. The example does help to identify a few of the characteristics that the force should have. Most important of all is that these versatile observers be able to establish *communication* with their own governments in ways that are quick and reliable, and in ways that are unques-

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tionably authentic. They must, in other words, solve the problem of identifying themselves so that the enemy cannot intercept the messages and change them, or physically commandeer the facilities, without its becoming evident back home that something is amiss. (Whether the observers require privacy of communication—i.e., cryptographic facilities—is a different question, to which the answer would depend on the job at hand.)

What they need by way of communication equipment—their own generators or access to electric power, transmitters, receivers, relay stations, and all that—is an interesting technical question, of which a part concerns the division of responsibility between themselves and their hosts. Probably, the more opportunity there is during normal times for these observers to simulate, in co-operation with their hosts, the kinds of things they would do in a crisis—or, better still, to engage in actual jobs that are similar to what they might be called on to do in a crisis—the more opportunity there would be to work out routines and procedures and methods of co-ordination so that they could utilize the facilities of the host country. If instead there is little for them to do but sit in their shacks under blackout waiting for the great moment, they may have to rely more on working out procedures for self-contained and independent communication than on trying to improvise sudden collaboration with the host country at a critical moment.

In addition to communication, *mobility* is a prerequisite. It has several dimensions. One is the ability to move sizable distances fast, navigating and avoiding hindrances. Another is being located initially at strategic points, dispersed to keep portions of the force within quick travel time to the places where they might be demanded. A third dimension is fine-grain mobility—the ability to move about within a city, to pass check points, to avoid molestation, and to enjoy immunity—in short, to have the equivalent of police protection and political authority, immunity to language barriers and other nuisances, and good guidance, road maps, knowledge of vantage points and access to them, and whatever else is required. Additionally they need practice—practice not only in the functioning of their own equipment and in their own capabilities to navigate, but in co-ordinating with their hosts, in overcoming obstacles and nuisances, in recognizing the kinds of occurrences that are "normal" so that they can be distinguished from abnormal obstructions on those occasions when abnormal obstructions might have a strategic interpretation.

In looking about for other jobs that observation teams might perform, and that would consequently be an excuse for such teams and an

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opportunity to experiment with them, some of the suggestions for monitoring space activity may become relevant. Even a rather innocuous program for inviting each other's observers to attend launchings, particularly those involved in programs of a more scientific and less military sort, might provide an activity at which observation and communication techniques could be tested and developed. Considering, for example, how much the Russians can observe in this country without the help of formal invitations from our military establishment, there might not be a great deal to lose in inviting them to places like Cape Canaveral from time to time. So if we thought it might someday be useful to have in this country some Russian observers of undoubted loyalty to the USSR whom we could call on to help Khrushchev see with his own eyes something that we wanted him to see, there may be several activities that are not so terribly sensitive or dramatic that they would commit us too much, and that would give us a chance to see just how hard it might be, on a few minutes' notice, to get a Russian to a spot 1,000 miles from Washington to see something significant, establish an authentic line of communication home, and persuade his own government that he had seen it. A little practice may go a long way, at least in overcoming such simple things as language difficulties, traffic regulations, how to find the Russians on short notice, means of communication, and even the personal and emotional problems that bear on such questions as the size of a team and the kinds of escorts they need.

Perhaps the newly initiated agreement on the status of Antarctica provides, under interestingly rigorous climatic conditions, some opportunities for seeing what the problems are in looking over an enemy installation, at the enemy's invitation, and reporting home what is seen.

SOME RESERVATIONS

It may be difficult to persuade a reader that the concept is valid and relevant, and nearly impossible to persuade him that there is anything to be done about it. Beyond that, it has to be admitted that even if something can be done, it is by no means obvious that we and the Russians both have an interest in it, or even that we do whether the Russians do or not. It may go without saying, for most of us, that if drastic disarmament should ever become the only alternative to imminent war, and the war that is imminent looks pretty unpromising, a scheme to facilitate disarmament efforts would be all to the good. But there are at least two kinds of problems that reduce the advantages of such a scheme and that have to be acknowledged even if we decide on reflection that they are not of controlling importance.

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One is that measures to avert war and to facilitate disarmament, even measures to avert accidental war, may reduce the potency of some of our deterrent threats, may reduce the Russians' fears of the consequences of their own aggressive actions, may remove some of the inhibitions on limited war by suggesting that the likelihood of explosion into bigger war is not as serious as it might have been. An important deterrent to Soviet aggression may well be the fear of "accidental war," an unpremeditated war, a war that does not begin with a cold-blooded determination by the United States to retaliate massively but rather comes out of the complex interaction of the fears and commitments of both sides—a war that results from false alarm, panic, mischief, human error, or a dynamic process of decisions whose consequences cannot be entirely foretold even by those who make them.[4] Reduce the fear of all-out war, including the fear of inadvertent war—perhaps *especially* the fear of inadvertent war—and an important deterrent to Soviet or Chinese aggression may be gone. Provide facilities for avoiding war at the eleventh hour and the Soviets may enjoy increased confidence that, whatever they do beforehand, they can always be saved at the eleventh hour and that the eleventh hour will be recognizable when it comes. Establish procedures and facilities that suggest that, when we might have launched all-out war, we will launch all-out negotiations instead, and the Russians may enjoy a new sense of immunity to American retaliation.

These are reservations that attach to any of the so-called "measures to safeguard against surprise attack," and that may similarly apply to measures to forestall general war at the last minute. How important they are depends on whether one is mainly concerned with the consequences of general war and the probability that it will occur, or with the need to intimidate and inhibit and discipline an aggressive enemy in circumstances short of total war.

The second sort of considerations that give one pause are of a lesser order. A flexible and adaptable observation system of the kind hinted at so sketchily here could be abused if one side or the other wanted to abuse it. One can feign alarm and demand reassurance as a means of using an observation force to get information not intended under the scheme, either information about how the enemy responds to dramatic events or just snapshot information about his posture that might be obtained by putting an observation force in action. The enemy can "spoof"; he can engage in spectacular actions that activate the system and play on our nerves but that, because of the system, are

[4] For an elaboration of this point, see T. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, ch. 8, "The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance."

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less risky than they might have been. He can accuse us of abusing the system for purposes of espionage. It is even conceivable that if we had our own trusted observers in Soviet territory who could see things that we knew existed but preferred not to acknowledge, we would find it more difficult not to acknowledge them. (If, for example, either side occasionally intruded into the other's territory and pretended not to, or if either liked to accuse the other of engaging in activities whose occurrence would be embarrassing to the other, it might be difficult or equally embarrassing to continue this once one's own observers could be called on to witness the truth.) These are in addition to all the other diplomatic and propaganda dangers that can readily be imagined.

HOW TO GET STARTED

If it is decided that there is something to this idea and that the dangers are outweighed by the advantages, and that there may be programs of action that allow us to give a stand-by scheme some exercise, the immediate question is how to open up the subject with the Russians and how to formulate the problem.

One possibility is to shift our approach to "safeguards against surprise attack." There are, broadly speaking, two different aspects to the surprise attack problem. One is premeditated surprise attack; the other is pre-emptive attack, false alarm, accidental war, and the like. The two are tied together, but in a rough way the distinction can be made. If one makes the distinction, it looks as though discussions and negotiations with the Russians on the subject of surprise-attack schemes have so far been oriented, at least implicitly, toward the problem of premeditated attack. I say "implicitly" because there has been no explicit agenda or agreement on the point; but what has been discussed seems to imply long-term surveillance rather than schemes to cope with crises. And the United States has generally deprecated discussion of "accidental war."

I imagine that some of our reluctance to talk to the Russians about measures to forestall "accidental war" stems from our sensitivity to public opinion, particularly opinion abroad, and an unwillingness to acknowledge that there could be any basis for the Soviet contention that "accidental war" (however defined) is a real possibility. But that phase of our public relations may be past, and maybe we need not be quite so defensive about it. Furthermore, there are special difficulties in discussing measures to safeguard against premeditated surprise attack; it must be a serious embarrassment to both sides to talk about the kinds of vulnerabilities they are most preoccupied with. The very information needed to make progress is the most sensitive kind.

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One might say that the *presumption of mutual interest* is stronger in the prevention of unpremeditated war (the so-called "accidental war") and that one may possibly discuss the subject without getting too close to the touchy question of just where he is most vulnerable and just what kind of surprise he would least like his enemy to engage in.

If, then, we acknowledge that unpremeditated war, or inadvertent war, or accidental war, or war resulting from a crisis of some sort is a significant possibility, and that the existence of a premium on striking first aggravates the possibility, we can assimilate this possibility to the general problem of surprise attack; and there may be a basis for discussing fairly openly just what kinds of joint measures could be taken to reduce misunderstanding in those cases where war caused by misunderstanding is imminent. It may be possible to begin with a list of reasonably innocuous hypothetical occurrences that could lead to a misunderstanding of each other's strategic intentions, and to discuss the kinds of measures that might lead to mutual reassurance and improved understanding.[5]

If, to take an example, there were no propaganda disadvantages in adopting the hypothetical premise that an accidental nuclear-weapon detonation might occur somewhere on the face of the earth, and specifically in the United States or the USSR, it might be a useful exercise to think with the Russians about the way that each of us could reassure the other that we were not misinterpreting the event as the harbinger of general war, and were not so afraid of the other's misinterpretation as to feel obliged to initiate a pre-emptive attack. (Perhaps events blamable on mischievous third parties would be a noncommittal way to begin discussions.) We could at least discuss such simple questions as how to establish a line of communication between Washington and Moscow, and how to get inspectors not only to the scene of the accident but to vantage points where they could see that the nation was calm rather than frenzied and that strategic forces were not being readied for attack.

At least it is worth thinking about.

[5] The arms-control significance of such communication with the enemy is discussed further in T. C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," *Dædalus* (Fall 1960), pp. 892-913.

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SWORDS AND PLOUGHSHARES

The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force

By DANIEL LERNER and RICHARD D. ROBINSON

MILITARY predominance in public life has a long and strong tradition in Turkey. Lybyer has told us: "The Ottoman government had been an army before it was anything else. . . . in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men."[1] And Gibb quotes el-Gazali, at the end of the eleventh century: "Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the caliph."[2]

These themes are still resonant when one considers the founding of the Turkish Republic. The "one body of men" who seized and shaped the new republican power was a military body. The loyalty of this elite, as of the larger populace, was given to the Gazi—the triumphant military commander. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was, one recalls, the only Turkish officer to emerge untainted by defeat throughout the disastrous period that began with the Balkan wars and ended with the Greek invasion. It was the military corps that named, and military prestige that sustained, the Leader—once a Sultan-Caliph, now a President.

Once installed, however, Ataturk moved in a radically new direction. After the peace was signed in 1923, he obliged the leaders of the revolutionary government to divest themselves of military office. His own official portrait was taken in white tie and tails, rather than military regalia. The man's uncanny feel for the vivid symbol revealed, in this case, a determination to civilianize the Turkish Republic that cut wide and deep.

Ataturk's position on this point was made abundantly clear as early as 1909 when he, along with Ismet Inonu (his successor as President and confidant throughout), argued vigorously in the Committee of Union and Progress against the direct participation of army officers in political affairs. At the annual party meeting in Salonika in the summer of 1909, Ataturk declared: "As long as officers remain in the Party we shall neither build a strong Party nor a strong Army. In the 3rd Army

[1] A. H. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge, Mass., 1913, pp. 90-91.

[2] H. A. R. Gibb and H. L. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, London, 1950, p. 31.

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most of the officers are also members of the Party and the 3rd Army cannot be called first class. Furthermore, the Party receiving its strength from the Army will never appeal to the nation. Let us resolve here and now that all officers wishing to remain in the Party must resign from the Army. We must also adopt a law forbidding all future officers having political affiliations. . . ."[3] On another occasion, that same year, Ataturk commented publicly, "To be victorious in the internal affairs of a country is due less to an army than to the successful offices of a government."[4] Shortly thereafter, both Ataturk and Inonu resigned from the party and, from 1909 to 1919, both men devoted themselves exclusively to military activity.

This policy of "civilianization" of administration, though not proclaimed explicitly as one of the six cardinal principles of the Republic, was nonetheless firmly imbedded in the Turkish Constitution of 1923, Article 40 of which clearly gave charge of the army to the Grand National Assembly and, as its representative, to the President. Also, it was declared unconstitutional for Assembly members to hold a second government office, presumably including army assignment. Likewise, the Constitution forbade the government to declare martial law for a period longer than a month without specific Assembly approval. The chief architects of the 1923 Constitution were Ataturk and Inonu.

In October 1924, anticipating an alleged military plot against his political authority, Ataturk requested all of his chief military commanders to resign their Assembly seats. He observed: "I have come to the conclusion that, for the maintenance of army discipline in required measure for the exercise of command, it is incompatible that commanders should at the same time be deputies."[5] Although the chief of the general staff was excluded in 1924 from the cabinet, of which he had been a member since its inception in 1920, he was nonetheless still answerable only to the President of the Republic. This situation continued up to the end of 1943 when, apparently in anticipation of Marshal Fevzi Cakmak's retirement, the army was placed more directly under full civilian control by making the general staff chief answerable to the cabinet and prime minister. Later, in 1949, a Supreme Council of National Defense was formed, on which sat several civilian cabinet

[3] Quoted in I. Orga, *Phoenix Ascendant*, London, 1958, p. 38. See also "Ataturk," *Islam Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul, Ministry of Education Publishing House, 1940, p. 271; and L. V. Thomas, "The Political Leader: Ataturk: A Case in Point?" a paper presented to a conference on "The Near East, Social Dynamics and a Cultural Setting," sponsored by the Committee on the Near and Middle East, Social Science Research Council, at Princeton University, October 1952, p. 5 (typewritten).

[4] Orga, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

[5] Mustafa Kemal, *Speech of October 1927*, Leipzig, 1929, p. 692.

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ministers. This organ has in part balanced the power of the general staff.[6] The election laws of Turkey now go so far as to disfranchise all military officers, soldiers, military students, and members of the police force. They may not vote in any election, or enter as candidates, or be politically active.[7]

In retrospect, it is quite evident that Ataturk deliberately attempted to fence the military off from active political life as soon as its political support was no longer essential to his power. Even the two high-ranking army officers who, following Ataturk's 1924 edict, had resigned their military offices to retain Assembly seats were soon deliberately discredited politically by Ataturk.

In short, Ataturk undermined the central proposition of the classic Persian *Mirror for Princes* literature, which had been domesticated in the Ottoman imperium over the course of centuries. Gibb has formulated this proposition concisely: "The prime object of the ruler's munificence must be his army: 'the king's enemy is his treasury and his friend is the army; when one is strong, the other is weak.' " Flying in the face of this ancient wisdom, Ataturk permitted the military institution to decline in relation to civilian power and prestige. Instead, he made the treasury his ally, or at least his preoccupation. As early as 1923 he is quoted as declaring that the great victory won by Turkish arms was not enough to achieve real liberation; the victory had only provided a strong foundation for future victories, victories in science and economics.[8] Again and again he reiterated this thesis.

The maintenance of civilian supremacy in republican Turkey has been a historical fact of the first order. In the Arab lands of the Middle East, as throughout the underdeveloped world, military take-over has been a regular feature of the postwar scene. Turkey's nearest non-Arab neighbors—Greece in the west, Iran in the east—passed through their most severe postwar crises by means of the military *coup d'état*. Only in the Turkish Republic had there been no military coup, nor indeed any effective military challenge to civilian supremacy. The coup of May 1960 was the first significant break with the Ataturk tradition.

Apparently on only two occasions had there been military plots directed against the civilian government of republican Turkey. Regarding both occasions the picture is very unclear. First, there was the 1926 plot against Ataturk's life, a plot in which at least some military officers were probably implicated. Several high-ranking officers were

[6] See Law No. 5398, May 30, 1949.
[7] Article 8, Election Law of 1946; Article 9, Election Law of 1950.
[8] *Ataturk Diyor Ki* [Ataturk Speaks], Istanbul, Varlik Yayinlari, 1951, p. 86.

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arrested, including the two generals who had refused in 1924 to resign from the National Assembly as Kemal had demanded and instead chose to resign from their military duties. Both generals were released shortly after their arrest but not before their political ruin. Was this merely a clever attempt to discredit these politically ambitious officers still further? A third officer, a colonel who had been a military aide-de-camp to Ataturk, went to the gallows. Not until 1957 was there again any hint of a military plot against the civilian government—in this case, an alleged attempt to establish a secret organization within the army to incite revolt against the regime. Nine army officers were arrested—three colonels, three majors, and three captains. All, however, were either released or acquitted, with the exception of one major, who was given a two-year prison sentence. Quite obviously, the authorities did not take the matter very seriously.[9]

To explain this unique separation of the political and military requires a comprehensive view of the process which has governed civil-military relations in the Turkish Republic. Although cast in declarative form, our statements have the character of hypotheses. Civilian supremacy had been maintained in Turkey because the governing code of the Turkish Republic was founded upon the *mystique* of civilian supremacy (which gained the force of a tradition under two civilian presidents who were also the acknowledged military leaders). That *mystique* had been tolerably well sustained by its visible results; three generations of Turks had acquired values and institutions that flourished better under civilian than military control. In short, by contrast with many other modernizing societies, the military sector in Turkey had been contained because the civilian sector had been relatively successful and the military had nothing better to offer. Since Ataturk and Inonu were the ranking military figures of their day, military interests were well represented at the highest administrative and political level. At the same time, both men were convinced personally of the necessity of civilian supremacy, and they acted consistently on that conviction.

Our evaluation of Turkish developments is, we realize, a direct challenge to those observers who have, in recent years, pointed out the serious deficiencies of the republican regime in Turkey. These deficiencies were real, and the complaints were justified, by American standards or by performance standards based on optimum rationality. The Turks had obviously not attained American standards of perform-

[9] *Cumhuryet* (Istanbul), November 26, 1958.

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ance. Nor had they achieved optimum rationality in policy and practice. *Who has?*

The question is neither impertinent nor irrelevant. Another, perhaps more appropriate, standard by which to judge the Turkish performance is the distance traveled from the starting level toward the level of national aspiration. Viewed in the context of the underdeveloped world today, and particularly by contrast with its Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey's performance had been relatively good—perhaps even absolutely good. Despite obvious problems, Turkey had met the complex requirements for speeding the tempo of social change while keeping the balance of social equilibrium—that is, for promoting individual mobility while maintaining social stability. How long Turkey can now continue to do so—under any regime—is another matter, particularly in the face of speeding urbanization. But let us return to a more direct consideration of the problem of civil-military relations. We note simply the relative success of civilian leadership in controlling, *while utilizing*, military personnel and resources.

Traditional society in Turkey had been, prior to the Republic, governed by a long-established coalition between the main social orders which constituted the elite—i.e., the court, the clergy, the military. The passing of traditional society began with the crumbling of the court—both the monarchy and its supporting "bureaucracy," the upper echelons of which consisted of an educated class liberated by its landowning wealth for full-time participation in affairs of state. As the court crumbled, the contest for power passed among rivalrous "men of the pen." The learned clergy were a failing force, though in a theocracy they provided the cloak of legitimacy for government and could do much to alienate popular loyalty from any regime not to their liking. While they maintained a strong hold over older people in the rural hinterland, they failed to make effective contact with the newer, younger intelligentsia at the urban centers, many of whom were (or became) young officers infected by Western technology and concepts. As the latter group was relatively small until the end of the nineteenth century, the exercise of power passed, largely by default, to the "civil service"—the administrative institution which often takes transitory control over the affairs of state in periods of decay.

Locked in contest was the "secular intelligentsia," which had not prospered nearly so well under the traditional regime. These included the "free professions"—composed of teachers, students, journalists, engineers, doctors, and the full array of quasi-intellectual roles of a predominantly secular nature. These competing segments of the intelli-

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gentsia were engaged in a combat without issue—neither side being capable of sustained governance. The "civil service" was typically too limited by its narrow administrative perspective; the "free professions" were typically too ineffectual by reason of their visionary ideologizing. Neither could claim ultimate authority in a state in which the governing power rested upon religious justification.

When the court crumbles and the intelligentsia is incapacitated, only the "men of the sword" remain capable of taking over political control. For many years in Ottoman Turkey the military had been inactivated by corruption, and by division between the traditionalists and the modernists within its leadership. When these problems were resolved, the "men of the sword" moved into political control. W. Z. Laqueur, contrasting the numerous instances of recent military take-over in the Arab countries with that guided by Ataturk, indicates how short the military tether may be: "Military leadership [referring to Egypt and Syria] thus meant a step forward—but only one and no more. Having forced the old rulers to resign, the new government proved incapable of giving the country the lead which Kemal Ataturk had given Turkey in the early 1920's. The perpetuation of the military rule in the absence of such a lead was tantamount to stagnation, to preoccupation with foreign policy. Absolute rule began to show its corrosive effect on the new rulers, and ever-recurring purges of the officer corps, including the original group of conspirators, caused a rift with the army. It is a process frequently described in the annals of history."[10]

What is the case for Turkish exceptionalism? Why did the Turkish military, having acquired power in the Republic, abjure the role of a military regime? Why had the Turkish military, since then, not been tempted into the alternate course of an alliance between military power and the secular intelligentsia (the modern "revolutionary" version of the classic alliance between men of the sword and men of the pen)? There was, in Turkey, a tradition of such efforts. Writing of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, L. V. Thomas tells us that "When younger officers of this type decided to join forces with westernizing true Ottoman civilian intellectuals and with certain 'minority' (millet) leaders of a like mind, Abdul-Hamid's day was done."[11] But the Young Turk Revolution was short-lived. Once the Ruling Institution was deposed, the incoherent ideology of this coalition, and its shallow pro-

[10] W. Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, New York, 1956, p. 22.

[11] L. V. Thomas and R. N. Frye, *The United States and Turkey and Iran*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 53.

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graming of social change, quickly became apparent. The military were not trained to think in terms of practical application of their high-flown ideas. With power came responsibility—and the coalition collapsed in the debacle of World War I.

Ataturk formed no coalition with the intelligentsia. In any case, they came to his side, as Thomas points out, *after* the seizure of power. Having become boss without their support, he was subsequently free to boss them without the heavy freight of "campaign promises." He used them as he needed them—mainly in support of his own powerful thesis that a modern, participant society operates by the steady enlargement of the margins of reward and responsibility among its citizenry. This is Ataturk's claim to genius as the first planner of social-economic development in contemporary terms. The corollary had to be, if Ataturk's vision was to remain effective, a society based on civilian supremacy in a secular state. In Ataturk's vision both the military and the intelligentsia had a role to play, but their role was subordinate to his twin concepts of populism and etatism. Central political control was essential to regulate institutional innovation—so that changes would occur fast enough, but not so fast that social mobility would undermine political stability. The Kemalist polity was pragmatic. Each policy and program was evaluated by what the ruling elite conceived to be the public welfare, not according to some *a priori* religious doctrine or political ideology.

How did the army fit into this picture of the Turkish Republic? In the first instance, the army was the vehicle that had brought Ataturk to power.[12] We recall that twelve of the seventeen Ottoman Turkish commanders of World War I became committed to the cause of the Turkish nationalists, and only two remained with the Sultan until the end of his government. But, curiously, Ataturk did not use the army as a major innovating force, after achieving personal power, despite the historic role of the Ottoman army in this direction.

Under the Ottoman Empire, as the vigor of the Ruling Institution waned, the military corps had taken a large hand in modernization of knowledge and institutional innovations. A case in point was the history of the Turkish printing press. Whereas the minority millets (self-governing non-Moslem communities)—Greek, Armenian, Jewish—had introduced their own printing presses into Turkey as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a proper Turkish press was not installed until 1728. During the period of continuous and disastrous

[12] D. A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics*, XI, No. 4 (July 1959), p. 533.

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wars which followed, this press lapsed into disuse. Not until 1784 did Selim III, searching for ways to rehabilitate his declining domains, re-establish a Turkish press. It was used not for spreading popular enlightenment, as among the millets, but for stimulating new thoughts and new ways among the enfeebled elites. Creasy tells us that the revived press specialized in treatises of science and technology relevant for the military corps: "Many European works on tactics and fortifications were translated from the French and published by the Sultan's orders, under the inspection of the Turkish mathematician, Abdurrahim Effendi."[13] Prior to 1909, even Ataturk translated some military treatises from the French.[14]

When Ataturk came to power in 1923, he must have realized, as a military man, that the military victory he had won was only a temporary reprieve. Turkey occupied a piece of real estate coveted by the great powers. To fill the Turkish power vacuum, and to do so before the great powers once again moved against Turkey, would require a total revolution in a relatively short period of time. A modern military establishment was clearly impossible without modern science and industry. These, in turn, were clearly impossible without a transformed political and social system which would permit the people of Turkey to realize more fully their human potential. Illiteracy, debilitating disease, religious dogma and fatalism, subordination of women—all of these had to go. And so the process of dramatic reform in all sectors of Turkish life was set in motion, each individual move being carefully timed and designed to take full advantage of favorable turns of events. Insight, inscrutability, and a sense of timing were among Ataturk's great assets as a radical planner.

Meanwhile, Ataturk carefully isolated the military command from direct involvement in partisan politics. It was not mere happenstance that of the thirty-five men who served in the Nationalist cabinets from 1920 to 1923, only nine were professional military officers, either active or retired (excluding those who had separated from the services and taken up civilian careers).[15] Even that part of the military forces used for rural policing purposes, the Gendarmerie, was placed under direct civilian control within the Ministry of Interior. Officers and personnel of this special corps, although still wearing the Turkish army uniform, were under general staff command only for routine administrative

[13] E. S. Creasy, *Turkey*, New York, 1906, p. 377.
[14] *Ataturk'un Askerligi Dair Eserleri* [Ataturk's Military Writings], Ankara, Is Bankasi, 1959.
[15] Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 535.

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purposes. Within the municipalities, law and order were maintained by a civilian police force which had no direct relationship with the army and was commanded by a separate branch of the Ministry of Interior. Later, a general law was enacted which forbade all private societies based on religion, race, family, region, and social or economic class. Undoubtedly, a military political organization would have been illegal under the general terms of this legislation, although this type of association was not specifically named.

Realizing that the independence and national power of Turkey were based primarily on a sustained social, political, and economic evolution, and that the country was not immediately threatened from without, the leadership diverted relatively little of its total effort to a revamping and modernizing of the military forces during this early period. That portion of the general budget allocated to national defense fell from roughly 40 per cent in 1926 to about 28 per cent in the early 1930's. It has been estimated that as late as 1932 the size of the Turkish army was little greater than that existing in 1922 (78,000 men). It was not until 1939 and 1940 that the Turks mobilized a substantially greater force, possibly something in the neighborhood of 800,000. Also in 1939, when the threat of World War II became a reality, military budgets were again stepped up. The national defense portion then rose to 46 per cent and, in 1940, to 56 per cent, at which high level it remained during the war years. Following the war in 1946, the percentage was cut back to about 33 per cent.[16] But by this time the promise of large-scale American military assistance was very much in the air. Throughout the period, however, the army rested upon non-professional soldiers drafted for a limited time from civilian life. Only the officers and some non-commissioned officers were professional.

Although isolated from partisan politics and generally de-emphasized, the army remained an important force in at least two respects. First, economic development plans, especially during the 1930's, were shaped in part by military factors, sometimes at the expense of maximum economic return. Second, the military forces constituted a source of skills and facilities. In times of emergency, military commanders occasionally took over civilian administrative functions—notably in the Kurdish area after the uprisings in 1925 and 1930, and in Istanbul during World War II and the anti-Greek riot of 1955.

[16] Figures are taken from *Mali Istatistikler* [Financial Statistics], Ankara, Basbakanlik Istatistik Genel Muduru, 1947, and *Commentary on the 1950 National Budget by the Ministry of Finance*, trans. from the Turkish by the Economic Cooperation Administration Special Mission to Turkey, Ankara, 1950.

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Accordingly, many retired army officers were elected to the Assembly or named to high administrative posts during these years. But, as D. A. Rustow points out, "the proportion of them in public life has diminished steadily since the War of Independence." About one-sixth of the Assembly in 1920 was of military origin, about one-eighth in 1943, one-ninth in 1946, one-twentieth in 1950 and 1954, one-twenty-fifth in 1958.[17] On Rustow's calculations, from the founding of the Republic up to 1955, "men of military background have served as President of the Republic (17 years[18]), Prime Minister (16½ years), Minister of Defense (16½ years), of Public Works (15 years), of Communications (9 years), and in other cabinet posts." Rustow observes that the first cabinet including no officers was that of Hasan Saka in 1948.[19] In addition, many of the provincial governors—the *valis*—were men of professional military origin. In other words, the civilian government did not hesitate to tap the administrative talents developed by the military, but only after the individuals concerned had divested themselves of their military identity.

Nonetheless, as the first Cold War decade opened in 1948, the innovating function which had characterized the nineteenth-century Ottoman officer corps had all but disappeared from the Turkish military. This change was a product of (1) an absence of serious external challenge to the army, (2) the deliberate isolation of the military organization from political activity, (3) successful innovation by the civilian elements, (4) a deliberate de-emphasis of military development by the civilian leadership, and (5) the growth of a military elite based on seniority rather than demonstrated ability. In 1948, the army was still horse-drawn, equipped with World War I weapons, ill-trained, poorly fed, and inadequately clothed. It was no longer the *avant-garde* of modernization as it had been in Ottoman times. Nor was it now a channel of upward mobility around a frozen civilian elite. Civilians were clearly in a position of unchallenged supremacy, politically and technologically, and it was in the civilian hierarchy that ability was most clearly recognized as a basis for promotion and power. Ataturk deliberately appealed to younger men, thereby building an identification between the careers of the more dynamic younger elements and his

[17] Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 550; see also the *Album* for 1950, 1954, and 1958, published by the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. An article entitled "Military Deputies in the Assembly," in *Halkci* (Ankara), February 3, 1955, gives short biographies of the fifteen retired military men sitting in the Tenth Assembly. Two of these had also pursued civilian careers in law and government administration.

[18] Rustow must mean 27—Ataturk from 1923 to 1938, Inonu from 1938 to 1950.

[19] Rustow, *op.cit.*, p. 530.

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civilian administration. The military hierarchy froze and went into suspended animation; the civilian hierarchy opened up and led the way to innovation.

Indeed, by 1948, the Turkish military forces were so steeped in tradition that any change was difficult to introduce without reorganizing and remanning the officer corps. Organized along rigid, Prussian-like caste lines, the forces had no personnel policy; rarely were men assigned to tasks on the basis of ability. All high-school and college graduates, other than members of certain ethnic minority groups, could become officers without difficulty, but enlisted men, regardless of proven capacity, could not. Many thousands of soldiers were used as family servants by the officer corps—one instance of the vast amount of military manpower that was wasted.[20] The young Ataturks of the 1923-1948 period would probably not have been attracted to this army.

Relatively low intellectual quality is often associated with a lack of social mobility. A social structure with low performance standards can afford to base recruitment and promotion on status rather than merit. As performance standards are raised, traditional social barriers break down and the key functions go to the men who can do them best, regardless of their social stigmata. In this sense, the American aid program provided a stimulus needed for the revival of the Turkish military corps. With American military aid came a new mission for the Turkish army, and the new concepts and methods needed to fulfill this mission. The impact of this aid on the operational level was expressed by an American military adviser in 1949: "The difficulty is that the men are conscriptees, and the most complicated piece of machinery they may have seen before coming into the service is a wooden stick plough. They hardly know the difference between a hammer and a screwdriver. . . . The Turkish Army will have a tough time keeping the equipment going which we have given it."[21] A further difficulty was the opposition by some older officers to the reorganization and retraining of the military establishment. These officers may have been acquainted with modern military machines from a distance, but few were competent in their use. Hence, modern technical training implied a threat to their leadership.

[20] See R. D. Robinson, "American Military Aid Program," New York, Institute of Current World Affairs, November 15, 1948; *idem*, "Impact of American Military and Economic Assistance Programs in Turkey," New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1956. For a graphic account of the relatively low level to which the army had fallen by World War II, see A. Humbaraci, *Middle East Indictment*, London, 1958, pp. 36-40.

[21] Robinson, "American Military Aid Program," *op.cit.*

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With the institution in 1948 of American military aid designed to implement the Truman Doctrine, the Turkish army found itself in the awkward position of having its generals receive instruction from American non-commissioned officers, who were, on the whole, as well or better paid and privileged. Halford Hoskins has given us a concise summary of the sequence of events set in motion at the beginning of 1948 by the delivery in Turkey of four large, modern submarines: "Some 350 Turkish naval officers and men were dispatched to the United States for technical training to enable them to take delivery of these and still other naval vessels. This was the commencement of a comprehensive program, aimed at the training, both in the United States and in centers established in Turkey, of thousands of Turkish officers and men in the latest American methods of land, sea and air warfare. The program was the more essential since an estimated 80% of the Turkish armed forces was composed of farm boys having no knowledge of mechanized equipment. From this time forward, shipments of military equipment, including training planes, attack bombers, tanks, heavy guns, and the many varieties of material necessary for their maintenance and operation, were scheduled to reach Turkey in a continuous stream, and in such quantities as could be employed effectively by the personnel that had undergone technical training. Although Turkish officials now and then complained that the supply of war equipment fell considerably short of the need, and presently cited this as an argument for the inclusion of Turkey in the Atlantic Pact, American military experts believe that the rate of supply at least equaled the Turkish rate of absorption."[22]

The main mission of the Turkish army was, of course, to provide an efficient force for national defense. To do this, however, as is suggested by the statement just quoted, the Turkish army had to undertake the modernization of the most substantial and significant sector of the Turkish population—its young, healthy males from the rural hinterlands, 700,000 of them. These men had to be taught the difference between a hammer and a screwdriver. They had to be taught how to use equipment of a type which they had never seen or heard of before. They had to learn how to participate in a modern military formation. Fortunately, this new mission coincided with a change in the Turkish political regime (resulting from the 1950 general election), which made possible a shake-up in the general staff and the consequent elimination

[22] H. L. Hoskins, *The Middle East*, New York, 1954, p. 37. See also press statement by Major General Horace L. McBride, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, Ankara, August 18, 1950.

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of some of the older and more conservative officers. The new regime owed no personal debts to the older senior officers. Turkey's participation in the Korean War also added to the general pressure for reorganization, for new types of training—in short, for modernization.

By 1952, the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) had constituted an array of "field training teams," one for each of the three Turkish army headquarters and for each aid-supported division, brigade, and regiment. Such teams were essentially advisory units, the word "inspection" never being used. The need for these teams was revealed by the fact that from 40 to 50 per cent of all vehicles supplied by American aid to Turkey were out of order. The reason was bad maintenance. ("Out of order" in this case did not mean merely "dead-lined" in the American sense; it often meant literally that the wheels would not turn.) By mid-1952, perhaps 90 per cent of the vehicles were again in operating condition.

How was the situation redressed? In part, by the direct intervention of the American field teams. Standard operating procedure required that if a team found something amiss in a Turkish unit—in respect either to its equipment or to its training—the unit commanding officer was "advised" on the spot what should be done. If he refused to conform, the officer was then told that the matter would be reported to Ankara. If he remained adamant, a report went to the Military Aid Mission headquarters in Ankara, where the matter was taken up with the designated members of the Turkish general staff. At the time, one American field team member declared: "Then we almost invariably get action." Turkish unit commanders knew this to be true and, as a result, co-operation on the unit level was reported to be excellent. By 1952 the change in political regime had made possible the designation of younger, more progressive officers who responded positively to efforts to conserve the machines being supplied Turkey under the aid program, even if it meant the active intervention of foreigners on the operational level. This maintenance crisis, plus the support of the Turkish general staff, gave considerable impetus to the Turkish military training program generally.[23] The need for vastly improved technical training had been made dramatically clear.

Out of this process emerged widespread recognition that Turkey's primary need was the rapid and steady increase of its "capacity for absorption"—this involving nothing less than the reshaping of the Turkish people and their perspectives on the world. The thousands of

[23] R. D. Robinson, "Americans in Turkey," letter to the Institute of Current World Affairs, New York, June 1952.

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young Turkish farm lads who went through the military technical training programs acquired more than a skill in the maintenance and operation of modern machinery. Many also acquired some degree of literacy and, along with it, the widening of outlook that comes with the acquisition of the three R's. They acquired new habits of dress, of cleanliness, of teamwork. In the most profound sense, they acquired a new personality.[24] Along with the physical and social mobility opened to them through the military training program, they acquired also the habits of *psychic mobility*. The military corps became, in this decade, a major agency of social change precisely because it spread among this key sector of the population a new sense of identity—and new skills and concepts as well as new machines. Young Turks from isolated villages now suddenly felt themselves to be part of the larger society. The connection between their private lives and public roles became vivid to them —and this sense of their new personality they diffused around them when they returned to their villages. In 1951, anthropologist Paul Stirling reported as follows: "The villagers today are conscious of their membership in the Turkish nation. . . . Under the Ottoman empire, the villagers thought not in terms of a nation, with a national territory, but of themselves as a group distinct from their neighbors on grounds of language or religion, or both. Whatever its origin, the present villagers are decidedly nationalistic; proud of Turkey's military prowess, interested in her mechanical achievements. . . . Undoubtedly, consciousness of being part of the whole nation is greatly strengthened by the compulsory term of military service which all the young men seem vastly to enjoy."[25]

By 1952, one could list eleven major changes that had been accomplished or at least incorporated into the thinking of the Turkish general staff:

(1) reduction of the Turkish army from an estimated 700,000 to 400,000;

(2) inauguration of service training schools and great expansion of technical training generally;[26]

[24] Based on interviews with Lt. Col. Leon D. Marsh, Classification Officer and Assistant G-1, TUSAG, Ankara, during January 1952.

[25] P. Stirling, "The Structure of Turkish Peasant Communities" (Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University, 1951; reproduced in Ankara by R. D. Robinson, mimeographed), p. 165.

[26] Shortly after the arrival of the American Military Aid Mission in 1947, a number of technical schools were established or greatly expanded, including schools designed to train technicians in naval electronics, naval ordnance and gunnery, mine warfare and sweeping, naval damage control and fire fighting, naval shipyard and industrial operations, submarines, anti-aircraft defense, army signal work, army medicine, army ordnance, infantry, artillery, army motor transport, army engineering, pilot training, radio communications, aeronautical mechanics, meteorology, aeronautical supply, and the operation of heavy highway equipment.

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(3) the training abroad of a significant number of officers and non-commissioned officers, many of whom would later become instructors;[27]

(4) institution of a testing and classification system as a basis for assignments;

(5) organization of a personnel section in the general staff and assignment of separate personnel officers to each major unit headquarters;

(6) reorganization of the Reserve Officers' Training School;

(7) requirement of a year's troop duty before admission to the Military Academy;

(8) reduction of the initial stint for non-commissioned officers;

(9) a new non-commissioned officers' law, making possible officer status for qualified NCO's;

(10) elimination of the use of soldiers as personal servants by officers; and

(11) much-improved living conditions for enlisted men.[28]

The first three items indicated a major and realistic reconsideration of Turkey's "capacity to absorb." Cutting the size of the army almost in half, while simultaneously improving and expanding technical training, bespoke a determination to do better by each man who passed through military training—a move toward making him a qualified modern soldier and, upon his return to civilian life, a qualified modern man. The third item likewise implied an accelerated transmission throughout Turkey not only of Western military and technical skills, but also of modern political and social concepts. These would be passed on to the ordinary soldier during the course of his training. The next four items were clearly designed to make superior training reach its payoff points by adequate methods of personnel selection and job classification. The last four items were important measures of democratization. While these changes were occurring, a couple of million men passed through their military training and a comparable number will do so during the next decade.

[27] No exact figures are available as to the number sent abroad, but as of early 1951 over 1,000 Turkish military personnel had been trained in American methods either in the United States or in Germany. (R. T. Hartman, *Uncle Sam in Turkey*, New York, Turkish Information Office, 1952, p. 14—a reprinting of articles published in the *Los Angeles Times* during September 1951.) Early in 1958, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that 300 Turkish jet pilots had been trained in Canada alone. (*Zafer* [Ankara], February 26, 1958.)

[28] Humbaraci, *op.cit.*, p. 39n, attributes the improvement of conditions in the Turkish army during the 1950's to a short spell of political liberalism and the experience of several thousand soldiers in Korea, where they had seen armies with very different standards, as well as to the influence of the U.S. Military Mission.

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Consider the impact upon these young men of their first exposure to the wider world outside their village, as they undergo training in this rapidly modernizing and democratizing army. Granted, as the result of a decade of both military and civilian training, it is no longer true that 80 per cent of the army's recruits are farm boys with no knowledge whatsoever of modern machinery. But the multiplier effect continues to operate, since 50 per cent or more of the recruits are still rural illiterates gaining their first exposure to a social institution operating in the modern style. Not only is this an army in which enlisted men might become officers (although this still happens rarely in practice), but even the members of ethnic minorities are now accepted as candidates for officer status. In the fall of 1955, indeed, several *women* were admitted to Turkey's War Academy as cadets.

All of this new egalitarianism takes place within the context of what is to illiterate and impoverished boys from the villages an overpowering "materialism." One has the impression that, owing to a projection of our own Western doubts and dilemmas, the value of such "materialism" for modernizing countries has been misunderstood and maligned. The "revolution of rising expectations" is motivated largely by the ever-spreading desire for more of the good things of life among people who, through most of history, neither had nor expected to have these things.

What happens when a young Turk returns to his village after having served his two years in the army? In the absence of definitive case studies, one can only make general observations. Clearly, if army living standards are superior to those prevailing in much of the surrounding civilian society—as now seems to be the case—the young discharged soldier is likely to find his traditional society inadequate to sustain his new level of expectations. A sense of frustration stimulates the young man to apply his army-acquired skills to promote civil innovation and "progress." He has been exposed to the machine concept and is aware of the advantages accruing to those with mastery of mechanical skills. Furthermore, the prestige of his military service has become identified in all minds with the new technology. Hence, it is likely that the soldier returning to his native village will resist falling back into the pre-mechanical era.

This resistance may lead to a falling-out between father and son. Contemporary observation in selected Turkish villages indicates that the apparent replacement of extended-family units by primary family households may be partly due to this friction. Young men are breaking away physically from their fathers' households, prior to the death of the father, and setting up their own homes perhaps a few hundred

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yards away. This practice is a distinct break with tradition. Moreover, many younger men are leaving the villages permanently and seeking a new life in the market town or big city. Recently, in private conversation, a high Turkish government planner speculated that one of the driving forces behind the accelerating urbanization is the desire of the younger people for an independent life in the primary family, an independence difficult to achieve within the small, semi-isolated, traditionally organized rural communities.

If the young man returning from the army—even though breaking away from his father's household—remains within the village, he may be the driving force behind both technical and social innovation, such as the purchase of modern agricultural equipment and the organization of a local youth society. He may also possess the necessary skills to operate the tractor. At the very least he now has the technical background that renders him a likely candidate for a short training course in the operation and maintenance of modern agricultural equipment. In other words, the absorptive capacity of this civilian sector in Turkey has been increased by the military training program.

As the number of such young men grows, the prestige of the military becomes identified increasingly in the public mind with technical competency. This identification can be of prime importance, for the military ranks high in Turkish eyes. On the basis of systematic field work, George Helling concludes that the dominating image for modern Turkish youth is still the soldier.[29] Therefore, identification of technical skills with military competency is perhaps of greater significance in Turkey than it would be in certain other societies.

Even general education may be identified with the military in the public mind, by reason of the large-scale program of basic education now being instituted by the Turkish army. The major purpose of this effort is to submit all illiterate draftees, who demonstrate in tests the native intelligence to participate successfully, to a seven-week curriculum in reading, writing, arithmetic, measurement, and elementary social studies. The program is just now getting into full swing, which means that roughly 120,000 men (50 per cent of the draftees) will go through the course each year in sixteen specially constructed, army education centers distributed over the country. The present course, given to draftees immediately after induction, includes thirty hours of Turkish per week, three hours of social studies, eleven hours of arithmetic. It is predicted that roughly 70 per cent of the students will complete the

[29] George Helling, "A Study of Turkish Values," a paper delivered at the Conference on Turkey, Harvard University, June 1959.

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course successfully. Special textbooks have been published with the co-operation of an American specialist. Later, over 100 additional titles will appear in simple Turkish for distribution to soldier-graduates to encourage continued reading.[30] Student motivation is quite obvious. One journalist reported his visit to the first pilot class in April 1959 as follows:

> Visitors to a classroom were welcomed by this rehearsed teacher-pupil exchange in Turkish:
> "What will you be if you do not learn to read and write?" asked the teacher.
> "Privates," chorused the class.
> "And what will you become if you study hard and learn your lessons?" pursued the teacher.
> "Corporals and sergeants," the class answered enthusiastically.[31]

There is reason to expect that this army program may give general education in the villages and small towns a very healthy shot in the arm by raising public acceptance, and even demand, for secular education. This will represent a vast change in attitude from the early days of the Republic, when secular education was resisted vigorously by large elements of the general public. Even today, there is considerable passive resistance, often religiously inspired, to the concept of secular education in the more remote rural areas, particularly in the eastern provinces.[32]

By 1959, approximately two billion dollars' worth of American and European equipment and technical assistance had gone into the shoring-up of Turkish military strength. Meanwhile increasing attention had been directed to building morale within the army and a more careful consideration given to the total impact the army might have on economic and social development. In a long statement in February 1958,[33] the Turkish Minister of National Defense explained that the new law on personnel assignment policy was being deliberately applied in such manner as to broaden the geographical experience of army personnel. In essence, the country was divided into three districts—western, central, and eastern. Within each district, military posts were classified into four categories depending upon their general environment—eco-

[30] Interview with Colonel Mithat Ceylan, officer in charge of the program, Ankara, October 2, 1959; see also Emin Hekimgil, "Education in Turkey," a paper prepared for the 22nd International Conference on Public Education, Geneva, July 1959, pp. 33-34.
[31] Jay Walz, in *New York Times*, April 17, 1959.
[32] K. Y. Wofford, "Report on Rural and Primary Education and Related Teacher Training in Turkey," a report to the Turkish Ministry of Education, Ankara, 1952, p. 30 (mimeographed).
[33] Reported in *Zafer*, February 25, 1958.

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nomic and social, climatic, cultural, and medical. Before an officer could be assigned a second time to the first district, he must serve out an assignment in either the second or third. Likewise, the classification of his specific post must change from assignment to assignment. (For some time, a general policy had been followed to the effect that draftees from the cities should be assigned to rural areas, rural draftees to duty in the cities.[34]) The Minister also reported improvement in military housing and health conditions. He made significant reference to army and navy efforts to produce in military factories certain machine and vehicular parts required by the civilian economy, "in order to make possible the participation of the military industrial establishments in our general development."

One should not discuss the impact of the army on the total economic and social structure of the country without reference to the highway development program, initially considered almost exclusively as a military matter. The U.S. Highway Mission dispatched to Turkey in 1948 was placed first under the Military Aid Mission. Not until sometime later was the highway program related to the economic aid mission. Certainly among the reasons that Turkish leadership became so interested in pushing the highway program were its military implications. Highway development has now gone far beyond that phase and is justified largely in economic and social terms. It is possibly now true that the vast majority of the Turkish population resides within relatively short distances of all-weather roads. Obviously, the existence of these roads has had an enormous impact on the routine of life in the rural communities, and hence also in the market towns and cities. Many hundreds of thousands of villagers now travel into market towns quite frequently simply to pass the time of day, to sit and chat in a coffee house, or to attend a local cinema. This increased geographical mobility is not unrelated to increased social and psychic mobility.[35] The new technical training in the Turkish army has provided many thousands of drivers and mechanics for the new vehicles moving on these new roads. This development of increased opportunity for geographical mobility has, of course, strengthened the tendency that we have already noted toward a breakup of the extended-family organization within the traditional community. It might also be observed that specialization in military function has paralleled and, to a certain

[34] Described in *Cumhuryet*, July 16, 1957.

[35] The impact of roads on the spread of Turkish mobility is described in Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958, chs. 1, 4, 5.

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extent, induced a similar occupational specialization within the civilian sector.[36]

An outgrowth of the use of the military to stimulate general development has been the Turkish emphasis on the non-military aspect of what are fundamentally international military pacts. As originally conceived, the Balkan Pact was to have been implemented by a number of non-military commissions active in the economic and cultural and political fields—one purpose being to expand trade relations among Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey and hence stimulate economic development generally. Also, in connection with the Baghdad Pact, now called the Central Treaty Organization (or CENTO), the Turks have been instrumental in directing attention to non-military activities, specifically the construction of an adequate communication system between Iran and Turkey. This project could be of substantial importance to the Turkish economy by opening up the easternmost provinces of the country, wherein are found rich mineral resources.

The Turks have also used the army as an instrument for general cultural development in the immediate areas surrounding major army installations. The location of the First Army headquarters in Erzurum has stimulated the effort to develop that city as the cultural center of eastern Turkey. Among the specific reasons cited by Turkish authorities for the establishment of a new university in Erzurum was the existence there of large numbers of military children, who would be likely candidates for university education. The impact of such an educational enterprise on eastern Turkey may be considerable. In recent years, the growth elements in these areas—the more educated and more wealthy—had been lured increasingly into Ankara and Istanbul by the more comfortable life and greater intellectual companionship to be found in these cities. Those parts of the country most in need of their dynamic elements were thus deprived of them. The army now tends to reverse this flight from the rural east and to provide a new dynamism that is likely to speed modernization by using public resources to build institutions that are educative, egalitarian, and functional.

Perhaps there is in the Turkish experience something of general import for American policy in economic development. One suspects that the distinction between economic aid and military assistance can easily be exaggerated—and is, in any case, ambiguous. We can deliberately plan, and help others to plan, our military assistance for maximum effect upon the economic and social development of the recipient

[36] R. D. Robinson, "Tractors in the Village," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXXIV, No. 4 (November 1952), p. 451.

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country. For example, foreign military personnel coming to this country for professional or technical training should perhaps also be exposed to our economic processes, political institutions, and social practices. Indeed, the army, the public school, the industrial enterprise, and the economic planning organization of an underdeveloped country tend to converge on common objectives. In such a situation, professional military training may well come to differ somewhat from that which is most appropriate in the United States or Western Europe. Perhaps, learning from the Turkish experience, we can help other countries to harness their national motivation to be strong, via military organization, more directly to the drive for accelerated development.

Finally, recent events raise questions about the fundamental compatibility between a vigorous military institution, on the Turkish model, and the principle of civilian supremacy in government. Why, after such a splendid history of service under civilian authority, did the Turkish army take over power in May 1960?[37] Does it now intend to install long-term military rule or will it, as it claims, create anew the conditions under which a democratic polity and civilian supremacy can function efficiently? Any answer to these questions involves an appreciation of the historic phase through which Turkish society, and its military institution, have passed.

The Turkish army has been nourished by, and in turn has nourished, that type of modern materialism which places a high value upon personal well-being. This "revolution of rising expectations," which has been spreading rapidly around the world, has turned out to be extremely treacherous in many areas. Expectations are raised long before they can be satisfied. The result is, quite often, a "revolution of rising frustrations." In one underdeveloped area after another, the inadequately satisfied or inhibited aspirations of the new literates have cumulated into a persistent discontent that makes stable parliamentary government under civilian political leadership impossible. This has led, in one country after another, to military take-over and the imposition of stability by coercion.

Until May 1960, the Turkish case was exceptional. The army, while adding its bit to the rising tide of expectations, had helped provide the perspectives, the skills, and the roles which could satisfy these expectations. In so doing, it had moved farther and faster than the army (or the civilian sector) had been able to do in many other underdeveloped countries. The evidence seemed clear that the Turks had

[37] Described in R. D. Robinson, "Upheaval in Turkey," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, XXXIX, No. 20 (July 1, 1960), pp. 153ff.

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used the army successfully as a lever for general development, while maintaining republican institutions and civilian supremacy.

The Turkish army seemingly had, almost uniquely, abandoned the military prerogative of standing aloof and watching civilian institutions crumble, and then taking over after the civilian elites have been brought to a complete impasse. It had, rather, committed itself to the firm and efficient support of a rapidly modernizing and democratizing society under the rule of civilian supremacy. This was exemplified by its commitment to recruit, train, assign, promote, and release the 400,000 men under its charge on the democratic basis of merit and the efficient basis of ability. Such commitment, in any military corps, acknowledges civilian supremacy in defining the goals and regulating the larger processes of the society as a whole.

Why, then, did a military junta proceed to wrest political power away from a civilian government during the pre-dawn hours of May 27, 1960?

The top priority of Turkish policy, in the past several years, has been to maintain a balance between "level of aspirations" and "capacity for absorption." Whatever its short-term defects might be, this is a reasonable policy for any underdeveloped country caught in the rapid tempo of modernization. Once the rising tide of expectations gets out of hand, once people want more than their institutions and available resources can provide, then the special brand of chaos that we have seen in many underdeveloped areas occurs. In this sense, Turkish materialism seemed a very promising avenue to a stable future based on the well-being of its citizenry.

The Turkish elite, in all the key sectors, had shown a profound awareness and consensus on this point. This awareness underlay what we consider to be the most remarkable demonstration of successful party politics in any underdeveloped area since World War II, despite the military coup of last May. Whatever may be said, and justly, in complaint against the harshness of the Democratic Party's policies toward the press and civil liberties, it had not permitted itself to deviate from the course of modernization based on economic development. Whatever might have been the anxieties of the People's Party to regain office—the most natural desire of all "out" parties being that they want to be "in"—its leadership had not succumbed to the politically attractive, if nationally dangerous, temptation to make political hay of traditionalist religious and xenophobic sentiment in the rural hinterlands. Nor had the Democratic Party, until recently, attempted to use the military

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to support partisan power—despite the uncertain outcome of recent elections.

These restraints can be taken as evidence that the Turks and their leaders, perhaps more than most others in the vast underdeveloped world, had defined what it was that they really wanted. Official Turkish spokesmen had stated privately that if forced to choose between continued economic or military development at the present pace, they would choose the former. They felt that their first line of defense, both against becoming too dependent on the West and against possible loss of sovereignty to the USSR, lay in continued economic growth at a pace that would bring Turkey, within the foreseeable future, into the range of the Western industrial states in terms of productivity and standard of living. These spokesmen had expressed the fear that in the absence of such economic growth, the days of Turkish independence would be limited. Indeed, economic development seemed to have been elevated to the position of a national ideology, to which the army subscribed as enthusiastically as did other elements in the population.

The lesson to be derived from the current failure of civilian leadership in Turkey is that such leadership can survive only as long as it continues to lead. The Turkish army could be entrusted with major programs that shaped national development—basic education, technical training, industrial production—so long as the civilian leadership generated the ideas and shaped the institutions which made these service programs functional for the society as a whole. The government made policy; the army served it. So it was for thirty-seven years. But when civilian leadership seemed to falter—(1) by leaning upon the army for political support, (2) by clogging channels of promotion for young men of ability and subjecting them to partisan pressures, and (3) by alienating the intellectual elite, which was closely identified with the junior officer corps—when these things happened, the situation changed. Moreover, since 1954 the civilian administration had been losing its former appeal to the growth elements in the population—the modern intellectuals, the ambitious technicians, the innovators and entrepreneurs. As the civilian administration was becoming a closed society (with clique values more important than ability and achievement in pushing men ahead), opportunities in the military establishment were increasingly becoming available to men of ability regardless of their origin, family, party, or age. The army's dynamism was not matched by the civilian sector. This tended to make the army's programs dysfunctional; its satisfactions turned into frustrations. When the tightly closed regime then tried to use the army for its own partisan

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political purpose—thereby violating the basic Kemalist doctrine of an apolitical army—it subverted the principle of civilian supremacy. The only way to save civilian supremacy under these conditions was, paradoxically, a military coup to install a caretaker regime that would re-establish the conditions of democratic civil government. What are the prospects?

The new military regime in Ankara claims to be reform-minded, not vindictive or partisan. The Committee of National Unity, the 38-member military group responsible for the seizure of power and administration of the provisional government, has uttered unequivocal commitments to republican principles and has promised to dissolve itself on the day that a new parliament convenes. By midsummer it was known that a number of important constitutional changes were to be undertaken—namely, addition of an upper chamber of the Turkish parliament, formation of a court empowered to review the constitutionality of legislative acts, institution of a proportional system of representation. Also, political prisoners had been released and the press had been freed (although not entirely so). On the other hand, virtually the entire leadership group (403 persons) of the Democratic Party had been imprisoned.

Despite the idealistic atmosphere of the Turkish coup, we know that power corrupts. In speculating on the Turkish future, one must take account of certain elements in the pre-history of the coup. In the first place, there is no record that General Cemal Gursel, present dictator of Turkey, resisted the use of the army for political purposes by the previous Inonu regime (1938-1950), nor its corruption, its rigged elections, and its almost total disregard of constitutional rights. The General apparently became disaffected with the Menderes regime shortly after he had been passed over for the top post in the army. He had been in military service for forty-five years, a general since 1947. Moreover, the opposition Republican People's Party had maintained an unremitting campaign at pre-election intensity against the government since the 1957 election, in which the party had drawn 38 per cent of the popular vote. Every act of the Menderes government—other than foreign policy—was condemned. The Menderes regime reacted by forbidding public political meetings except during a pre-election campaign. Ismet Inonu's deliberate flouting of the law in Kayseri on April 3 instigated the use of the army to prevent his further campaigning. (No election was in the offing.)

On March 21, the government reportedly (not refuted) intercepted a secret order from the headquarters of the Republican People's Party

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to its branches virtually directing them to go underground, to name secret couriers, and to found an "ear newspaper." On April 17, Ismet Inonu told a group of retired generals and admirals (in his home) that it was up to them, and to the military, to protect the soundness of Turkish society and the ideals of Turkish progress and development. This statement was reported in the press and has not been refuted. Two days later, government spokesmen understandably charged the opposition with deliberate conspiracy to overthrow the government by force. It was the appointment of a commission to investigate these charges and the suspension of all partisan political activity for ninety days that touched off the student riots. Republican members of parliament were found among the students during the rioting, thereby casting doubt on the spontaneity of at least some of the disorders. Charges made about murdered students during the time of the riots were later found to be unsubstantiated. (As Adnan Menderes publicly announced at the time, two were killed during the rioting, almost accidentally.)

In his letter of May 3, which was virtually an ultimatum, General Gursel insisted that President Celal Bayar should resign, but no mention was made of Prime Minister Menderes. He also insisted that "problems of concern to the Army must be solved with dispatch." The use of the army for apparent political purposes was mentioned elsewhere in the document. One wonders what these other, undesignated problems were. All except three members of the entire parliamentary delegation of the Democratic Party were imprisoned shortly after the military take-over and are to be denied freedom to participate in the new elections, thereby virtually assuring domination by the Republicans—a minority party insofar as is known. However, there is considerable evidence that, right up to the moment of the coup, the Democratic Party remained the popular party. Prime Minister Menderes was attributed on the grass-roots level with having diverted an increased share of the national income out of the cities and into the villages and small towns.[38]

Apart from the subversion of civilian supremacy, the military take-over sets several exceedingly dangerous precedents: (1) the trial of

[38] As an apparent step to curtail popular participation in political life, a temporary law went into effect on July 4, 1960, which forbade political parties to set up or maintain branch organizations of any sort other than those located in provincial seats and municipalities. This move was obviously designed to break the organizational strength of the ousted Democrats in Turkey's 38,000 villages, wherein dwell 70 per cent of Turkey's population. Preceding the move were recurrent reports of arrests in rural areas occasioned by uprisings and demonstrations in favor of the jailed leaders.

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ousted politicians for "unconstitutional" or "illegal" acts, (2) the collective punishment of a regime, and (3) constitutional reform without popular mandate. Should the coup eventuate merely in the transfer of power to the Republican People's Party, the spirit of rancorous reprisal against political opponents, long an element of public life in Turkey, will remain alive. Any Republican administration holding office in the near future will hardly dare relinquish power to a Democratic administration, even though the latter be the victor at the polls. The short-run costs to democratic polity of a coup made in the name of democratic polity will be high. For the long run, much will depend upon the wisdom of the present caretaker regime in setting conditions under which democratic political life can grow rapidly and civilian supremacy can prosper.

The Turkish experience vividly illustrates the constant challenge to civilian leadership posed by a rapidly developing society in which the democratic tradition is new. The striking past accomplishments of the Turkish Republic enhanced, but obviously did not automatically assure, its prospects for creative civilian leadership in the future. The new nations-in-a-hurry seek to accomplish in decades the modernization that was achieved over centuries in the West. Their great need is to accelerate mobility while maintaining stability. The military institution, historically the chosen instrument for imposing stability, can be transformed into an agency that promotes mobility within a framework of civilian ingenuity and innovation. But when the civilian leadership fails to maintain the tempo and balance of social change, when dynamic growth is crippled by partisan nepotism, a frustrated military is likely to take over control. This is the great lesson which the Turkish Republic has to teach the underdeveloped nations of the world. Its past provides a model, and its future a test, for the role of dynamic government in the critical decades of rapid growth that lie ahead—and, perhaps more fundamentally, for the supremacy of civilian authority itself.

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THE ROLE OF TRADITIONALISM IN THE POLITICAL MODERNIZATION OF GHANA AND UGANDA*

By DAVID E. APTER

SOCIAL analysts have long been preoccupied with those features of traditional culture and belief which affect the direction of change and the receptivity of a society to innovation. In spite of the very considerable literature concerned with acculturation, there have been few efforts to examine different types of traditional systems with respect to the problems they pose for political modernization. We attempt this form of analysis here. The plan is to examine two countries, Ghana and Uganda, which are engaged in the effort to build a national society. Each is experimenting with constitutional forms and each has had to deal with the problem of traditionalism. Indeed, the central problem of those concerned with building national, as distinct from local, political institutions has been to create overarching political parties, voluntary associations, and governmental forms that bridge older parochialisms. Moreover, just as tradition is a source of parochial strengths and social pride, so its characteristics vary widely. There are some who argue that any understanding of modernity in Africa must be based on an examination of the variants of the traditional systems.

In this article, we shall compare recent political events in Ghana and Uganda, and try to show how they have been shaped by the nature of traditionalism. By this means we can illustrate the implications of two different kinds of traditionalism and the problems they pose for modern nation-builders.

I. TRADITIONALISM

The importance of traditional factors in change was not the discovery of Max Weber, as some have thought. Such antecedent greats as Marx and Coulanges sought to link to the problem of modernization those

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stable symbols, artifacts, and values transmitted by the people of a society through generations. Marx was particularly concerned with its economic aspects; Coulanges with its religious aspects. Since that time, the study of tradition has been either directly or indirectly brought into the most contemporary concerns. Most recently, Lerner has observed the behavioral consequences and durability of tradition by exploring degrees of participation in mass media of communication. Fallers has dealt with it in terms of bureaucracy. My own concern has focused on the functional implications of traditional political forms for modern ones.[1]

Nor is interest in tradition a peculiarity of social scientists. Politicians, no less than academics, recognize that traditional factors which under some circumstances seem to create immobilities in social structure, and abort or minimize innovation, at other times can open the door to an entirely different range of behaviors. Administrators who in Mali Federation (formerly Senegal and French Sudan) for years sought with only small success to establish effective local units of government, possessing cultural and solidary features satisfying to the population, now find the very same measures enthusiastically taken up by African leaders and interpreted as peculiar to the genius of Africans. Under the ideology of *negritude*, the meaning attached to community development, cooperation, and communalism has been transformed into a living and continuous feature of the African past. By this means, innovation has been "traditionalized" and made comfortable. Change is not strange or foreign, requiring new roles or learning. Traditionalism puts novelty on trial rather than the people that novelty is supposed to serve. The lesson of Mali is that contemporary administrators and political leaders in Africa who can learn to enlist traditionalism in the service of innovation will indeed be contributing to successful political modernization.

Traditionalism, as distinct from tradition, we can define as validations of current behavior stemming from immemorial prescriptive norms. It is not that traditionalist systems do not change, but rather that innovation—i.e., extra-systemic action—has to be mediated within the social system and charged to antecedent values. Modernism, in contrast, presupposes a much remoter relationship between antecedent values and new goals. Modern systems, with their complex and highly differentiated social structures, value change itself.

These distinctions between modernism and traditionalism, valid as

[1] See D. Lerner *et al.*, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, Glencoe, Ill., 1958; L. A. Fallers, *Bantu Bureaucracy*, Cambridge, Eng., 1956; and D. E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*, Princeton, N.J., 1955.

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they are, leave unanswered the question why some traditional systems can innovate more easily than others. Answers have been sought in the structural features of traditional societies, while traditionalism has remained a more or less undifferentiated concept.

The discussion here accordingly distinguishes between two types of traditionalism. The first can be called *instrumental*; the second, *consummatory*.[2] Each kind exhibits certain structural tendencies. The combination of value type and structural tendency determines the problems that confront political leaders as they seek to build modern nations. We shall examine these combinations in Ghana and Uganda.

As we are using the term, instrumental systems are those which can innovate easily by spreading the blanket of tradition upon change itself. In such systems, those who are called upon to arbitrate in matters of custom, and to interpret in some official capacity, are easily persuaded to find traditional counterparts in contemporary events. Such systems can innovate without appearing to alter their social institutions fundamentally. Rather, innovation is made to serve immemoriality. The characteristic structural expression of instrumental traditionalism is a military type of system, with hierarchical authority stemming from a single king or command figure.[3] Appointive ranks in the system tend to underwrite the king as the central source of authority. A heavy reliance on performance is a characteristic of office and the chief who fails to serve his king loyally and well is subject to removal or death. Religion is decidedly secondary in such a system, whose primary value

[2] As we are using the terms, "instrumental" systems are those characterized by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and independent of ultimate ends; "consummatory" systems are those characterized by a close relationship between intermediate and ultimate ends. The terms are derived from Parsons' categories of "cognitive-instrumental meanings" and "expressive-integrative meanings." See T. Parsons *et al., Working Papers in the Theory of Action*, Glencoe, Ill., 1953, p. 105.

In our sense, the difference between instrumental and consummatory values can be illustrated by the following example. Consider two traditional systems, one consummatory and the other instrumental in value type. Both are short-hoe cultures and an effort is made to introduce new agricultural techniques, particularly the use of tractors. In the consummatory system, changing from the short hand-hoe system will so corrupt the ritual of hoe-making, the division of men's and women's work, the religious practices associated with both, and the relationship between agricultural rituals and the authority of chiefs that it would be impossible to consider a tractor only in terms of increasing agricultural productivity. In the instrumental system, by contrast, the tractor would simply be viewed in terms of its ability to expand agricultural output and would not affect the ultimate ends of the system. In the first instance, such an innovation represents a threat to the system. In the second instance, it is far likelier to strengthen the system by increasing farm income.

[3] For a discussion of hierarchical authority, see A. Southall, *Alur Society*, Cambridge, Eng., 1956, esp. ch. 6. See also D. E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism*, Princeton, N.J. (forthcoming).

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is service to the king or state. Examples of such systems are Morocco, Ethiopia, and Buganda.[4]

The traditionalism of consummatory systems is much more complex. They were first described by Fustel de Coulanges when, deploring the simplistic interpretations of Greece and Rome as prototypes for modern societies, he wrote that examining the institutions of those two systems without a knowledge of their religious notions left them "obscure, whimsical, and inexplicable." He went on to say: "A comparison of beliefs and laws shows that a primitive religion constituted the Greek and Roman family, established marriage and paternal authority, fixed the order of relationship, and consecrated the right of property, and the right of inheritance. This same religion, after having enlarged and extended the family, formed a still larger association, the city, and reigned in that as it had reigned in the family. From it came all the institutions, as well as all the private laws, of the ancients. It was from this that the city received all its principles, its rules, its usages and its magistracies."[5]

Thus society, the state, authority, and the like are all part of an elaborately sustained, high-solidarity system in which religion as a cognitive guide is pervasive. Such systems have been hostile to innovation. Change has produced fundamental social upheavals such as migration to towns. Broken are the warmth and intimacy of custom. Not only were ancient Greece and Rome examples of such systems, but so was Ashanti.[6]

Our general hypothesis is that the instrumental-hierarchical type of system can innovate with ease until the kingship principle is challenged, at which point the entire system joins together to resist change. In other words, such systems are highly resistant to political rather than other forms of modernization, and in particular cannot easily supplant the hierarchical principle of authority with a representative one.

[4] The reader should note that the name Uganda refers to the entire country, the Uganda Protectorate, which includes many different tribes; Buganda is a tribe within Uganda; the Baganda are the people (plural) of Buganda; a Muganda is a single member of the Buganda tribe; and Kiganda is the adjective form.

[5] Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, n.d., p. 13.

[6] Such systems can innovate, however. Indeed, the philosophy prevailing in Senegal today is similar to that described by Coulanges, but the religious system is pervaded by humanistic socialism. Hence to build upon traditional solidarities, the emphasis on family, corporatism in institutions, personalism, and the like go hand in hand with joint participation in communal economic efforts. By this means, work is ennobled and given new meaning in traditional terms. See, for example, the expression of this point of view by M. Mamadou Dia in *L'Economie africaine*, Paris, 1957, and "Economie et culture devant les élites africaines," *Présence africaine*, Nos. 14-15 (June-September 1957), pp. 58-72.

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Consummatory values are most significantly rooted where the structural expression of authority is pyramidal rather than hierarchical. Pyramidal structure means that patterns of subordinacy and superordinacy are limited to such activities as war or court appeals. For most purposes a chief or political leader is responsible to his social group rather than to a senior chief or official. The chiefs at each level of the pyramid thus have similar powers and are relatively autonomous of one another. Such a structural form relies heavily on semi-segmental kinship relationships. The autonomy of the chief or political leader is thus a reflection of the autonomy of the kinship unit itself.

The consummatory-pyramidal systems are highly resistant to all forms of innovation, and the consequences of change are external political groupings that form as new solidary associations cutting across the older ones. In other words, new social structures with a political focus emerge, with the object of tearing down the older ones. Let us examine these processes in Ghana and Uganda.

II. Two Traditional Systems

Buganda, one of the most important kingdom states in the lake area of Eastern Africa, was regarded very favorably by Europeans who first came upon the country in the latter half of the nineteenth century. First Arabs, and then British and French missionaries, were welcomed by the king, or *Kabaka*, of Buganda. Kabaka Mutesa I encouraged competitive performances by the three religious groups—Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant. Although he died a pagan, he was intensely interested in Christianity.

To the Baganda, adoption of Christianity came to denote a superior technological and educational status. The older religious system, associated with the institution of clanship which was itself giving way to a hierarchical chieftaincy system, disappeared without producing much internal strain. Christianity easily passed muster as an aid to the Baganda in maintaining their society. The only point of concern was the fact that missionaries, in gaining adherents, tended to usurp the functions of chiefs. Since the latter remained responsible to the Kabaka, while the missionaries were not, a disturbing element was introduced into the political system.

Competition among religions, however, resulted in religious wars. These were eventually resolved by allocating fixed numbers of chieftaincies to Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims. The religious factions became tantamount to political parties within Buganda.

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The missionaries themselves commented on how quickly the Baganda took to education and became ardent religionists as well.[7] After British intervention and the establishment of the Protectorate over Uganda, regular Catholic and Protestant school systems were established. The chiefs were the best-educated group in the population. Catholic chiefs were products of Kisubi, the Catholic school, and Protestant chiefs were products of King's College, Budo. Both were modeled after British public schools.

Moreover, freehold land tenure was introduced and 8,000 square miles were distributed among 1,000 chiefs and notables, who thereby became a kind of squirearchy. The recipients of the land were mainly Catholics and Protestants.

Whatever the innovated structure, whether civil-service chieftaincy, a parliament and council of ministers, modern education, or freehold tenure, it strengthened the system. The instrumental quality of hierarchical kingship was never defeated. The innovations that were most easily accepted were those that strengthened the Buganda government and also facilitated the individual's efficiency within it.

As a result, the organization of political life, which had been the crucial social structure in Buganda, was regarded as continuing from the past, with each innovation simply perfecting and strengthening an established system. All novelty came to be regarded as a device for strengthening tradition. As we shall indicate below, the main form of nationalism which emerged was that of a modernizing autocracy in which the government of the Kabaka and the Kabaka himself represented effective nationalism.

In Ashanti, on the other hand, responses to innovation were relatively complicated. Chieftaincy, despite its tiers of relatively autonomous powers with respect to various units of government, was nevertheless hemmed in with restrictions. Chieftaincy faced inward to the people to whom, by lineage and totem, the chief or headman was related. Instead of the individual atomism of Buganda, which was held together by regard for the Kabaka and the external force of hierarchical authority, the Ashanti chief was linked with an elaborate system of religiously sanctioned self-restraints on behavior. When land alienation began to occur in undue measure, for example, chieftaincy was affected and the stable confines of the social system were undermined. When Christianity was introduced, it helped to weaken the traditions of chieftaincy and removed the control that the dead ancestors exercised over the

[7] See R. P. Ashe, *Chronicles of Uganda*, London, 1894; and A. R. Tucker, *Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa*, London, 1908, *passim*.

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living. The result was excesses by chiefs, who turned to British authorities for their support. When education was introduced, chiefs had to be ordered to send their children to school. While they could not disobey the orders of district officers, they often sent the children of their slave lineages rather than the children of royal blood. The succeeding generations of chiefs were thus by no means the best educated. The support required for the authority of the chiefs violated customary restraints on behavior. The excesses of the chiefs soon came to be regarded as perversions of traditional society, from which younger and more educated elements began to disaffiliate. Christianity helped ease the process of disaffiliation and there developed, along with an increase in urbanization and the growth of villages, the phenomenon of the urban village Christian and the rural village pagan. Most important, a series of wars between the British and the Ashanti was a token of the inability of Ashanti to absorb those innovating effects of a system of colonial rule which was basically common to both Buganda and Ashanti. In the end the *Asantehene*, or king of Ashanti, had to be exiled. Indeed, from 1901 to 1935, the Ashanti Confederacy did not exist as such.[8]

Within the context of the term "traditional," both Ashanti and Buganda were traditional systems. Both required validations of current behavior by appeal to immemoriality. Both had myths of origin involving a powerful figure associated with the formation of the society, and with whom the king had claims to ancestry. In the case of the Ashanti, the powers of origin descended to the Golden Stool rather than to a person. In Buganda, descent was reckoned through the line of kings, or Kabakas. That the preservation of power and continuity should reside in an object in the case of Ashanti—as distinct from a person, as in Buganda—is not without significance. For, in Ashanti, those in power serve the present by serving the past. It is a symbol of ancestral concern which is the visible repository of authority. In Buganda the king was, as both Roscoe and Fallers have called him, despotic.[9] While there was—and still is—pomp and ceremony around the king, he was not regarded as a descendant of living ancestors. He was rather the punishing, aggressive, and virile representative of a dynamic people expanding their military hegemony in the Lake Victoria region. Hence the essentially religious and theocratic nature of the Ashanti state, and the more secular and military character of Buganda.

There were other important differences between these societies. In

[8] J. N. Matson, *Warrington's Notes on Ashanti Custom*, Cape Coast, Prospect Printing Press, 1941 (2nd edn.).

[9] See, in particular, John Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 232.

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Ashanti, the system of political organization had its prototype in the extended family, which included up to a hundred members, possessing strong solidary affiliations. Families lived together in villages and it was unusual for an Ashanti to live alone or with only his immediate family.

In addition, the Ashanti had an elaborate lineage system whereby recruitment to office and the allocation of rights and duties were organized. The core political unit was the village. The largest unit was the division, over which there was a paramount chief. Kumasi, which established a compact with the other Ashanti divisions in a historical episode veiled in mystery and magic, became the center of a Confederacy. An elaborate balance of checks and controls on authority extended from the village level to the division, including restrictions on the exercise of power by the Asantehene, or king of the Ashanti Confederacy.

The system in Buganda was much simpler in one respect, and much more complex in others. Unlike the chief in Ashanti, who was a religious figure, a lineage figure and, moreover, elected to office, the chief in Buganda was appointed by the king, or Kabaka, and was responsible to him. The chief was subject to summary dismissal at the pleasure of the Kabaka. Much closer to the Ashanti pattern was an earlier, pre-Kabaka, clan system which continued to play a part in subsequent periods. The king was both *Sabataka* (head of all the clans) and Kabaka.

Every Muganda is a member of a clan. Clans are hereditary. The elders of clans had responsibilities over the family, the social conduct of individuals, and inheritance. Chiefs, who were appointed, reflected the powers of the Kabaka. Clan elders, who were elected from eligible lineages, reflected religious and immemorial powers. These two principles of authority were in constant conflict. Increasingly, performance in serving the Kabaka and thereby the state became the basis of chieftaincy. Performance and service became readily identifiable since Buganda, as a military system, was in process of expanding at the expense of her neighbors.

The acceptance of hierarchical authority thus was associated with successful national aggrandizement and the pure authority of the Kabaka was not mitigated by any other countervailing principle. Tension within the system was produced by conflicts between clanship and chieftaincy. But the Kabaka represented the central authority in both systems—i.e., Sabataka or head of all the clans, and Kabaka or head of all the chiefs.

Two effects were immediately observable from the twin systems of

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organization in Buganda united by a system of autocratic and hierarchical kingship. Clans were scattered throughout the country. In any area an individual on the move could find a clansman and receive certain benefits from him. This not only facilitated mobility but also ensured considerable uniformity of custom and behavior throughout the system.

The chiefs, who were territorial governors for the king, were also military leaders. Their followers were loyal to the chief because the chief reflected the Kabaka's authority. This military-administrative system of organization included a massive network of military roads converging, radially, upon the center or capital. Yet the capital itself was often moved, so that there was no "center" and "hinterland."

The result was a "suburban" pattern of life in which clanship counterpoised chieftaincy in daily life, but each man's eyes centered upon the king. In time of war, which was often, the military administrative system required almost no modification. The necessary mobilizations took place under the chiefs. Food continued to be produced, and family life managed to go on quite well. In contrast, Ashanti had to shift to a quite different military formation in time of war, and then returned to their peacetime pyramidal organization when war was over.[10]

What were some of the controversial issues which the Kiganda system was unable to absorb? The most characteristic one was an inability to adjust to any permanent limitation on the power of the Kabaka. Whether a Muganda were chief or peasant, educated or not, he maintained the same unabashed veneration for the office of the Kabaka. Or, to put the matter another way, the principle of national aggrandizement was never lost, and the Kabaka was its symbol. Each of the major conflicts which aroused the Baganda and posed serious problems for the Protectorate government centered around possible dangers to the autonomy of Buganda or diminutions of the authority of the Kabaka.

In contrast to Ashanti, then, the Baganda have instrumental values. Ends are relatively well defined and essentially patriotic.

Both Baganda and Ashanti developed their own forms of tribal parochialism. The former were adept in retaining considerable political

[10] Ashanti had a complex hierarchy of chiefs. At the pinnacle of the hierarchy was the *omanhene*, or divisional chief. Independent in his sphere of authority, he was nevertheless hedged about with restrictions. His was a religious role symbolizing lineage relationships to ancestors, and only members of a founder's or royal lineage were eligible to be elected to chieftaincy. The same held true for village chiefs and headmen. During war a division chief and others would take a position in the army and a more hierarchical system of authority would come to prevail. See E. Meyerowitz, *The Sacred State of the Akan*, London, 1951, especially ch. 10.

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autonomy, and the Uganda Agreement of 1900, which stipulated the relations between Baganda and British, became a legal bulwark of ethnic nationalism and political parochialism. In Ashanti, where no such constitutional relationship existed, internal conflict was widely manifested throughout the entire area, creating instabilities which eventually led to mass nationalism. In more contemporary terms, in Buganda nationalist politicians have so far been able to make little headway and are regarded by the Buganda government as malcontents and ne'er-do-wells. One finds there an absorbing situation, in which the British authorities are anxious to see nationalist political parties develop on an all-Uganda pattern as the solution to building a modern state.[11] In Ghana, the party nationalists have become tantamount to the state itself, regarding chiefs dimly, to say the least. Not only have they taken active steps to break the chief's power, but the Asantehene, the paramount chief of Ashanti, has been their particular target. In the last encounter between the Asantehene and the party government, it was the former who had to admit defeat. The quasi-religious character of traditional society has been replaced by the quasi-religious character of modern nationalism in Ghana. We can analyze these developments more closely.

III. Contrasting Efforts at Political Modernization

Uganda and Ghana are in the process of modernization. Practically, this has meant establishing parliamentary institutions by means of which the whole country is governed. Ghana achieved the level of political development in 1950 which Uganda now hopes to achieve. In other respects as well, Ghana has developed more rapidly. National income per head in Ghana is double that of Uganda. More effective internal transport and trade facilities are found in Ghana and Africans participate actively in all aspects of technical and commercial life. In Uganda, Asians and Europeans still monopolize the more important sectors of the economy and are the predominant racial groups in the civil service. In contrast, Africanization of the civil service in Ghana is virtually complete, with only a few senior positions and technical services still performed by Europeans, and these mostly on contract.

Ghana is economically well off for an African country.[12] Since 1951,

[11] See *Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959* (Wild Report), Entebbe, Government Printer, 1959, pp. 33-35.

[12] A population of approximately 5 million in an area of over 90,000 square miles is divided into several main tribal groups. The northern peoples are chiefly grouped in Muslim kingdoms. The central group is the seat of the once-powerful Ashanti Confederacy. The southern groups—Fante, Ga, Ewe, and others—have had the longest

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80 per cent of its internal savings has been based upon a single cash crop, cocoa. Other sources of income are gold, bauxite, manganese, industrial diamonds, and timber. It has advanced economically under a series of development plans, the first of which was primarily concerned with expanding basic transportation facilities. Railways were extended, a deep-water port built at Takoradi. The principle of a reserve fund for economic contingencies was established early. The first ten-year development plan was launched at the end of World War I and, except during the period of the world depression, Ghana has been development-conscious. Both under the later stages of colonialism and under her present nationalist government, she has been a social-welfare state.

What was the effect of innovation? Traditional chieftaincy and social organization increasingly became a focus for internal resentments. Bitter conflict over land developed. The pattern of self-restraints on behavior was upset. Land alienation in the form of concessions was common. Considerable friction developed between chiefs who took their seats not only in traditional councils, but on the legislative council and other conciliar bodies set up by the government, and the urban, educated elites which emerged with the spread of modern commerce. Each emerging group thought itself destined to inherit political power. The result was cultural withdrawal which prepared the ground for mass nationalism in Ghana after the Second World War. The chiefs, failing to consider the sources of mass nationalism, regarded it as simply an event in a long and stable cultural tradition which would only help to restore chieftaincy to its proper role.

The Western-educated elites regarded the nationalists as usurpers of their roles. The British viewed them as dangerous malcontents, subversive of public peace and good order. Such rejection gave fervor to the nationalists of the Convention People's Party (CPP), who by adherence to the party gave a new coherence to Ghana as a national society. They brought about a closer integration of the different peoples making up the territory, and they made economic and political institutions African rather than foreign by using them in the interests of self-government. Politics had already become polarized between traditional and secular authorities during the colonial period. Now the fundamental issues of traditionalism and modernity became wrapped up in more complex conflicts over democracy itself.

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contact with Western commerce and education. There are old families inhabiting the former "factories" of early traders who intermarried with the local people and established their own family dynasties. See J. Boyon, *Le Ghana*, Paris, 1958, pp. 7-10.

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The major achievement of the CPP in Ghana was the organization and maintenance of an effective mass political organization. This resulted in centers of communication in the towns and villages, requiring members who could co-ordinate the activities of others. By building the CPP into a social group, a fraternity of the disadvantaged was encouraged to mold society in its favor by means of national political institutions and political freedom. A widely diverse membership was provided with a feeling of confidence in the future. Self-government was the goal. New opportunities were to be achieved thereby. A vision of a new society which was as vague as it was powerful was the moral claim of the CPP.

Yet in creating a mass political organization devoted to achieving independence, the CPP incorporated elements which had no long-run natural inclinations toward one another. More particularly, traditional groupings formed centers of opposition to Dr. Nkrumah both inside and outside the party. The main source of opposition was Ashanti. The Asantehene and his council helped plan the organization of an opposition, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), which itself renewed an old alliance between intellectuals and traditional authorities.[13]

With demands for a federal system of government, the situation rapidly grew dangerous. One Cabinet minister, a leading CPP figure from Ashanti, was ambushed outside his house and his sister killed. Government leaders did not dare to go to Ashanti for almost two years. Moreover, the appearance of successful traditionalism in Ashanti encouraged other opposition groups to form. In Accra, in Nkrumah's own constituency, there was formed an Accra people's movement which was essentially parochial and anti-Nkrumah. Everywhere traditionalism and the natural organization of the ethnic and tribal group seemed the only possible alternative to party rule by the Convention People's Party.

The conflicts over traditionalism and the future of democracy were sharpest during the period just prior to independence. In the general election of 1956, the candidates of seven parties and 45 independents ran for office. In spite of the fact that the NLM was able to put only 39 candidates in the field, and the CPP was well enough organized to contest all 104 seats, the latter received only 398,141 votes and the combined opposition received 299,116. This opposition vote was extremely high, considering the fact that a vote for the CPP was con-

[13] In 1957 the NLM joined with other tribal parties like the *Ga Shiftimo Kpee* to become the United Party. The former leader of the party, Dr. K. A. Busia, is currently in Holland, Ghana's first real political exile.

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sidered a vote for independence. Approximately 50 per cent of the electorate voted. In the post-independence period, the opposition was smashed. A series of acts rushed through Parliament were designed to break the power of traditional authorities. So successful were these efforts that, when elections to the Kumasi Municipal Council were held in February 1958, the CPP won 17 out of 24 seats—a remarkable achievement.

In attacking traditionalism, movements of the CPP type take on the characteristic of inviolability. They have a tendency to brand splinter groups and the opposition as playing into the hands of the "feudal" elements in society. The idea of party fealty is stressed more than any other.

The pattern which can be clearly seen in this conflict between traditionalism and modernism is thus the continuous affiliation to and disaffiliation from powerful social groupings that each make total claims on the allegiance and support of its members. The clear loser in such a situation is the opposition. In crucial respects, therefore, countries like Ghana find that in attacking tradition and supporting modernity they become one-party systems. It is not that there is no opposition, but that organized party opposition finds itself in difficult circumstances. Traditionalism, which serves the opposition as an effective rallying ground for popular support, is branded as subversive.[14] Indeed, at the Accra African Peoples' Conference in December 1958, tribalism and religious separatism were defined as evil practices by Africa's leading nationalists. It was resolved that "those African traditional institutions whether political, social, or economic which have clearly shown their reactionary character and their sordid support for colonialism be condemned."[15]

What, then, has political modernization meant in Ghana? Attacking tradition has resulted in the development of an "organizational weapon" type of party which, constantly on the attack, probes for weaknesses in the system. It seeks to jostle the public into functionally useful roles for

[14] At the same time, the parliamentary opposition in Ghana has been effective on occasions. There are times when the CPP backbench threatens to bolt party whips and vote with the opposition. Such a threat has been a useful means of modifying the position of the government on several issues, not the least of which was modification of the Emergency Powers Bill, while the constitutional changes of early 1957 were incorporated under pressure from the opposition. Bitterly contested decisions which often resulted in suspensions of parliamentary sessions have been those involving basic liberties. Three such measures were the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Bill, the Emergency Powers Bill, and the Deportation Bill. For an excellent study of Ghana's parliament, see D. G. Austin, "The Ghana Parliament's First Year," *Parliamentary Affairs*, XI, No. 3 (Summer 1958), pp. 350-60.

[15] All-African Peoples' Conference, Resolution on Tribalism, Religious Separatism, and Traditional Institutions, *Conference Resolutions*, Vol. I, No. 4, issued by the Conference Secretariat, Accra, 1958.

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the pursuit of modernization. To prevent the loss of power, and to modernize as rapidly as possible, are the basic goals of those who have inherited the mantle of British power. Modernization has come to require a host of attitudes of mind and social organizations antithetical to traditional ways of doing things. Political modernization therefore attacks head-on traditional ways of believing and acting.

In these respects, the Ghana government has been unable to make use of traditionalism to support innovation. The past has become a dead weight on the present government, which by the use of inducements, and by occasional kicks and blows as well, seeks to drive people toward a new way of life. Because of the government's loss of support in the traditional sectors of society, the burdens of modernization on Ghana have become more intense. Unlike Senegal, where the blending of traditionalism and modernity has eased the transition to new political and economic forms, in Ghana traditionalism has not provided a genuine source of pride and inspiration. Unlike the French African concept of *negritude*, the slogan "African personality" has remained largely devoid of content.[16] Ghana, in assuming the heavy burdens of modernization without the supports of traditionalism, has become a relatively autocratic system.

Uganda shows a completely different political pattern. Unlike Ghana, which is a maritime nation, Uganda is situated inland on the shores of Lake Victoria.[17] It is roughly the same size as Ghana, with an area of 80,000 square miles and a population of approximately 6 millions.[18]

By virtue of its superior institutions and successful collaboration with the British, Buganda was made a privileged area. The Uganda Agreement of 1900 formally recognized these privileges, and elsewhere in the country the Kiganda pattern of territorial organization was established—a three-tiered system of local government, each with a chief and a council (*Lukiko*) and ranging in scope from the parish to the county. The British retained an appointive chieftaincy system, but one which followed the practice of a regular civil service, with chiefs being promoted, transferred, and retired. Theirs was the task of maintaining peace and good order, collecting taxes, and otherwise taking care of

[16] It is interesting to note that while the term "African personality" is widely attributed to Nkrumah, it is in Nigeria that an effort is being made to give it content. Examples of such efforts are the journals *Black Orpheus* and *Odú*, which, as cultural and literary journals, seek to give a philosophic and cultural significance to the term.

[17] Blessed with an exceedingly good climate and well-distributed rainfall, most of Uganda is fertile agricultural country. To supplement her two main crops, cotton and coffee, she needs more diverse export commodities, and copper and other raw materials are being successfully exploited on an increasing scale.

[18] See *Colonial Report*, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1959. Buganda represents approximately 20 per cent of the population of Uganda.

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the areas under their jurisdiction. Buganda, as a province, formed the model for the other ethnic groups to follow in the districts. In more recent times the parliament of Buganda, the Great Lukiko, has been the model for the district councils, which have become the object of considerable tribal parochialism in the districts outside of Buganda.

The three races, African, Asian, and European, live in uneasy proximity. Asians are involved in petty commerce, and increasingly in larger commercial enterprises in urban centers such as Kampala, while Europeans generally remain in charge of major commercial operations. Few Europeans were successful in farming in Uganda, where a situation comparable to that of the white settlers in Kenya never developed. Asians and Europeans have always tended to collaborate in representing the commercial interests of the country.[19] Asians were represented on the Legislative Council along with Europeans from the very onset, after World War I. No Africans were represented on the Legislative Council, nor was it regarded as desirable that they should be, until after the Second World War. It was widely held that Buganda's own Lukiko served as her political outlet, and the same situation was thought to prevail in the districts. It was regarded as essential to the interests of Africans that the principle of trusteeship, the mainstay of administration during the interwar period, should be maintained through the Governor and his staff.[20]

Until the present day, nationalism in Uganda was largely expressed through the Buganda government "establishment." There is now stirring the kind of "modern" nationalism which is increasingly inclined to limit the powers of the Kabaka and make of Uganda a united, self-governing nation. But modernism as an ideology is confined to a very few. Indeed, it has been largely pre-empted by the Buganda government. Let us examine the process by which this occurred.

Although the Baganda did not suffer national defeats as did the Ashanti, religious wars in the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted in the deposition and restoration of the Kabaka by Europeans on two occasions. The Baganda have never gotten over that. Given the special position of the Kabaka in the structure of Kiganda society, cavalier treatment of them on the part of the Europeans deeply wounded and aggrieved the Baganda. Even during the period of their closest collaboration with the British (roughly from 1900 to 1926), such

[19] The Indian Association and the Uganda Chamber of Commerce were instruments of that co-operation.

[20] For a discussion of this period, see K. Ingham, *The Making of Modern Uganda*, London, 1958, *passim*.

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grievances were nursed. A singular touchiness has thus characterized relations between the British and the Baganda. Unlike the more typical case in the districts, changes in political organization have, if they originated with the Protectorate government, been stoutly resisted. The Kabaka as a symbol of modern nationalism has been continuously strengthened and now has more power than at any time since British control.

When the Agreement of 1900 was signed, the Lukiko, or African parliament, dominated by the chiefs, was empowered to distribute land on a freehold basis to the most important people in Buganda. The three chief ministers received the largest estates (with the exception of the Kabaka himself), while others were given land according to their chieftaincy rank, or their general status.[21] Few pagans received any land.

Since chieftaincies had been divided up according to religion, both Protestants and Catholics of wealth came to have a considerable stake in the modified system. By fixing the proportions of chieftaincy along religious lines, family wealth and position were distributed in the same manner. Both Protestants and Catholics had some wealthy families in possession of land, and in important positions in the community. The Muslims suffered most of all the religious groups, while paganism quickly disappeared.

Those in the clan system who had been traditionally entitled to certain burial estates or clan lands, and who lost those lands during the parceling-out of freehold, became the first political force in Buganda. The clan system thus formed the "natural" opposition to a government of chiefs. This resulted in considerable internal dissension. Gradually the *bataka*, or clan groups, came to represent the *bakopi*, or peasantry. Land holding had become almost synonymous with prestige and social position.[22] Indeed, it appeared for a time that the system would become based on dynastic land-holding families, and the principle of easy access to political office and performance would be eliminated. Yet other innovations helped to prevent this. For example, the expanded educational system, which was enthusiastically supported by the Baganda, did not limit facilities to the children of chiefs, but included

[21] Uganda Agreement of 1900, para. 15. See *Laws of the Uganda Protectorate, Native Agreements and Buganda Native Laws*, London, 1936, pp. 1380-81.

[22] Important in preventing such dissension from assuming proportions of "class conflict" was the fact that peasants could, and did, buy freehold land. Moreover, no landless peasantry was created. Everyone could get a leasehold property at a nominal and fixed rental. This deterred migration to towns, and no urban-rural cleavage developed. Buganda remains a rural "suburbia." See A. W. Southall and P. C. W. Gutkind, *Townsmen in the Making*, East African Studies No. 9, Kampala, East African Institute of Social Research, 1956, *passim*.

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peasant children as well. Education was regarded as a major basis for entry into the political hierarchy (which remained the only major social organization throughout Buganda).

The instrumental values of the Baganda, colliding with a threatening monopoly of political roles by families of the senior chiefs who had received land, or by important Protestant and Catholic leaders, prevailed over both elites without altering the autocratic principle of hierarchical kingship. This allowed progressive modification of the Lukiko and greater opportunities to the public as a whole. Unlike the consummatory system of Ashanti, where individuals had virtually to withdraw from the traditional system in order to seek new careers and opportunities in a different kind of society, the Kiganda system was modified in practice, while posing few contradictions in principle.

Although the Buganda government was often in conflict with the peasantry, such conflicts appeared in the guise of government and its loyal opposition. The British, through a Resident, built up the influence of the chiefs and the ministers of the Buganda government. They regarded them as modern because of the ease and alacrity with which they learned to collect taxes, adapted themselves to methods of bookkeeping, and were able to control the public.

Thus the autocratic principle has prevailed in Buganda until the present. Innovations, it is widely believed, have come not from an alien source, but through the Buganda government itself. With the country's leaders able to maintain social discipline, because to act irresponsibly is to act against the Kabaka, a sense of awe and formality in social relations has helped retain public support. To keep the public "on the alert" and politically conscious, skirmishes against the intervention of the Residency are constantly fought.

As a result, the Baganda have regarded themselves as exceedingly blessed in a state of political autonomy. The Buganda government has been the most successful nationalist "party" in the country. Success in the economic field as well, particularly with the cotton and coffee crops, brought the Baganda considerable wealth as compared with the rest of Uganda. To add to their complacency, they had, by such visible indicators as tin roofs on their houses, number of bicycles, number of laborers from elsewhere working for them, and number of educated people, the highest standard of living in the Protectorate. They were able to absorb new forms of income, and to accept the standards of education, knowledge, skill, and training as requirements for a job such as chieftaincy, while retaining the essential character of their political system.

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The freehold system, the chieftaincy system, the method of recruitment, the standards of selection, the acceptance of cash crops, all helped to make Buganda extremely modern in many ways. *But the prerequisite to accepting any modern feature on the political level was that some real or mythical traditional counterpart had to be found for it.* Hence, if the Lukiko was now a regular council with minutes, committees, and a budget, it was nevertheless regarded as an age-old institution. If chiefs were now almost invariably large landowners or related to the original holders of freehold, in custom those responsible for the control over "heads," i.e., over families and soldiers, were found to be the equivalent.

In 1955 several important measures were passed. In the districts, the District Councils Ordinance gave the councils both executive and legislative powers, enabling them to make bylaws on a wide range of subjects.[23] In Buganda, after the deportation of the Kabaka for refusing to co-operate with the Protectorate government (part of his effort to retain autonomy for Buganda), a new Agreement was signed which enhanced the powers of the Lukiko, made the Kabaka in effect a constitutional monarch, and gave the Baganda three new ministries—Health, Education, and Natural Resources—in addition to the three they already had (Prime Minister, Chief Justice, and Treasurer).[24] These reforms in effect gave to Buganda and to the district governments substantive warrants of authority and responsibility to attend to most of the economic and social schemes which are regarded as necessary to modernization. In Buganda the autocratic nature of the system has now come under attack—but the attack is still exceedingly mild. Elsewhere, in the districts, the effort to achieve local autonomy is regarded as the essence of political modernity.

What the system in Buganda cannot resolve are challenges to the principle of autocratic or hierarchical kingship. Resisting the first direct elections to be held in Buganda in 1958, the Baganda saw themselves threatened by devolution of authority to an African national government. Opposed to the nationalism of political parties, they regard representative government on an all-Uganda basis as tantamount to the destruction of their own society. In a pamphlet justifying the position of Buganda, the *Katikiro*, or Prime Minister, recently pointed out that the "peaceful growth of Western democracy in Buganda has been possible because the Baganda's customs and traditions are adaptable to new ideas which do not seek to uproot their fundamental political conceptions. . . ." Yet the pamphlet also warns

[23] See *District Councils Ordinance, 1955*, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1955.
[24] See *Buganda Agreement of 1955*, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1955.

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that "The Baganda cannot exist as a people unless the Kabaka is the Head of the political structure in his Kingdom. Therefore, any constitution which envisages placing any other ruler or any foreign monarch in the position of the Kabaka of Buganda has no other intention but to cause the Baganda to cease to be a nation." More importantly, he concludes: "From time immemorial the Baganda have known no other ruler above their Kabaka in his Kingdom, and still they do not recognize any other person whose authority does not derive from the Kabaka and is exercised on his behalf."[25]

As a result of this position, it is the Protectorate government and British officials who are trying to build a modern national state in Uganda. How well they have succeeded is indicated by the fact that in the first direct elections in 1958, Buganda refused to participate, as did several other districts.[26]

Still more recently, a constitutional committee has recommended the establishment of responsible government at the center, with a legislature possessing 72 elected seats.[27] The Buganda government voiced its bitter opposition, but non-Baganda see in it the possibility of a political society not dominated by Buganda. With the Baganda anxious to secede from Uganda entirely if that is necessary to maintain the position of the Kabaka and the Buganda kingdom, there is bitter conflict between the Buganda government, on the one hand, and party politicians allied to British authorities, on the other.

There is now emerging among many Baganda an awareness that the absorptive capacity of the traditional system and its instrumental values has been reached. This is taken by the traditionalists to indicate a need for secession if the system is to be preserved. Younger groups are anxious to build a larger national society, a united Uganda. These are regarded as traitors by the traditionalists. However, the traditionalists are not anti-modern. Quite the contrary, as we have seen, they have built up a modern if miniature state in Buganda and now that very modernity is used as a justification for autonomy.

The result is that political parties remain largely ineffective both in Buganda and in Uganda as a whole. Recently, in an effort to gain popular support, several parties induced anti-Asian riots aimed at reducing the economic and commercial power of Indians. But in spite

[25] M. Kintu, *Buganda's Position*, Information Department, Kabaka's Government, Kampala, Uganda Printing and Publishing Co., 1960, pp. 1-2.

[26] See C. P. S. Allen, *A Report on the First Direct Elections to the Legislative Council of the Uganda Protectorate*, Entebbe, Government Printer, 1959, Appendix J.

[27] See the Wild Report, *op.cit.*, which anxiously notes the need for political parties in order to create effective central government.

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of such efforts, political parties remain weak and the Buganda government continues to be the main source of parochial nationalism. Political party leaders hope that when responsible government develops at the center and the financial resources of the country are allocated on the basis of popular government, the strength of the Buganda government will be diminished. The struggle to obtain parliamentary institutions is less concerned with Britain or the colonial administration than was the case in Ghana. Rather, it is directed against the Buganda government because of its unwillingness to subordinate hierarchical authority to the principle of representative government. Thus the ethnic nationalism of Buganda remains the most important political obstacle to self-government and has crippled political party growth, rendering the political heart of the country virtually lifeless.[28]

As has been pointed out above, however, non-Baganda groups are developing a new political party that has been launched by recently elected African representatives of the Legislative Council. They seek to make the Legislative Council the crucial political organ in Uganda, and are reluctant to be tied to the tail of Kiganda parochialism. Thus the possibility presents itself that the central conciliar institutions of Uganda will now tend to favor the rest of the country. Grants in aid, development plans, and educational schemes can now become the target of competitive nationalism, fought out in the context of competing parochialisms. In that event, neither the traditional institutions nor their insularity will long be maintained.

Moreover, direct elections to the Buganda Lukiko will bring party politics strongly into the Buganda sphere.[29] It is possible that competitive nationalism can be transformed into federal government at the center. Federal government is a compromise system brought about by conflict among the constituent states, and conflict is necessary for its vitality. What is possible in the Uganda situation is political modernization in a federal system, in which the several traditional states will be allowed to modernize their institutions on their own terms. In the

[28] It must be pointed out, however, that in Uganda, unlike colonial Ghana, everyone knows that self-government is forthcoming. Lack of such certainty helped to develop an effective nationalist movement in Ghana, where to remain outside the party was tantamount to being pro-colonialist. In Uganda, all groups know that the country will eventually get self-government, and there is far more effort on the part of each of them to retain and expand their influence and power. Foreknowledge of self-government, in that sense, has helped to diminish the urgency of nationalism.

[29] Already in the new Lukiko, elected in 1959 (without direct election methods), five political parties are represented, a predominantly Catholic party supplying 80 per cent of all party representatives. The Buganda government has accepted the principle of direct elections but has steadfastly refused to implement it.

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demand for federalism all groups see some hope for their survival. Federalism itself has come to mean political modernism.

IV. Conclusion

In both Ghana and Uganda tribal or ethnic parochialism has persisted with widely varying results. Kiganda parochialism has itself been a form of modernism. Civil-service chieftaincy and bureaucratic norms have bolstered the kingdom. Indeed, the Buganda government is widely regarded as the most progressive force in the country. Hence, for the Baganda, to be modern is to be parochial.

In Ashanti, modernism clashed directly with traditionalism. The religious aspect of the traditional political and social structure was an important part of a network of suitable restraints on behavior. When these were disrupted by innovations in commercial enterprise and colonialism, traditional authority was quickly undermined. Yet because traditional authority was so much a part of daily life and custom, those who broke with tradition found themselves in drastic need of new and powerful social affiliations, for to break with tradition was to break with family, lineage, and ancestral fidelity.

In contrast to Ashanti, Buganda remains the most powerful solidary association possible. Social satisfactions are still achieved within Buganda and its government for all those who belong to the kingdom. In Ashanti the formation of a new political party was itself a process of forming new and powerful symbolic attachments. The Ashanti members of the CPP became fiercely devoted to the organization. The messianic role of the leader was based on the development of a new morality to supplant the old. Hence the deep cleavages in society which remained after self-government had been obtained posed the problem of nation-building after independence rather than before it.

We can summarize some of the more salient points of contrast between the two systems as follows:

(1) *Absorption of innovation.* Ashanti, with its consummatory-pyramidal system, was unable to control the effects of innovation. Ashanti tended to shrink from contact with the modern world. Early missionaries were imprisoned. The Ashanti wars were efforts to expel the British, as a foreign body, from the body politic. The effects of contact loosened the hold of traditionalism, although it remained a powerful force.

Buganda was able to control innovation. The European presence was absorbed and rendered useful. By careful planning and the use of

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modernizing agencies, the Buganda government increased its autonomy and control as time went on, rather than suffering partial decay.

(2) *Internal divisions and discontinuities.* What had hitherto been reinforcing social institutions of the consummatory system of Ashanti rapidly broke down into competing power groups and sources of internal antagonism and weakness. Thus the development of conflicts between youth and age, royals and non-royals, slaves and non-slaves, were all examples of conflict over the continuing strength of particularistic criteria which could be reconciled only so long as older religious and institutional checks were sustained. Such social controls were highly internalized, with authority variously distributed. As soon as the continuity of past and present was disrupted, the various groupings rapidly came to compete.

In Buganda the internal conflict continued, as in the period prior to contact, between clanship and chieftaincy—all, however, under the umbrella of the king as both Sabataka, head of all the clans, and Kabaka, or king. The advantages of appointive chieftaincy had long been apparent in the military undertakings of the kingdom and a secular tendency inherent in the system was simply reinforced by contact with the British. The system was able to modify itself to restrain the old conflicts sufficiently so that the principle of hierarchic kingship did not require substantial alteration. Allegiance did not become confused.

(3) *Competition for affiliations.* Internal conflict in Ashanti produced widespread attitudes of guilt. Cleavages divided the extended and nuclear families. Social breaks which meant modifying one's religious practices and sundering ties with the past (and one's ancestors) led to migration of individuals to urban areas which supported very different patterns of social life. These created more fundamental differences in outlook between urban and rural groups who, within one generation, had grown apart but were still not socially distant. The Ashanti were able to retain affiliations among those who represented orthodoxy. However, breaking such affiliations could not be resolved by the simple acceptance of heterodoxy. Rather a new orthodoxy had to be posed against the old. Thus the new affiliations of the political party assumed the proportions of a militant church movement.

In Buganda, there was relatively easy adaptation of internal cleavage to serve the larger purposes of the state. As a result, no Baganda repudiated their chiefs or the Kabaka. The Buganda government was itself a source of modernism, and no incompatibility between modernism and traditionalism resulted in the enforced disaffiliation of discontented

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groups. No discontented urban groups emerged, anxiety-ridden and seeking drastic change.

(4) *Legitimacy conflicts.* Just as innovation could not be controlled in Ashanti, so the secular authority of the colonial government was posed against the traditional authority of the chiefs. Immemorial prescriptive rights clashed with concepts of efficiency and performance as a basis of authority. In Buganda, the autocratic principle prevailed and two oligarchies, British and Baganda, worked alongside one another. They were in constant competition, but they did not challenge each other's legitimacy. Both were oriented to efficiency and performance.

In Ashanti almost any outside activity, by being resisted, posed an ultimate legitimacy problem. So closely interrelated were the elements of social life and belief that they conformed nicely to Durkheim's concept of a fragile and mechanical society. Ultimately all threats were threats against legitimacy. Hence not only was colonialism viewed as a threat to traditional legitimacy, but nationalism was even more so. The conflict between lineage and ancestral sanction (immemoriality) for current acts and secular forces was introduced by colonialism, and helped to produce the nationalism which then had to break the power of traditionalism and its residual hold upon the public. Thus modern nationalism in Ghana is essentially an effort to create a wider legitimacy which introduces some of the same instrumental characteristics which Buganda possessed traditionally. *The result is a growth of an autocratic principle of leadership in Ghana*—the organizational weapon serving as its own justification.

In contrast, in Buganda, the conflict over legitimacy never emerged in sharp form in the colonial-Buganda government relationship. Indeed, even when the Kabaka was exiled, early in the relationship, or more recently when the present Kabaka was deported, the principle of the Kabakaship was not questioned by the Protectorate government authorities.

However, now that the problem of building wider affiliations has been tackled effectively by the Protectorate government, political parties are challenging the principle of hierarchical authority. *They are seeking to supplant hierarchical authority with representative authority* as a means of building a modern nation. They do not, however, need to create attitudes of universalism and performance as the basis of political recruitment since these are already widespread and traditional.

Where the consummatory-pyramidal system prevailed, there developed fierce competition between traditional and secular leaders to monopolize allegiance. This was expressed by the latter in efforts to build over-

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arching and autocratic institutions which by autocratic means fostered egalitarianism in political recruitment and the exercise of authority. The problem was to prevent social atomism while mobilizing those resources of the society which could capitalize on change itself. This put exceedingly heavy burdens on political nationalists, whose need for organizational control and support became all important.

In the instrumental-hierarchical system prevailing in Buganda, change has aided parochialism and modernism of a local sort, making political modernism of the national state more difficult to achieve. Where consummatory values prevail in the traditional sector, the political leaders lose the advantages of traditionalism. Their need is to find new ways and means of employing it to ease the burdens of political development. Where instrumental values prevail, the local and national forms of modernism need to be brought into some kind of useful identity, so that instrumental traditionalism can reinforce political modernization at the national level.

Ghana shows the effects of a single-party unitary government and its difficulties in modernization. Can a modernizing nation be created through a federal system of government in which the parts will reinforce the whole? In this respect, Uganda represents a potential alternative to the Ghana pattern. Out of regard for instrumental traditionalism, Uganda may find a political compromise proximate to the needs of the public, achieving modernity with both prudence and freedom.

Modernism and traditionalism have become key political issues. Buganda has retained both her tribalism and her separatism, penalizing the political advance of the country as a whole. Ashanti, the last stronghold of tribalism in Ghana, has been defeated by modernism in the form of nationalism. Buganda and Ashanti, Uganda and Ghana, both facing similar problems in different ways, shed some light on the politics of modernization in contemporary Africa.

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NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS IN AFRICA

By HERBERT J. SPIRO

WHEN the American Founding Fathers set about the task of perfecting the constitution of their union, they turned to the theory and practice of the Old World for counsel and illustration. The Federalist Papers contain many references to Hume and Montesquieu, the British Constitution and ancient leagues. However, it was not copying from foreign examples that made such an outstanding success of the Constitution of the United States. Rather it was the authors' imaginative creativity that gave to this oldest of the still operating written constitutions its unique combination of stability and flexibility, effectiveness and efficiency. The most successful parts of the Constitution—its federal aspects, the Supreme Court, the amending procedure, the Presidency—were not copied from models in the Old World, but created by inventive genius that applied itself to solving the new problems of the New World.

The novelty of the institutions they devised exposed the Founding Fathers to one of the strongest streams of criticism that flowed westward from Europe, even from their warmest sympathizers there. Similarly today, as the newly self-governing countries of Africa are experimenting with new constitutional forms, their harshest critics from the Old World—which by now includes the Americas—concentrate on deviations from conventional and cherished devices that the African experiments seem to ignore. The critics' praise is loudest when the copying from Western models appears to have been most accurate. European and American advisers to African governments tend to commend to their clients tried and true institutions, like the separation of powers or a clearly defined federalism, a two-party system or efficient electoral administration. As a result, they may be doing the Africans in particular and the cause of constitutionalism in general a great disservice.

I

The modern nation-state as a "form of government" was fashioned in response to certain sets of problems that its monarchic founders were facing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These problems could best be dealt with by centralizing, within one territorially defined

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unit, the "organized means of violence"—that is, army and police, bureaucracy and judiciary. Hence the immense preoccupation with all the attributes of sovereignty which is still plaguing contemporary world politics: sovereign states insist upon the inviolability of their territorial frontiers even on the threshold of the age of the seeing-eye satellite. Similarly, current international friction between two states, like Italy and Austria, one of whom harbors within its borders a minority group ethnically related to the population of the other, is an aftermath of attempts—which made good sense in an earlier age—to bring as many culturally similar people as possible under one sovereignty, and to have territorial boundaries run *between* two ethnically different populations rather than *through* one that was homogeneous. During the periods that were tone-setting for the political style of the English-speaking countries, one major issue at a time divided public opinion, and for this and other related reasons two great national parties began to dominate popular politics and have done so ever since. But wherever the attempt has been made to impose this kind of party system upon societies whose publics were divided by several equally important disagreements, the results have never been as intended and have seldom been beneficial.

There are clearly many aspects of the nation-state, even the constitutional and democratic nation-state, which make it less than adequate for solving the internal and external problems that confront contemporary polities, even in those parts of the world that have been "civilized" for centuries or millennia. If this were not true, then political scientists could not have collected as many case studies in the pathology of constitutional democracy as in fact they have. And the process of allegedly *inter-national* politics would not have come to its present sad pass. These inadequacies of existing constitutional forms in the West should make us more diffident in counseling and criticizing the founders of new political systems in Africa as they begin their difficult task.

The merits of a new African constitution are unrelated to the fidelity with which it copies that of the United Kingdom, the United States, or one of the last three French Republics. The influence of a new political community in Africa cannot be gauged by the strength of its armed forces or its capacity to safeguard the integrity of its borders. Its longevity may have very little to do with the degree to which its bureaucracy is centralized. The popularity of an African government may be great despite the absence of a two-party system or, indeed, any party system. And citizens' rights may enjoy sound protection even

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though there is no loyal opposition and no conventional bill of rights. Moreover, it is conceivable and perhaps likely that many Africans value some other goals more highly than those served by the Western institutions just mentioned—i.e., constitutionalism, power, durability, popularity, and private rights. But even if they are deliberately designing their new political forms in pursuit of identical goals, their chances of success would be low if they tried to copy mechanically from more mature constitutional systems.

II

In the newly self-governing or soon-to-be-independent territories of Black Africa, organized means of violence are, fortunately, scarce. While the experiences and traditions of various African peoples naturally differ, none has achieved the goals recently considered most important through use of armed forces, nor do they plan or are they likely to attain anything that seriously matters to them by such means in the future. All of the great nation-states outside Africa, by contrast, became "great powers" in direct consequence of military actions. Some military establishments have had an aristocratic character, others have been more democratically based, but regardless of this every constitutional system has had to assign an important place in its constitution to the problem of civil-military relations. This need never become a problem in the new African polities, if organized force is kept at its present relatively low levels. And if civil-military relations are kept from becoming a problem, then it would be senseless to make the possession, organization, and control of armed forces a crucial aspect of either independence or the framework of government.

This is one great merit of the suggestion made by James M. Nicely, a Trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, that, in sub-Saharan Africa, "a state of disarmament might be created *ab initio*, when the matter is flexible, instead of vainly struggling toward that end in the future, when military and naval establishments are in being and attributes of sovereignty are colored by power."[1] This idea commends itself not only when viewed from the plane of world politics. It also holds great merit in view of a very basic transformation in the source of authority of governments *within* modern states. The original authority of the centralizing founders of nations like France, Great Britain, and Russia was based largely upon the power which they commanded. For their days, Lord Acton's famous dictum—that

[1] "Goal for Emerging Africa," letter to *New York Times*, April 13, 1960.

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government rests on consent, not force—may have been wrong. In our own day, however, the authority of governments is grounded increasingly in consent. This is true even of totalitarian rulers, however crooked the means used to manufacture that consent: one can do anything with bayonets but sit on them—at any rate, for very long. But nowhere is the truth of Lord Acton's assertion more evident than in the new polities of Africa, where men who utterly lacked instruments of force have been able to push out the wielders of the only organized means of violence extant in their territories. Colonial "powers" simply found the task of government too difficult in the face of massive internal *dis*sent. That is why they are "scuttling the ship of colonialism" all over Africa, in Sir Roy Welensky's disapproving metaphor. The new African leaders have come to the fore not because they took over control of the centralized organs of force, but because they embodied and symbolized the consensus of their peoples.

There is a further reason for downgrading the role of force and upgrading that of consent in Africa: the traditions of lengthy deliberation about disputes to which many of its tribes are heir. Deliberation about controversies usually leads to compromise by way of agreement, rather than to a verdict in favor of one party only which is then *enforced* upon the loser by government, as in the West. One may hope that these traditions will lend themselves to adaptation for purposes of devising procedures for the operation of the new political systems.

III

The kings who founded the modern states of Continental Europe began by building centralized, efficient, and honest armies, police forces, and bureaucracies. The citizens who, in a later age, went down in history as the creators of modern constitutionalism literally "invented" machinery that exercised regularized restraints upon these concentrations of power. In almost every case, a restrained army, police, or bureaucracy also became less centralized, less efficient, and less honest than when it had been a mere instrument of royal absolutism. Foreign observers of American government and administration, especially those who come from more unitary, less federal systems, often express amazement at the inefficiency and lack of probity with which Americans put up, and which are largely attributable to the strength of "states' rights," even in 1960. But police and bureaucracy, subjected to superior restraints for the purpose of public accountability under a decentralized federal constitution, are at the same time also helped in the performance of

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their work by being in closer touch with their publics. This gives them a broader, more human understanding of these people's problems, and as a result makes the public more amenable to accepting the services of their servants.

In the new African political systems, the causes of the original centralization of police and bureaucracy are lacking. More important, the reasons for emphasizing the importance of territorial boundaries between sovereign states are also absent. It was at the center of the figurative circle described by these frontiers that nation-builders concentrated control of their power. And they always tried to draw the borders of their states so as to follow the geography of, first, strategy and, second, cultural affinity. Today in Africa—as, indeed, increasingly all over the globe—the strategic reasons for defining boundaries are evaporating under the impact of modern weapons systems. The cultural ones do not exist. The present boundaries of African states were drawn in the course of the scramble for empire, setting up what one independence leader has called "the artificial cages"[2] within which the various movements are now driving toward self-government. Many different tribal, religious, and linguistic groupings are living inside each colonial cage. For example, on the Rhodesian side of a "natural" frontier like the Luapula River, there is a chief some of whose villages and headmen live on the Congolese side, and who in turn owes loyalty to a paramount chief or "king" whose court is hundreds of miles away in the Congo. The international friction caused recently by the international distribution of tribes like the Ewe in West Africa is also relevant. But historical accidents of this type stand in danger of becoming divisive international issues only because the new political systems are being constructed on the traditional European pattern, and in that pattern it is of gravest consequence whether or not an ethnic group is split up into two minorities under two different sovereignties.

IV

As the new constitutions, and the new constitution, of Africa are being constructed, both logic and experience indicate the need for evolving new forms of political association. We may hope that these will tend to merge into a pluralism of overlapping public authorities, serving a variety of purposes and comprising a variety of functionally or geographically defined publics. The pattern that will emerge is not likely to resemble the forms of American or any other extant federalism.

[2] Mr. Kapwepwe of the United National Independence Party in Northern Rhodesia.

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After all, even in the United States, the mold cast in 1788, and recast during the Civil War, has proved inadequate to present needs, so that port authorities, river valley authorities, and air pollution control authorities have had to be constructed which cut across state lines and enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the previously dominant federal, state, and local governments. In Europe, in the face of even greater obstacles generated by traditional notions of national sovereignty, the European High Authority and Common Market have now been brought into being. The hope is that, in Africa, such obstacles will not be allowed to arise from the outset. Rivers which under colonialism served as frontiers can be used to create a new feeling of community among people living on both banks, as they develop the resources of their valley. Extractive industries formerly competing because they grew up under different sovereignties will be able to pool their research activities and to exchange their working personnel. This has been possible even in the past, though it was made difficult by requirements for border passes or different *linguae francae* used, for example, on the Rhodesian Copperbelt and in the Katanga mines in the Belgian Congo. Since members of the same tribes often prefer similar types of work, although this may be available in different states, there should be many opportunities in the future for furthering old and creating new feelings of community and the corresponding political associations. Nor will goals like these detract from the impact of independence movements. Unlike their precursors in Europe, the African independence movements are drives not for *national* self-determination, but for simple self-government.

Some European countries tortuously evolved, in the course of hundreds of years, the distinction between Empire and Church and, later, between civil and spiritual authorities and jurisdictions. African polities may evolve somewhat analogous distinctions, though probably much less clearly defined, between tribal and/or religious jurisdictions, on the one hand, and the more public, more secular jurisdictions of the kind just mentioned, on the other. In Africa, people may be prepared to countenance dividing lines between authorities that would appear unclear and blurred to Westerners, because things will finally be accomplished through the support of *general consensus*, rather than the sanction of *specific force* applied to a particular target. Even in the United States today, a welter of non-governmental private courts, like commercial and ecclesiastical ones, daily produces decisions that are being accepted by those who come to seek the justice of an economic or religious community. When such private verdicts are not accepted,

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in the exceptional case, recourse can be had to the regular courts of the land, and in this sense the existence of these overlapping jurisdictions may entail delay and inefficiency. On a higher plane, this is also true of the overlapping and competing jurisdictions of governmental courts in the American federal system, and of the institution of judicial review. Both have drawn much criticism from non-American observers coming from more unitary backgrounds. However, as a great American judge has said, it was not the purpose of the Founders to promote efficiency but to protect liberty. If an even more complex and variegated network of functional and geographic jurisdictions should grow to cover Africa, new liberties might be sown and nurtured in consequence—in the form of opportunities to develop old and new affinities that would no longer be forced into the dull rubrics provided by one centralized administration.

V

The bias in favor of copying Western constitutional models that is shared by most Western consultants to and critics of new African governments indicates how hard it will be to persuade leaders of independence movements to heed our suggestion to be boldly different and to innovate. While fighting for independence, they looked upon the achievement of full sovereignty with all its trappings as their one great goal, which would bring international equality and respectability. They have no reason to want to *change* the international system of states, so long as they can join it as full-fledged members. And now another Westerner, albeit from a country without a colonialist past, comes along to tell them that they would make a great mistake by adopting proven Western constitutional forms, that they should instead evolve their own, suited to their own peculiar conditions and problems. This kind of advice is likely to be received with suspicion. It may seem to resemble the constitutional subterfuges that are being used by clever colonial regimes right now to postpone the inevitable end of their rule. Or it may remind them of the paternalistic European attitude that considers "civilized" constitutional forms unsuited to Africans, who are described alternately as "primitive" or "immature."

That is certainly not the spirit in which these words are being written. These suggestions were motivated neither by the arrogant feeling of superiority that so many Europeans show toward Africans, nor by a *narodniki*-like feeling of inferiority that some American liberals, ashamed of the human failures of our civilization, display toward the

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naïve political virtues of the latter-day "noble savage." The motive rather is simply to show that the constitutional techniques, traditions, and standards of the Old World are largely irrelevant to the novel problems of the New Africa. Sovereignty, the concentration of force, the delimitation of territorial boundaries, the streamlining of jurisdictions, and all the other paraphernalia of the nation-state are already hampering the healthy evolution of the very political systems with and around which they grew up. This is true even of some of the most cherished of Western institutions, like the parliamentary opposition as an instrument for enforcing a government's accountability and protecting the rights of minorities. If a people is in nearly unanimous agreement on such goals as economic and educational advancement, why bring about artificial disagreements and thereby detract from the impetus to progress provided by this consensus? Why risk the exclusion of supporters of an opposition from contributing to progress, when only a handful of persons are qualified by training or experience to make such contributions? To the extent that an African population values private rights—probably rights that differ from those considered most important in Western lands—its own leadership should be looked to for creating new safeguards for that purpose.

What should Western friends, and especially American friends both black and white, do to help African governments which are engaged in this process of constitutional experimentation and innovation? Beyond indicating the probable consequences of particular constitutional policies, learned from the comparative study of government, they should do very little. They should, of course, continue and expand economic assistance, but they might try to imagine how our Founding Fathers would have reacted if, in addition to sending economic and military aid to the thirteen Colonies, the Prussian or French government or scholars had been so arrogant as to send constitutional blueprints to Washington, Madison, Hamilton, and their colleagues. In that sense, these suggestions are really meant as advice not to Africans, but to Americans who would counsel Africans: leave your friends to their own imagination and creativeness, and they will make their own contribution to the constitutional history of mankind. Europe contributed the institutions of the sovereign nation-state to that history. America contributed the design of a flexible and absorptive constitutionalism. Is it too much to hope that Africa will contribute new forms of political association that may yet help all mankind to overcome those threats to its continued existence which the obsolescence of the sovereign nation-state has raised in our time?

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THE BOLSHEVIK PAST AS THE FIRST SECRETARY LIKES IT

By S. I. PLOSS

THE leaders of all modern states have appreciated to some extent the role played by historical studies in determining a citizenry's world outlook. The keenest sense of awareness has been exhibited by the authoritarian rulers, the self-chosen "men of destiny" who have felt compelled to fulfill—and to generate enthusiasm for—a "historic mission" whose execution would benefit a select people or mankind in general. Thus did the archracist among this century's European despots reflect on April 11, 1942, with regard to his new subjects in the east: "To teach the Russians, Ukrainians and Kirghiz to read and write will eventually be to our own disadvantage; education will give the more intelligent among them an opportunity to study history, to acquire an historical sense and hence to develop political ideas which cannot but be harmful to our interests."[1]

Within that eastern area of which Hitler spoke, an unusually subjective study of the past had long been an important aspect of political education.[2] It has continued to be important since the war. A Soviet directive of 1946 required the elite who were enrolled in Party training establishments to attend courses in Bolshevik, USSR, and world history.[3] At that time no fewer than 280 hours of the curriculum at Moscow's Central School for youth leaders were devoted to work on the evolution of Bolshevism.[4] A more recent report affirmed that in 1958-1959 the study of the Party's history was to hold "a most important place" in the Party educational system.[5]

A corollary of the strongly marked functionalism which distinguishes Party historiography is that a comparative study of its dated treatises

[1] *Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-1944*, trans. by N. Cameron and R. H. Stevens, New York, 1953, p. 344.

[2] There are several well known monographs on historiography in Party dress. For some indication of its employment among those who "count" in Soviet society, see the pioneering work of Z. Katz, "Party Political Education in Russia, 1918-1935," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), VII, No. 3 (January 1956), pp. 237-47.

[3] Decision of the CC CPSU(B) of August 2, 1946, "Training and Retraining of Leading Party and Soviet Workers," in *Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza v Rezoliutsiiakh i Resheniiakh S'ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TsK, 1898-1953* [The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and Plenary Meetings of the Central Committee, 1898-1953], Moscow, 1953, II, pp. 1019-27.

[4] *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, September 14, 1946.

[5] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13 (1958), p. 120.

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helps to illumine the elements of change and continuity in Soviet politics over the years. Heedful of this, the present article sketches the points of likeness and difference between the 1959 version of the Bolshevik record, edited by Ponomarev and others, and the *Short Course*, which was obligatory reading for university students and Party members in the USSR from 1938 through 1952.[6]

THE BACKGROUND

The objectives to be gained by study of the *Short Course* were enumerated in an edict heralding publication.[7] The "confusion" resulting from "the abundance of various points of view and the arbitrary interpretations of the most important questions of Party theory and history which occurred in a number of earlier texts" would be terminated. The political thought of V. I. Lenin would no longer be taught "as if it were something apart from Marxism"—an error, since "Leninism arose and developed on the basis of Marxism. Without a knowledge of this foundation of Leninism one cannot understand Leninism." The *Short Course* was thus indirectly to indicate what Lenin and in turn Stalin deemed apocryphal in the literary heritage of Marx and Engels. The resultant amalgam, called Marxism-Leninism, would leave Soviet Communists and their foreign counterparts no respectable ideological alternative to the iron doctrine known in the outer world as Stalinism.

The *Short Course* was likewise to correct political misconceptions extant in Soviet society. These were, in order of Stalinist abhorrence: that socialism could not be attained on anything less than a world scale; that all wars were "unjust"; that Bolsheviks were pacifists; and that under socialism central authority ought progressively to diminish. The Soviet state had, indeed, to be admired as "the chief instrument in the hands of the workers and peasants for the victory of socialism and for defense of the socialist gains of the toilers from the capitalist encircle-

[6] The textbooks are *Istoriia Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bolshevikov), Kratkii Kurs* [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course], edited by a Commission of the CC CPSU(B) and approved by the CC CPSU(B) in 1938, Moscow, 1945; and B. N. Ponomarev, editor-in-chief, I. M. Volkov, M. S. Volin, V. S. Zaitsev, A. P. Kuchkin, I. I. Mints, L. A. Slepov, A. I. Sobolev, A. A. Timofeevsky, V. M. Khvostov, and N. I. Shatagin, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza* [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, 1959. B. N. Ponomarev is reported to have been the director of the CC CPSU Secretariat's Department for Liaison with Non-Bloc Communist Parties as of December 1, 1959 (*National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union*, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 25).

[7] Decision of the CC CPSU(B) of November 14, 1938, "Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with Publication of *History of the CPSU(B), Short Course*," *KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, op.cit.*, II, pp. 859-75.

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ment." Finally, the public was to be made unreservedly confident of the new intelligentsia or, more precisely, the state bureaucracy, whose humble origins seemingly assured devotion to the cause of socialism. The introduction to the *Short Course* itself adds that mastery of the contents "sharpens our political vigilance" and "strengthens our certainty of the ultimate victory of the great cause of the Party of Lenin-Stalin, the victory of communism throughout the world."[8]

Such were the avowed aims of the *Short Course*. A calculated modesty prohibited frank notice of the underlying design, which was to endow Stalin with infallibility and compromise thoroughly his just-purged enemies. The entire work abounds in stories of vicious anti-Lenin and anti-Soviet plots hatched throughout the regime's existence by Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and others at the bidding of foreign intelligence services and thwarted thanks only to Stalin's timely intervention. His wisdom alone seemed to constitute the dynamic of internal progress.

The myths and homilies in the first edition of the *Short Course* are understandable when one bears in mind the situation then obtaining in the USSR and the world at large. Subsequently, the tyrant wished to deny his army chiefs the lion's share of glory for organizing the victories of 1943-1945. Contrary to popular expectation, final triumph did not bring a more relaxed life. A new foreign threat was claimed to exist. These factors all but outdated the *Short Course*, with its omnific *zodchi*, or architect, promise of future welfare, and alertness to bourgeois-inspired conspiracy. The *Short Course* was highly instrumental in the propaganda drives launched intermittently from the days of Stalingrad to the seventh postwar year.

The release of Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* in October 1952 spelled the demise of the *Short Course*. The former exaltation of "revolution from above" became discordant when *Economic Problems* stressed a gradual transition instead of a radical leap to a barter system of trade between factory and village. The guidepost for mental drill shifted accordingly in the direction of Stalin's latest "theoretical enrichment" and the *Short Course* was demoted in status to collateral reading.[9]

The substantive core of Party education just after Stalin's death was material on economic practice and the manifesto issued for Bolshevism's fiftieth anniversary.[10] The official commentary on a three-volume col-

[8] *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 4.

[9] See W. Leonhard, "Party Training after Stalin," *Survey: An Analysis of Cultural Trends in the Soviet Orbit* (London), No. 20 (October 1957), pp. 10-16.

[10] *Ibid.* Manifesto excerpts are given in *New York Times*, July 27, 1953. On the dating of Bolshevik origins, more below.

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lection of Party documents for the years 1898-1953, which appeared early in 1954, neglected the *Short Course*.[11] Its death knell was sounded two years later at the 20th Party Congress. The Report of the CC asked for "a popular Marxist textbook of Party history, one based on historical fact, in which the epoch-making experiences of the Party's fight for communism are scientifically formulated as general principles and events up to the present day are treated."[12] Mikoyan next discredited the *Short Course*, admonishing historians who explained "complex" episodes of the Civil War as "the alleged wrecking activities of individual Party leaders of the day who many years later were incorrectly declared enemies of the people."[13] Khrushchev then brought the *Short Course* into full disrepute with his confidential report, "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences." This inquired rhetorically:

> If Stalin is the author of this book [i.e., the *Short Course*], why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October historical period of our glorious Communist Party solely into an action of "the Stalin genius"?
>
> Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the Party in the socialist transformation of the country, in the construction of socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and also other steps taken by the Party which undeviatingly travelled the path outlined by Lenin? This book speaks principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports. Everything without the smallest exception is tied to his name. . . .
>
> It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our Party which will be edited in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism. . . .[14]

This signified a demand for a text which would reassert vigorously the Party's faded identity and, equally important, sanctify the mainstream of domestic growth over the past quarter-century. The "collective leadership," although determined to smash the Stalin godhead of terrorism, was hardly disposed to alter the yet useful structure of hierarchical authority and organized social inequality. Khrushchev and his allies sought to legitimize these "excrescences" of the revolution—and register their own claim to exercise power—by suitable quotations from the works of the popularly revered Lenin. Hence, according to three of the men commissioned to undertake the textbook project, their foremost task was ". . . to show the genuine greatness and

[11] Leonhard, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

[12] Khrushchev speech in *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

[13] *Ibid.*, February 18, 1956. At the same time, historians had to "go in step with the Party," proceeding from "positions of Leninism."

[14] *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents*, New York, 1956, pp. 73, 88.

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the outstanding role played in the creation of our Party and the world's first socialist state by Vladimir Ilich Lenin. . . . we tried to show Lenin as the creator of a specific plan for socialist construction. A special chapter of the new textbook presents the Leninist theoretical solution to the problems of industrialization, collectivization and cultural revolution."[15]

THE NEW ORTHODOXY

The enhancement of Lenin's "greatness" at once leaps to the eye when the histories of 1938 and 1959 are juxtaposed. His distinctive participation in the revolutionary movement is underscored by tracing back to 1903 instead of to 1912 Bolshevism's existence as an independent strain of Russian social democracy. Lenin's eminence as a thinker rather than an organizer is chiefly extolled. His "April Theses" of 1917, which committed Bolshevism to unremitting political warfare against the nascent Russian democracy, are no longer "famous" but "ingenious."[16] The fateful decision to telescope the Revolution's bourgeois-democratic and proletarian phases which the Theses embodied was not merely "an important step forward in the theory and practice of Marxism"; it was "a very great scientific discovery which played a great role in the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia."[17] Recounting the events of October 25/November 7, 1917, the *Short Course* states that the "Bolsheviks" then issued a manifesto "To the Citizens of Russia." Now, it appears, this notice of the Provisional Government's dissolution signed by the Trotsky-led Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was "written by the ingenious inspirer and leader of the revolution, V. I. Lenin."[18] He personally formulated the revised Party program of 1919.

Lenin the theoretician was not, however, a man "divorced from practice" but concurrently an adroit *praktik*: "All work in organization of the [October] rising was guided by Lenin."[19] He engineered personally such initial breakthroughs on the diplomatic front as the Genoa Conference of 1922: "Lenin in fact directed from Moscow the work of [the Soviet] delegation."[20] And throughout those difficult times Lenin was in constant touch with his associates. The three months preceding the October Revolution saw over thirty meetings of the

[15] "History Is a Great Teacher" (interview with Mints, Kuchkin, and Zaitsev), *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, July 9, 1959.
[16] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 177; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 202.
[17] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 177; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 203.
[18] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 199; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 236.
[19] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 234.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 342.

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Central Committee, including two plenary and two enlarged plenary sessions, something ignored in the *Short Course*. Summing up the "heroic period" of 1918-1921, the new text reminds the reader that "the Leninist standards of Party life" were observed faithfully, with "meetings of the CC, conclaves, conferences and congresses" summoned regularly.[21] But, unlike histories predating the *Short Course*, the 1959 version does not usually offer a breakdown on voting in the CC or at Party congresses in 1917 and 1918; to do so would be to reveal the very non-monolithic character of Bolshevism at that time.[22]

HERETICS RE-EVALUATED

Also unlike works produced in the 1920's, the *History of the CPSU* forgoes a complete listing of the men elected to the CC in the regime's first years, lest undue curiosity be aroused about those who served the revolutionary cause well until driven by conscience to oppose the more adaptable oligarchs.[23] With a few notable exceptions, the classic oppositionists are treated more benignly than hitherto, the essential difference being their portrayal as objectively rather than subjectively hostile to the dictatorship's well-being. Thus, Lenin's intimates who urged a coalition government following the October takeover are cleared of the charge that they wittingly were "accomplices of the bourgeoisie."[24] The "Left Communists" who in 1918 decried acceptance of the harsh German peace terms are referred to as an "anti-Party group" and their advocacy of "revolutionary war" as a "treasonous and disastrous policy." Their motivation was, however, sincere—Bukharin and his ilk were "overcome by revolutionary phraseology," the Party's quick successes had caused them to be "intoxicated."[25] The historical evidence fabricated to prejudice the integrity of former Left Communists who stood trial in March 1938 is now repudiated implicitly: in 1918 the Left Socialist Revolutionaries proposed unfruitfully to Bukharin that Lenin

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 317. A serialized version of Chapter IX that appeared in a journal approved for publication on November 12, 1958, also mentioned "collective leadership." Significantly, this term was excised from the final draft of the textbook; cf. *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniiu* [Aid to political self-education], No. 11 (1958), p. 99.

[22] Cf. N. N. Popov, *Ocherk Istorii Rossiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bolshevikov)* [An Outline of the History of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, pp. 205, 226-28.

[23] Popov offers a complete list of members and alternates in the post-revolutionary CC's. The *Short Course* names only those who consistently deviated in accordance with the Party line, first under Lenin and then under Stalin. Thereupon the list closes abruptly with the phrase "and others." This procedure is followed in the annotation to the documentary collection of 1953, *KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh*. The 1959 text does not even give this partial listing, perhaps to avert doubt about the Lenin-Khrushchev tie to be discussed below.

[24] See *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 202.

[25] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 259ff.

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be removed as the head of state and a new, all-radical government formed, which means that there never was a Bukharin-Trotsky plot to arrest and then murder Lenin, as claimed in the *Short Course*. Also, the SR-led revolt of July 1918 did not commence with the knowledge of Bukharin and Trotsky, as "proven" in Justice Ulrik's court. In sum, there was no "general counter-revolutionary conspiracy of Bukharinites, Trotskyites and 'left' Socialist Revolutionaries against the Soviet power." The adherents to that day's Party opposition must be regarded henceforth not as "the enemy hidden within the Party's ranks," but as "disorganizers of the Party who violated its unity and undermined the dictatorship of the proletariat."[26]

This relatively benevolent attitude toward dissentients is extended also to the Zinoviev-Kamenev union of 1925, an affair which was "anti-Party" but not "criminal."[27] The latter-day Trotskyites and Rightists are dealt with far less generously, evidently because their protests against bureaucratism and disproportionate forcing of heavy industry, respectively, coincide too uncomfortably with today's popular grievances. The general appraisal of Trotsky suggests that it will be some time before Moscow requests his remains for interment in or beneath the Kremlin wall. As before, Trotsky's brilliant direction of the units which staged the October rising goes unmentioned, with the credit belonging yet to the Party's still-born Military Revolutionary Center. "Judas" Trotsky the long-time foreign agent has become, *à la* Sorokin the diarist, a headstrong individualist and power-seeker, a faint-hearted creature totally bereft of creative ability. Along with most of his companions, Trotsky joined the Party in mid-1917 not, to be sure, in order to "destroy it from within," but, nonetheless, to "fight against Leninism and to foist on to the Party their opportunist and anti-socialist policy," which is defined as one of reconciliation with the Mensheviks.[28] While acting as defense commissar,[29] Trotsky did not deliberately sabotage operations, assume an "arrogant and hostile" stance in relations with old Bolsheviks in the army, or seek to shoot Communist subordinates "just because they had incurred his displeasure." But he was remiss in the performance of duty: the military organs were often "sluggish" and delay caused excessive casualties; "distortions of military policy" occurred, perhaps because Trotsky

[26] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 208; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 262.
[27] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 265; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 373.
[28] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 190; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 222.
[29] "The organization and formation of the Red Army were the concern of an All-Russian collegium led by N. V. Krylenko and N. I. Podvoisky. The entire process of creating the armed forces of the Soviet Republic was guided by the Party led by V. I. Lenin" (*Istoriia KPSS*, p. 249).

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"blindly trusted" (though did not "venerate") ex-tsarist officers.[30] As if to compensate for the now missing epithets, the authors insert an allegation that during the Kronstadt mutiny Trotsky muttered despairingly: *Kukushka prokukovala!* or, "All is lost!"[31]

Trotsky's stock declines further in the era of the New Economic Policy. Covetous of power, he tried in 1923 to utilize the illness of Lenin and mounting economic difficulty "to take the Party leadership in his own hands and conduct a policy which in the final analysis would have led to a restoration of capitalism."[32] The Lenin "Testament," bared fully after the 20th Congress, is so paraphrased as to include only the negative remarks which the stricken master dropped about the leadership qualities of Trotsky, as well as Zinoviev and Kamenev. The Opposition Bloc formed by these three men in 1926 is no longer represented as a cabal of "spies recruited by foreign espionage services" which aimed at reviving moribund bourgeois democracy. The "criminal work of the Trotskyite factionalists" in 1926-1927 is seen foremost in their attempt to "defame the Party machine which the Party created over decades of revolutionary work."[33] Instead of elaborating on this essentially truthful utterance, the authors prefer to jump back to the realm of make-believe. They accuse the Bloc's members of denying a need to defend the country from "imperialist intervention" and even being "ready to stab the Soviet land in the back when it was attacked by the imperialists."[34] The purpose behind such malice is not expressed in direct terms. An accompanying reference to "the agents of class enemies within the Party" leads one to assume that the opposition was somehow in collusion with NEPmen and kulaks. It suffices for the authors to aver that a Bloc victory would have augured a capitalist restoration in Russia. The present-day Communist should, at any rate, be interested more in the lesson drawn at the 15th Party Congress—namely, that adherence to the Bloc and dissemination of its views was "*incompatible with membership in the Party.*"[35]

The decision of the 16th Party Congress (1930) on the Right deviation is also quoted ominously: ". . . [*to*] *deliver a merciless rebuff to all attempts to shake and undermine the steel-like Party discipline and*

[30] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, pp. 224, 226, 227-28, 230-31; and *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 293, 294, 298, 300. Tukhachevsky, Trotsky's commander in the field, is absolved of the guilt of issuing a "wrecker's order" during the Polish campaign in 1920. Although rehabilitated posthumously by 1958, he is not ranked with the military heroes of the Civil War.

[31] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 324.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[33] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 276; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 384.

[34] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 384-85.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 383, 384, 397.

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unity of the Leninist Party."[36] Possibly to brace readers for some future reckoning with Malenkov of 1957's "anti-Party group," the new text surpasses the *Short Course* in denigrating his ideological forerunners: Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky recanted in 1929 not just to effect "a temporary retreat so as to preserve their ranks from debacle"; theirs was "a doubledealing [*sic*] maneuver, for the Rightists covertly went on with their subversive activity."[37] Khrushchev's acute sensitivity to the unity question evidently induced the authors to withdraw the former acknowledgment that in the organized political debate of 1923 "a small number of cells in universities and offices voted for the Trotskyites." Substituted for this is a statement that "In the discussion the Trotskyites suffered total defeat."[38] Hence, there is no reason to inform the reader, as does the purge-worshiping *Short Course*, that early the following summer an anti-Trotskyite campaign raged in institutes and state bureaus. This retrospective unanimity is again demonstrated by deletion of the previous admission that in January 1926 the Young Communist League's executive in Leningrad refused to stamp as "correct" the decisions reached at the Party's 14th Congress.[39]

THE PLACE OF STALIN

Stalin, of course, was the staunchest champion of Party unity after Lenin's death and as such he is revered in the new text. Downgrading there is: the names of ten other Bolsheviks who returned from Siberian exile in March 1917 are now offered; it is disclosed, however deviously, that Stalin then held an "incorrect" position by advocating support of the Provisional Government and immediate peace without its overthrow; the phrase "Comrade Stalin wrote in *Pravda*" becomes "The Bolsheviks decided"; the 6th Congress and not Stalin alone opposed Lenin's surrender to the authorities after Kerensky moved against the Bolsheviks in July 1917; Stalin is no longer credited with heading the yet glorious Revolutionary Military Center; he never did submit to the CC a plan which in 1919 led to the defeat of the White Russian General Denikin; the Party and the Soviet people, not Stalin, made a vow at Lenin's bier "to fulfill his behests to the very end"; omitted is an excerpt from Stalin's speech to the first convention of collective farm shock workers in 1933, and notice that it was he who the same year informed leading Party bodies about the results of the first Five-

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 428. The words "merciless rebuff" are not italicized in the primary source as reproduced in *KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh*, II, p. 565.
[37] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 282; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 405.
[38] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, pp. 254-55; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 358.
[39] See *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 265.

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Year Plan; since Lenin was omniscient, it follows that the character flaws he detected in Stalin and noted in the Testament must have existed.[40] Stalin is, moreover, divested of the Marxist intellectual's toga, at least insofar as the early portion of his career is concerned: his discourse on the nationalities at the April Conference in 1917 was "based on Leninist principles" and not framed by "Lenin and Stalin"; the *Foundations of Leninism* (1924) turns from "a masterly exposition and a weighty theoretical substantiation of Leninism . . . [a] trenchant weapon of Marxist-Leninist theory in the hands of Bolsheviks all over the world" into a mere "book," albeit a useful one which facilitated a study of Party history and presented "everything new which V. I. Lenin had contributed to Marxism."[41]

The omissions and shifts of emphasis in the new text which detract from Stalin's stature are usually offset in this or some other manner. To cite a few examples: in the spring of 1917, Stalin "soon" abandoned the old-fashioned concept of two-stage revolution and ceased to urge an immediate peace; when others at the CC meeting of September 15/28, 1917, demanded that Lenin's messages calling for a seizure of power be burned, "Stalin suggested that the letters of Lenin be distributed to the more important organizations for discussion"; the decisive battles of the Civil War did, it seems, occur on the eastern and not the southern front (where Stalin had his Tsaritsyn mission, a circumstance which begat appropriate hosannas in the *Short Course*), but on the eastern front a "great role" belonged to a Party commission of inquiry which uncovered defects in military organization, and Stalin was one of the efficient commissioners; the Lenin Testament is cited to the effect that Stalin was "one of the outstanding leaders of the Party" and the document's postscript that he was "too rude" is ignored; *Problems of Leninism*, which Stalin penned in January 1926, increased faith in the chances for totally building socialism without foreign assistance and it helped to correct distortions of Lenin's ideas.[42] It was precisely because he "firmly and unwaveringly defended Leninism" against Trotskyism and other "anti-Party groupings" that Stalin was not, in accordance with Lenin's dying wish, removed as Secretary General in 1924.[43]

The "go-soft-on-Stalin" line which Khrushchev propounded after the East European upheavals and ferment in intellectual circles at home

[40] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, pp. 176, 185, 190, 197, 227-28, 256-57, 303-5; and *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 199, 201, 217, 220, 234, 301, 359, 362-63.
[41] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, pp. 182, 255; and *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 210, 359.
[42] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 201, 231, 288, 362-63, 373.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 363.

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in 1956 is exemplified by the new text's account and evaluation of the Great Purge which began in 1937. About that time, Stalin ". . . began to legalize some of the limitations of intra-Party and soviet democracy which were inevitable in conditions of heated struggle with the class enemy and his agents. He began to violate the standards of Party life and the principle of collective leadership as formulated by V. I. Lenin. Many important questions were decided by him alone."[44] Unfortunately, there appeared in Stalin's activity a certain "divergence of theory and practice." His writings manifested a proper outlook on the people as makers of history, the "collective" nature of Party management, the need for a solicitous approach to personnel, and increased "democratism" within the Party. Stalin also emphasized justly that the state had to be fortified and the people kept in a vigilant mood, especially wary of "the plots of the hostile capitalist encirclement." And there were "individual elements of the defeated oppositionist groups of Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Rightists and nationalists" who "stepped beyond the bounds of Soviet legality and not rarely joined with counter-revolutionary elements." They deserved physical annihilation, but not so the "many honest Communists and non-Party people who were in no way guilty," yet perished in the NKVD cellars. Their plight is attributed firstly to "the rogue and political adventurer" Beria (who actually became Security Chief when the mass arrests had abated). Beria, for reasons unstated, cunningly exploited Stalin's "personal shortcomings," which are likewise passed over in silence. The archpractitioner of mass terrorism, Ezhov, is only tersely remembered as one who had a "shameful role" in the macabre doings. Happily, both culprits were "duly punished" and "those who were unjustifiably repressed were fully rehabilitated in 1954-1955."[45]

The commentary on the atrocities of the late 1930's outdoes itself in euphemism. Concededly, "serious" harm was inflicted on the Party.[46] An important reason for production deficits in 1939 was inept management due to the recent "changes" in staffs.[47] But, in terms reminiscent of the almost 7,000-word declaration which the leaders of the CPSU signed on June 30, 1956, when trying to quell sedition and explain their acquiescence in the police outrages of Stalinism: ". . . the mistakes which were committed as a result of the cult of personality of J. V. Stalin, although they braked the pace of development of Soviet society,

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 483.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 483-84.

[46] Khrushchev's "secret speech" refers to "untold harm to our Party" and "tremendous harm to our country" (cf. *ibid.*, p. 484; and *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, pp. 10, 38).

[47] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 497.

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did not halt its development and, moreover, could not alter the socialist nature of the Soviet system. All the activity of J. V. Stalin himself was connected with realization of the great socialist transformations in the Soviet land. The Soviet people fully trusted the Party, were guided by its instructions and pushed forward the great cause of socialism. Socialist construction attained still newer successes [after the purges of 1937-1939]."[48]

What, therefore, emerges, is an idyllic image of the good steamship *Socialism*, which on its unprecedented and epoch-making voyage to Port Happiness crosses uncharted seas, regrettably loses some crew and passengers because of gyroscopic mischief but, nevertheless, stays on the course plotted by the Marxist-Leninist compass.

AN UNSQUARED CIRCLE

As under Stalin, there are in the USSR today two divergent currents of social psychology, one orthodox Marxist and the other etatist. The Communist elite strives for "increase in full measure of the Party's leading role," while various intellectual and professional groups idealize the free-willed autonomy of the scriptural commune. Ponomarev and his colleagues must somehow reconcile these aspirations. They spare no effort to bestow democratic virtue on the governmental system conceived by Lenin. The national parliament elected in November 1917 in accordance with Western standards of political morality is disposed of briskly in the *Short Course* ("it was necessary . . . to dissolve the bourgeois Constituent Assembly"). Lenin's bizarre rationale for this act is now presented and supplemented with the comment that "The people approved the dissolution of the bourgeois Constituent Assembly."[49] This contention is supported by hauling out of obscurity the 3rd Congress of Soviets which met in January 1918 to approve formally decisions taken by the Bolshevik-dominated cabinet. Additional testimony concerning the "new, higher type of democracy, *proletarian*, Soviet democracy," is offered by recalling the special Soviet Congress held to ratify the Brest peace. The Left SR's, who soon favored a resumption of hostilities in order to reopen the grain trade with the Ukraine and relax pressure on the villagers of Central Russia, were expelled from the soviets not arbitrarily, as the *Short Course* implies, but in accordance with the "popular will" as expressed in a decree of the 5th Soviet Congress. Such manifestations of *vox populi* are contrasted with "the

[48] Cf. *ibid.*, p. 484; and *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, pp. 293ff.

[49] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 204; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 253.

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falseness of bourgeois democracy." Party members are given assorted excerpts from Lenin's "Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky," which tries to refute the German Socialist's charge that the Bolshevik regime violated democratic principles. They are also reminded of Lenin's long-forgotten injunction of 1922 on "the exceptional importance of systematically unmasking bourgeois, 'modern democracy,' especially in the United States of America."[50]

The authoritarian tendency radiates from items added partially to meet the command that the new history boost cadre morale. Thus, when in the spring of 1918 the Party gave "full scope to the independent action of the soviets as organs of state power," it "at the very same time assured the leading role of the Party in the system of the proletarian dictatorship."[51] Spontaneity is now denied to the youth movement of 1917 and its culmination a year later: "The creation of the Young Communist League and its activity were from the very start under the guidance of the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin."[52] The advance of the Czechoslovak Legion was not merely halted by the Red Army in late summer 1918, but "Thanks to the measures adopted by the CC RCP(B) and Party organizations, . . . the eastern front was consolidated."[53] The guerrilla fighters and striking laborers who harassed Kolchak's rear are now held to have been guided by underground Party committees. The theme of Party supremacy in all things and at all times also enters the discussion of Soviet diplomatic strategy in the mid-1930's: the Party, and not "the USSR" or "our country," acts to expose fascists and make collective security pacts. The USSR does not simply join the League of Nations—this is done pursuant to a decision taken by the Party CC in December 1933. The most sweeping reassessment ushered in by the supremacy theme concerns the reason for Bolshevism's comparatively easy triumph in 1917. The *Short Course*'s verdict on the primary factor coincides with that of many Western analysts—namely, the weakness, poor organization, and political immaturity of the native middle class. This truism gives way to the discovery that "The decisive condition of victory for the revolution was that at the head of the popular masses stood the tested, militant and revolutionary party of Bolsheviks."[54] The irreverent foreign observer is tempted to conclude that the grandchildren of those who inhabited the Romanov patrimony are considered by their rulers to be no more capable of

[50] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 253, 262, 271-72, 341.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 268.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 269.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[54] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, pp. 202-3; and *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 238-39.

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self-help than were their grandfathers, despite four decades of tutelage by the Party molded after Lenin's prescription.

SOVIET RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

Whatever sentimental bond exists between the Soviet rulers and ruled derives largely from the nationalism accented initially some four years prior to release of the *Short Course*. The Great Russian component of "Soviet patriotism" increased in breadth during World War II and the new text recognizes its continued appeal (at least to Great Russians). Thus, whereas the *Short Course* hails the 1917 April Conference for taking "a path leading to the victory of the Socialist revolution," its replacement maintains that the assembly showed "the sole path for the country's withdrawal from war and desolation, salvation from exploitation and liquidation of the threat of Russia's enslavement by foreign imperialists, the road of struggle for the victory of the Socialist revolution in Russia."[55] The Kornilovites of the summer of 1917 are imaginatively excoriated as "traitors to the motherland" who "did not stop at opening the way for the foe into the depths of Russia."[56] A year later, "The counter-revolutionaries agreed to give the foreign imperialists enormous stretches of territory and were ready to dismember Russia, turn her into a colony, if only power could be wrenched from the hands of the toilers."[57] At that dark hour, "The true patriots were the Bolsheviks, who saved Russia from destruction by German imperialism and enslavement by foreign states."[58] The former officers of Nicholas II (less Tukhachevsky) who helped to avert national disaster by serving in the Red Army are, accordingly, commended. The string of Russian military disasters which Stalin recited in his 1931 address upholding the breakneck industrial tempo is now disregarded.

In an attempt to mollify ethnic-minority Communists who had become indignant over Stalin's wholesale exilings and purges, his heirs yield a few sops to their pride. Several non-Russian Party affiliates who helped in the post-1918 reincorporation of the borderlands and were executed in the Ezhov period are mentioned honorably.[59] The act of

[55] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 184; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 212.

[56] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 224. [57] *Ibid.*, p. 276. [58] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 251. Sultan-Galiev, the Tatar national Communist, who was first arrested in 1923 and disappeared in the Ezhovshchina, is not amnestied. Nor is A. Ikramov, the Uzbek Party leader who figured in the major trial of Rightists in 1938 and was restored to grace in an announcement made locally in 1957. The authors intone that "The 8th [Party] Congress categorically opposed the creation of a federation of autonomous Communist parties and steadfastly held that it was essential to have a single, centralized Communist Party with a single Central Committee to lead all Party work. . . . The creation of Communist parties of the Soviet national republics as component and inseparable parts of the RCP(B) signified a new stage in the organization of the

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reincorporation, or sovietization, may no longer be construed as Muscovite willfulness:

> *1938*: . . . the Soviet Government was now [i.e., after November 1918] able . . . to start an open struggle, military and political, for the liberation of Estonia, Latvia, Byelorussia, Lithuania, the Ukraine and Transcaucasia from the yoke of German imperialism.
>
> *1959*: Annulment of the Brest Agreement and the collapse of German imperialism's policy of conquest enabled a new surge of struggle by the toiling masses of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic area against the occupiers and the bourgeois nationalists. The Red Army came to the aid of the rebels.[60]

COMRADES ABROAD

The *Short Course* was written before Munich, when Stalin had a mutual military assistance pact with France and might have expected a still broader Western-Soviet coalition in the event of increased Nazi adventurism. Therefore any display of favor toward the foreign CP's, many of whose leaders were being victimized in their Soviet places of exile, was considered inopportune. The drastic alteration of the power balance and governmental structures effected from the Elbe to the Yalu during and after World War II has now made possible a forceful reaffirmation of Soviet communism's universalist ambitions. Three of the *History*'s authors thus tell an interviewer from *Literaturnaia Gazeta*: "The Party is shown not in isolation from the world revolutionary movement but linked with its development. . . . we tried . . . to stress the idea of proletarian internationalism, whose standardbearer is the CPSU." The Soviet party's primacy in the movement is, verily, the leitmotif. Lenin's speech to the 4th Comintern Congress in 1922 is "a sort of testament to all the fraternal communist parties to learn from the experience of the Russian Communist Party how to fight against capitalism and for the dictatorship of the proletariat and how creatively to adjust this struggle to the specific conditions of their lands. . . . Soviet Russia remained for the world proletariat the richest treasury of historic revolutionary experience."[61]

The national sensibilities of the foreign parties in power at present are, however, regarded discreetly, much in keeping with the Soviet Union's readjustment of ties with other members of the "socialist camp" which began in 1954 and quickened after Hungary. A sizable

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Communist Party of the Soviet land on the basis of the Leninist precept of proletarian internationalism and was a model of Party organization in a multi-national socialist republic" (*ibid.*, p. 295).

[60] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 221; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 284.

[61] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 346-47.

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number of Czech and Slovak prisoners-of-war are now supposed to have entered the Red Army after its founding and to have defended "the fatherland of the toilers of the whole world."[62] The Czechoslovak Legion command, however, was able to dupe a larger portion of the rank and file with a rumor that the Soviet government intended to transport them to Austria-Hungary instead of the western front. Similarly, in 1920, "a segment of the Polish workers and other strata of the toilers were deceived. The rulers of Poland took advantage of the toilers' hatred of tsarist Russia, which had enslaved Poland, and they pretended that the liberating struggle of the Red Army was a foreign attack. The toilers of Poland failed to realize that they were being deluded."[63] Out of the archival safe comes a CC pronunciamento of May 23, 1920, that "the defeat of the Polish white guards who are now attacking us *will in no manner change our attitude toward the independence of Poland.*"[64] The anti-Communist militant Pilsudski, formerly labeled a "bourgeois counter-revolutionary nationalist," is not mentioned and his "imperialist" homeland is termed instead "bourgeois-landlord" Poland.[65] The Chinese are the most conspicuous recipients of this expedient courtesy. They rank first among the foreigners who joined the Red Army's hitherto forgotten international brigades of the Civil War period. The "first civil revolutionary war" that was waged in China during the years 1924-1927 is found now to have influenced seriously the global movement for national independence. Mao's name precedes all others in a listing of international communism's "solid Marxist-Leninist core" as constituted in 1935. He is said to have been at that time "a strong theoretician of Marxism-Leninism, chief of the [Chinese Communist] Party and experienced leader of the masses."[66]

OVERTURES TO WESTERN SOCIALISTS

The revival in 1956 of the united-front-from-above tactic, which was preached in 1935 but ignored in the *Short Course* because of the Great Power alignment then prevailing, makes for several alterations that are geared to impress favorably the Social Democratic mind. The first Comintern Congress is thus no longer held on Bolshevik initiative

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 276.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 311.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 308.
[65] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, pp. 228-29, 230; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 307.
[66] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 280, 376-77, 452, 453. Chapter XI as serialized in a journal approved for publication on March 16, 1959, asserts that the Chinese Communist Party *led* the anti-warlord crusade of the 1920's. The textbook version, ready for print three months later, differs on this point, affirming that the CCP *tried* to lead the struggle (cf. *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniiu*, No. 3 [1959], p. 29; and *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 376-77).

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(as indeed was the case) and its audience includes radicals who are of non-Communist persuasion (a half-step toward complete veracity). The German SD's of 1932 are relieved of the fanciful stigma of "traitors to the working class" who "paved the way for fascism through a policy of compromise."[67] Studiedly oblivious of the bitterness left by Communist sectarianism of the early 1930's and the revulsion which Stalin's internal policies caused among Western Socialists, the authors conclude that, prior to World War II, "The split in the labor movement significantly weakened the forces which opposed fascism and war."[68]

The current advocacy of united fronts and peaceful coexistence requires that the CPSU be viewed as an unwavering opponent of civil and international strife. During the Kornilov affair, ". . . Lenin proposed to the SR's and Mensheviks, who were still dominant in the soviets, that they take power for the soviets. The Party wished to use the last chance for the peaceful development of the revolution. But the SR's and Mensheviks, who had firmly linked themselves with the bourgeoisie, refused to take the single chance which remained for the soviets' peaceful ascension to power."[69] Their peaceful overture rebuffed, the Bolsheviks took care to see that their overturn would be conducted, as it was, "exceptionally swiftly."[70] An incident of revolutionary mayhem like the lynching of army chief Dukhonin, who refused to treat with the Germans on order of the Lenin government, as chronicled in the *Short Course*, is now best forgotten. With reference to the Decree on Peace which followed the Bolshevik coup within hours: "For the first time in history there were proclaimed new principles of international relations, condemning war as an instrument for the solution of disputed questions and making peace the basic policy of the socialist state. Yet in this first Soviet decree there was proclaimed the Leninist idea of the possibility of coexistence of two systems with different social organizations."[71]

In the light of Khrushchev's findings in 1956, Lenin's dictum of March 1918 that "further military attacks by imperialist states on the Soviet republic were inevitable" is omitted from the new text.[72] Its chapter on 1918-1921 closes with the refrain that "The Soviet land stood before all mankind as the defender of peace, freedom and independence."[73]

[67] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 289; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 450.
[68] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 453. [69] *Ibid.*, p. 225. [70] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 237.
[72] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 209; and *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 261-62.
[73] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 317.

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A MORE HOSTILE WEST

The "party of peace" still avoids pacifist illusions. As the power alignment in 1938 called for the last Kaiser's imperialism to be assessed "the most dangerous marauder" of its day, so that in 1959 demands that it be simply "a strong and dangerous marauder."[74] The economic and military rivals of imperial Germany are accompanied now by America, which, "pursuing its own imperialist objectives, joined the Entente in April 1917."[75] The alleged dealings of Entente agents with Kornilov become wider and more insidious:

> *1938*: Representatives of the "Allies," Britain and France, also came to General Kornilov, demanding that action against the revolution be not delayed.
>
> *1959*: The role of military dictator, by agreement [regarding "the counter-revolution"] with the American and Anglo-French governments, was given to the commander-in-chief General Kornilov. . . . He was promised aid by the representatives of the USA, Britain, and France.[76]

The Western plotters are no longer moved in the first instance by a desire to install a government which would restore the discipline of the Russian army as a preliminary to reactivating the eastern front. This is clear from the "fact" that in September 1917, "Under the threat of a growing revolutionary movement in their rear, the British and French imperialists tried to agree with the German imperialists on peace so as to wage a joint struggle against revolution."[77] Western military contingents arrived in Russia primarily because "The foreign imperialists could not reconcile themselves to the existence of a land where power was held by the workers and peasants, whose existence might exert a revolutionary influence on the toilers of the capitalist lands."[78]

Anti-Western sallies unknown to the 1938 version have the British unofficial representative in Russia, Lockhart, conspiring in 1918 with the American and French ambassadors with a view to kidnapping and then murdering Lenin; the assassin of Voikov, Soviet envoy to Warsaw, in 1927 is identified positively as a man in British hire; the United States arms embargo of the mid-1930's willy-nilly made fascist aggression easier in Abyssinia and Spain. The shift in power relationships between 1938 and 1959 also causes a reappraisal of the Western attitude toward the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931. The United

[74] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs.*, p. 206; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 256.
[75] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 196.
[76] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 192; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 224.
[77] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 226-27.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 275.

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States, Britain, and France, according to the *Short Course*, then feared that Japan would exclude them from Chinese markets, and so responded in alarm with a reinforcement of their Pacific squadrons. The 1959 *History of the CPSU* asserts of the same powers: "Although the expansion of Japan into China impinged on their interests, they, in essence, encouraged the Japanese aggression. The Western powers counted here on inciting a clash between Japan and the Soviet Union."[79]

TODAY'S LENIN

N. S. Khrushchev, the solicitor of these new exercises in historical distortion, had not entered Stalin's privy council as a full member when the *Short Course* narrative was completed. But even then the current Soviet leader was sufficiently important to be honored as a political worker in the Civil War. An equivalent passage in the *History* ranks him in proper alphabetic sequence with twenty-two others under the rather mixed rubric of "old cadres of Party leaders, comrades-in-arms and pupils of Lenin, organizers of the victory of the great revolution" and "the new leadership cadres, on whose shoulders lie the work of liquidating the results of war and building a socialist society."[80] Khrushchev is also singled out in novel fashion with nineteen other anti-Trotsky fighters of 1926-1927. He profits chiefly from anonymous association with certain engaging aspects of Leninist thought and economic reform. The ancestors of the regional economic councils on which Khrushchev staked his career in 1957 are summoned from limbo. The same applies to the resolution of the 1921 Party Congress which asked that the trade unions be allowed a hand in "training and promoting administrators from the workers and toilers," with the unions suggesting candidates for managerial posts and speaking up in behalf of worker interests.[81] While insisting on the economy's "centralized guidance by the state," Lenin is said to have urged "the active and conscious participation of the masses in economic life, with diverse control from below," which accords with Khrushchev's penchant for mass consultation and listening posts at the grass roots.[82] An excerpt

[79] Cf. *Kratkii Kurs*, p. 288; and *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 415.

[80] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 314. An official review makes it clear that Khrushchev belongs in the first category (*V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniiu*, No. 7 [1959], p. 18). The citation also includes CC Presidium members Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Shvernik. The honoring of Voroshilov is a sign of magnanimity, as well as of "authenticity," in view of the failure on p. 655 to mention him among the nineteen dignitaries (besides Khrushchev) who in June 1957 "decisively spoke out against the anti-Party grouping."

[81] *Istoriia KPSS*, pp. 324-26.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 266. See D. Scott, "Decentralization and Social Change," *Soviet Survey: A Quarterly Review of Cultural Trends* (London), No. 29 (July-September 1959), pp. 61-66.

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from a rediscovered Lenin speech of 1921 has the ring of a Khrushchev oration made in the late 1950's: "At present we facilitate world revolution by our economic policy. . . . The struggle has been projected on to the international arena. We shall decide this task and then win out surely and definitively on an international scale."[83] The Khrushchev "style" likewise comes to mind when one reads that "V. I. Lenin personified the new type of State figure. He deeply believed in the creative powers of the popular masses and had intimate contacts with them."[84]

CONCLUSION

A comparison of the official excursions made into the past of the CPSU in 1938 and 1959 tends to support the judgment of those who discern a post-Stalin "change" in the atmosphere, as distinct from the political texture, of the Soviet system. That system, much to the gratification of its public, has been liberated from the constant dread of terroristic heresy-hunts. It remains, however, what its founder called one of "unity of essentials, of fundamentals, of the essence," with somewhat greater "*variety* in details, in specific local features, in methods of *approach*, in *methods* of exercising control" than in 1953.[85]

The "essence" of the system, as under Stalin, is an autocracy commanding great military power which at home fosters mistrust of the Western democracies and enjoins sympathizers abroad to "fight against capitalism and for the dictatorship of the proletariat," while allowing them no allegiance save to "the fatherland of the toilers of the whole world." The new history's darker and more sweeping panorama of Western hostility, combined with its intensified restatement of global mission, indeed makes suspect the facile belief that Soviet communism has under the cohabitation preachment lapsed into an innocuous sort of national socialism.[86] Similarly, the historical license of which the textbook's authors avail themselves so freely evidences

[83] *Istoriia KPSS*, p. 331.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 248. The serialized version of Chapter VIII in a journal approved for publication on November 12, 1958, refers to Lenin as a "new *proletarian* type of State figure" (*V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniiu*, No. 11 [1958], p. 51). The excised adjective may have been thought to detract from the Lenin majesty.

[85] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, 2 vols., Moscow, 1947, II, p. 261.

[86] *Pace* William O. Douglas and John Gunther. "Under Stalin, Russia worked clandestinely in foreign lands. Under the new regime she is no longer an outsider conspiring with an internal underground" (Douglas, *Russian Journey*, Garden City, N.Y., 1956, p. 233). "World revolution incited by Moscow is no longer an element in policy because it is no longer considered to be necessary. Moreover the whole stress of Soviet policy since the middle 1940's has been toward *national* development" (Gunther, *Inside Russia Today*, New York, 1958, p. 488; italics in original).

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anew that intellectual utilitarianism which in Stalin's time induced a foreign observer to speak of modern Russia's "anti-culture."[87]

The "variety in details" and so forth evolved since 1953 has affected chiefly the role of the Communist Party and state administrative organs. The Party evidently has been revivified as an agency of social control. The strictures against factionalism within its ranks assured, however, that in early 1959 the Party's Central Committee was no more a deliberative body than were the Elizabethan parliaments.[88] The Soviet autocrat, like the Tudor, had presumably found it desirable for "society" to have a sense of participation in, and hence feel responsible for, the conduct of national affairs. The notables in all walks of life who had been recruited into the Central Committee (and some who had not) were invited to sit periodically in the Great Kremlin Palace to hear the First Secretary outline future policy and welcome suggestions on its marginal aspects. The formulation of "essentials" was clearly beyond their purview.

At the heart of post-Stalin administrative reform has been the transfer of a wide range of problems to the competency of republic-level ministries and the decentralization of industrial management. The new textbook reminds us, however, that the sovereignty of the "single, centralized Communist Party," with its "centralized guidance" of the national economy, still vitiates the constituent republics' theoretical *gosudarstvennost*, or "statehood," and "autonomy." Here again Lenin's formula of basic unity and expedient variety applies.

The Party-state's vaunted "monolithism" should not, however, be taken seriously. The heightened applause now accorded "soviet democracy" does to some extent serve as a warning to unregenerate bureaucrats who would muzzle the watchdog groups attached recently to the local soviets. But it must likewise signify the hierarchy's concern over the yearning "below" for thoroughgoing democratization.[89] While hardly foreshadowing an imminent upheaval, the implicit popular recognition of Communist arbitrariness has in the past created a formidable obstacle to the attainment of enthusiastic loyalty on a wide scale. It helps to explain why books like the *Short Course* were read

[87] See W. Weidlé, *Russia: Absent and Present*, trans. by A. G. Smith, New York, 1952, pp. 122ff.

[88] The same can be inferred with regard to the CC Presidium from angry word that the opposition of the mid-1920's tried to convert its forerunner, the Politburo, into a "discussion club" (see *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* [Problems of the History of the CPSU], No. 6 [1959], p. 29).

[89] An involved reply to the charge that the 21st Party Congress, "having discussed economic plans for the country's development, paid little attention to political problems, the problems of developing state, socialist democracy," is in *V Pomoshch Politicheskomu Samoobrazovaniiu*, No. 10 (1959), pp. 33-43.

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in the USSR almost entirely on a compulsory basis. For although deficient in knowledge of the formal norms that ensure real democracy, the bulk of the Soviet people have been less apt than many outsiders to accept at face value the Kremlin's professions of sincerity, at least insofar as domestic affairs are concerned. A study of the new history's reception as well as its contents may thus suggest themes which the true democracies may exploit in the contemporary battle of East-West ideologies.

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COMPARISONS OF UNITED STATES AND USSR NATIONAL OUTPUT

Some Rules of the Game

By ABRAHAM S. BECKER

HOW large is the Soviet gross national product (GNP) relative to our own? A third as large? Half? Two-thirds? Which of the estimates is correct? As the unique solution, none of them, unfortunately. Nor need we search for other numbers: these are probably the best of the lot, and in any case, the reply would be the same. The problem is not one of data, or of definitions, or of estimating methods. Such problems do exist and present difficulties of their own, but the inescapable and immovable barrier to the unique solution in US-USSR national output comparisons is the crucial fact of differences in the structures of the American and Soviet economies. In general, in comparisons of different economies or of the same economy at different times, diverse structures create what the economist calls an "index-number problem." The worst of it is, the "problem" is insoluble.

All this is old hat to many students of the Soviet economy and to economists generally. Relegated to performing on the back courts before a limited audience in the know, those concerned with international comparisons were used to playing the game according to rules which have it that a single ratio is at best never more than a half-truth and two ratios can be equally true. However, Soviet-American output comparisons have now become a mass spectator sport, played before an American public that shows signs of being disturbed by the course of the "industrial race" proclaimed by Khrushchev and is anxious to get at the "truth." Unfortunately, in the new popular game of US-USSR comparisons, the rules, which are direct corollaries of the index-number problem, are often more honored in the breach than the observance. New to the game, the public is understandably vague about the rules. Many of the participants, on the other hand, are certainly familiar with the rule-book but are reluctant to undertake what they feel will be difficult explanations.

But to leave matters as they stand can only do our side a disservice, for, as this article proposes to show, a prerequisite to public understanding of where we stand in the economic competition with the Soviet Union is observance of a few critical rules in framing comparisons of the United States and Soviet economies. In redefining these few

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rules, perhaps it will be possible to demonstrate at the same time that the required explanations are considerably less difficult than is commonly feared.

I

It may be helpful to begin with a brief restatement of the index-number problem as it concerns us here. In the example below, using arbitrarily chosen numbers, the national product of the USSR and the United States is assumed to be composed of only the output of guns and butter. The prices per unit, quantities, and values produced in each country are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

	USSR			UNITED STATES		
	Price per unit, rubles	*Quantity, units*	*Value of output, rubles*	*Price per unit, dollars*	*Quantity, units*	*Value of output, dollars*
Guns	50	100	5,000	10	200	2,000
Butter	100	10	1,000	2	1,500	3,000
National product			R6,000			$5,000

The national product of the USSR is composed of 5,000 rubles of guns and 1,000 rubles of butter, while the United States produces $3,000 of butter and $2,000 of guns. How large is the Soviet national product relative to that of the United States? We cannot compare rubles and dollars directly but must attempt to translate one of the monetary units into the other: we must convert rubles to dollars and then compare two dollar magnitudes, or convert dollars to rubles and compare two ruble magnitudes.

We may effect the conversion by asking, in turn: (a) What is the value of the quantities produced in the USSR *at US prices*, and how does this dollar sum compare with the dollar value of US national product? (b) What is the value of the quantities produced in the United States *at USSR prices*, and how does this ruble sum compare with the ruble value of USSR national product?

The results of these two computations are given in Table 2. If we value Soviet quantities produced at US prices, US product appears to be about five times as large as Soviet product. On the other hand, if we value US quantities produced at Soviet prices, the relative superiority of US output appears to be more than five times as great as shown in the first comparison. Which of the two ratios is correct?

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TABLE 2

	USSR national product	*US national product*	*Ratio of US to USSR product*
At dollar prices	$1,020	$5,000	4.9
At ruble prices	R6,000	R160,000	26.7

First, let us note that the large difference in the two national product ratios is the result of substantial differences in relative prices and relative quantities in the two countries. In our arbitrarily chosen example, guns are five times as expensive as butter in the United States, but cost only half as much as butter in the USSR. To put it another way, the USSR-US price ratio for guns at 5 rubles per dollar is a tenth as large as the price ratio for butter at 50 rubles per dollar. At the same time, the USSR produces half as many guns as the United States but less than 1 per cent as much butter. The divergence of the USSR-US price and quantity ratios is responsible for the divergent values of the ratio of USSR-to-US total product. If, however, the ratio of the USSR price to the US price were the same for all commodities, even though the quantity ratios differed, total product in the USSR would be the same proportion of total product in the United States, whether measured in rubles or dollars.[1]

Obviously, international price ratios are not the same for all commodities—whether the comparison is between the United States and the USSR or any other pair of countries. Within a single economy, the structure of prices changes even over short periods. Can we possibly circumvent the dilemma by avoiding the use of prices or, alternatively, by using the prices of only one economy to measure output in both?

The national product is an aggregate of varying physical quantities of many different goods and services. In order to add dissimilar things, to add guns to butter, we need, in John R. Hicks' phrase, some "rule of equivalence." The particular equivalence rule to be used necessarily depends on our objective in measuring changes or differences in national output. Economists distinguish two broad categories of measure-

[1] In our example there is an inverse relationship between price ratios and quantity ratios. Such a relationship is a common characteristic of comparisons involving two economies at a point in time, or the same economy at different points in time. The explanation lies in the tendency for commodities produced on a relatively large scale to be cheaper than those produced on a relatively small scale. But an inverse relationship between price and quantity ratios is not necessary for a divergence in the product ratios. For this, what is necessary is that both the price ratios and the quantity ratios be different for the various products.

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ment objectives—changes in productive capacity or in economic welfare, "economic welfare" being defined in terms of the utility of goods to households or to, say, the Central Planning Board, depending on whose preferences shape the allocation of resources in the society.

As it turns out, prices will necessarily be our rule of equivalence for both objectives. For if we are concerned to measure comparative welfare, we require that the quantities of the various goods and services produced be weighted in proportion to their relative utility. If measurement of comparative productive capacity is our objective, commodities must be weighted in proportion to their relative drain on the community's capacity, i.e., in proportion to the relative volume of resources they consume. In either case, as a practical matter, prices are the closest we can come to the equivalences we desire. It is perhaps unnecessary to add that a comparison involving the USSR and the United States will be restricted to measurement of relative capacity, since it is difficult to see what meaning can be attached to a welfare comparison of two economies which differ radically in the fundamental principle of economic organization—who controls the allocation of resources.

Three important consequences follow from the conclusion that we require price as our equivalence rule. First, any international comparison (analogously, any intertemporal comparison intranationally) will yield two different indexes, corresponding to the two price structures which serve as equivalences, because the structure of relative prices and quantities differs from country to country (and within the same country, from period to period). These differences are inevitable, for they are but the reflections of dissimilar (or changing) structures of preferences and resource availabilities.

Second, neither index is *a priori* preferable over the other. We may add guns and butter and compare US and USSR output using either preference-scarcity pattern as the common measuring rod. However, each pattern is unique, appropriate to only one country. If we wish to compare the respective national outputs of our numerical example in terms of the American pattern, the ratio of total output in the two countries is 4.9. If we ask the distinctly different question of how the national products compare when measured in terms of the Soviet pattern, the answer is 26.7. In each case, the quantities of one country are being valued by alien standards and there is no intrinsic reason to choose one comparison over the other. The correctness of either index depends on the particular resource pattern which is the context of the

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comparison; neither index is appropriate for both contexts; both indexes are necessary for the complete "truth."[2]

From what has already been said, it should be clear that the average of the two ratios is also not acceptable as the single number characterizing the relation of USSR to US national product. The average reflects neither the dollar nor the ruble price pattern and in principle, therefore, is simply wrong.[3] Use of the average does less damage when the two ratios are relatively close together (as they are not in the above example). Even so, it is a misleading procedure at best, for the average alone cannot tell us how much the ratios diverge. The average of 4.9 and 26.7 is 15.8. But 15.8 is also the average of 15.7 and 15.9, of 10.0 and 21.6, and of 0.9 (i.e., Soviet product greater than US product) and 30.7, among many others.[4] The larger the spread between the ratios, the less justifiable is the use of the average as their surrogate.

II

So far, the argument has been based on a hypothetical example. What are the actual numbers? Morris Bornstein, of the University of Michigan, has compared Soviet and US GNP in 1955 for the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress.[5] He estimated total Soviet GNP in 1955 as 26.8 per cent of US GNP in the same year when measured in 1955 ruble prices, and 53.4 per cent when measured in 1955 dollar prices.

[2] Since there are some important things wrong with Soviet prices as measures of relative opportunity costs, it may be argued that the comparison in ruble prices is misleading. But whatever the inadequacies of Soviet prices, no one would claim that US relative prices are proper indicators of Soviet opportunity costs. Second, it is possible to make certain adjustments in Soviet prices which make them more meaningful for these purposes.

[3] That is, there is no economic meaning which can be attached to the average ratio. Attempts have been made to attach such meaning but, to the writer's knowledge, none of these efforts has been successful.

Since it is sometimes claimed that the average, in effect, neutralizes the counteracting biases of the primary ratios, it is necessary to say a word here about the nature of these "biases." Without going into technical detail, suffice it to say that such biases do exist and they result from our unavoidable need to approximate the rates at which resources are mutually substitutable at capacity levels in a wide range of alternative possible output combinations by means of relative prices which refer to only one historical point in that range of combinations. Nevertheless, this does not certify the correctness of the average ratio. In the first place, in this context, the average ratio still has no claim to economic meaning but only to statistical expediency. Second, there is no assurance that the average ratio can fulfill even this limited role of statistical compromise, for we know little about the shape of the curve of alternative output combinations in either economy and, hence, of the direction and magnitude of the biases to which the primary ratios are subject.

[4] For statistical reasons, the usual procedure is to employ a geometric rather than arithmetic average. However, the same objection applies to use of either average.

[5] "Comparison of Soviet and United States National Product," *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Washington, D.C., 1959, II, p. 385.

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The geometric average of the two percentages is 37.8. By 1958 Soviet GNP had increased 24 per cent (in real terms) in Bornstein's estimate; US GNP rose by only 2 per cent according to official US figures.

In 1958, then, Soviet GNP can be said to have been about one-third of US GNP, when both are measured in rubles, and about two-thirds as large when measured in dollars. The geometric average of these ratios is 46 per cent. It is this kind of number—USSR GNP less than half as large as ours—that is frequently heard in public discussion.[6] Regrettably, no attempt seems to have been made to caution the public that this represents an average of ratios which differ by a factor of two.

Citation of the average ratio without reference to the disparate components that make it up is misleading because it prevents recognition of a central fact: Soviet national output is simultaneously considerably smaller than but also almost as large as ours. Since the context of the public discussion is the Soviet-American economic race, in which the relative positions of the contestants at start and "finish" are a prime focus of controversy, use of the average ratio alone is particularly confusing because it results in a distorted view of the relative standings at various points in the future. Thus, according to Allen Dulles,[7] even by 1970 Soviet GNP will be not much more than 55 per cent of ours. However, using the same growth rates as underlie the above estimate—4 per cent for the United States and 6 per cent for the USSR—USSR GNP in 1965 would be either less than two-fifths or just three-quarters as large as US GNP, depending on whether the comparison is based on Soviet or American prices; by 1970 Soviet GNP would be about 42 per cent or about 82 per cent as large as US GNP. It goes without saying that the projected relative position of the USSR is considerably improved in the exercise if the gap between Soviet and US growth rates is increased. If US GNP increased annually by 3 per cent and Soviet GNP grew by 7 per cent,[8] by 1970 the ruble comparison would show Soviet GNP somewhat more than half as large; the dollar comparison would show Soviet GNP *larger* than US GNP.[9] Are we

[6] For example, Allen W. Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified in hearings before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on November 13, 1959, that Soviet GNP in 1958 was estimated by CIA as 45 per cent of US GNP in the same year (*Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session, November 13-20, 1959*, Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 4). I want to point out that Professor Bornstein's understanding and treatment of the index-number problem in Soviet-American comparisons are above reproach. I have used his estimates as the basis of the discussion, not as an example of the practices I am criticizing.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[8] Three per cent is the approximate US average rate of growth over the past half-century, as well as of the last nine years; 7 per cent is CIA's estimate, according to Mr. Dulles, of the Soviet growth rate for 1950-1958.

[9] The Soviet claim is that the national income of the USSR is now about 60 per cent as large as ours, both defined according to the Marxist concept, and that growth rates of

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then to be alarmed by the dollar comparisons or comforted by the ruble ratios?

One more statistical rabbit remains to be pulled out of the hat. The above projections are based on 1955 ruble and dollar price patterns. Should the price trends of the past decade be maintained in the next—i.e., if the Soviet Union should succeed in maintaining price stability or even moderate deflation, and if the US economy should continue to suffer from appreciable price inflation—Soviet GNP might well "overtake and surpass" US GNP, both measured in dollar prices of the *given year*, considerably before 1970. At the same time, the gap between ruble-based and dollar-based GNP ratios would have diminished appreciably, and even when valued in ruble prices (again, of the given year), Soviet GNP would appear respectably close in over-all size to US GNP.

At this point, the observer on the sidelines is within his rights in asking whether the game is worth the candle. Are we in effect engaging in "some meaningless parlor game devised in the Kremlin"?[10] Yet, it is important to bring home to the public a point which, though seemingly obvious, encounters considerable emotional resistance: if the Soviet economy continues to grow faster than ours, at some point in the future it will inevitably be larger than ours. A passage from a paper prepared for the Congressional Joint Economic Committee illustrates an attitude still widely held in this country: "The realistic expectation as of the present time is that our relative advantage over the Russians will diminish but at a slackening rate. . . . There is no sufficient reason to feel sure that she [USSR] cannot some day match us in per capita output, although most of us may properly have sufficient confidence in the superiority of our own system to doubt that she can do so."[11]

Beyond this limited educational goal, however, comparisons of total GNP alone are not useful measures of the course of the Soviet-American economic race. We have seen that such comparisons are highly sensitive to the price patterns which are the means by which different quantities of dissimilar products are made commensurable. Whether we use dollar prices or ruble prices, whether prices of 1955 or 1965, makes an

8 per cent for the USSR and 2 to 3 per cent for the United States mark the crossover dates as 1968 for total output and 1970 for per capita output. (Index-number problems rarely intrude on Soviet-made projections.) See, for example, A. Aganbegian, "Dognat' i peregnat' SShA po urovniu proizvoditelnosti truda" [Overtake and surpass the USA with respect to the level of productivity of labor], *Sotsialisticheskii trud*, No. 4 (1959), p. 22.

[10] Hans Heymann, Jr., "Problems of Soviet-United States Comparisons," *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, I, p. 10.

[11] Howard C. Peterson (Committee on Economic Development), "Soviet Economic Growth and United States Policy," *ibid.*, II, p. 519.

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enormous difference to the results, each of which is equally "true" within its own defined context. Moreover, the baskets of goods being compared are so radically different in their composition that any measuring procedure attempting to make the baskets comparable does violence to the reality.

Fortunately, it is *not* the over-all size of the baskets but what is in them that is of direct interest to us. The central issues of public policy posed by the speed of Soviet growth hinge on the fear that rapid economic progress enhances Soviet ability to carry out its hostile designs against the free world; and here the over-all GNP comparison supplies only the truism that a large and fast-growing Soviet GNP does signify an expanding resource base for the execution of Soviet policy. In contrast, comparisons of defense efforts, levels of consumption, foreign aid programs—in the context of the total quantity of resources available to each country—are the direct approaches to effective policy decisions. Fortunately, too, though unduly burdened with the relatively sterile over-all GNP comparisons, public American discussion has recognized the need to focus on the specific components of total output relevant to the issue at hand.

III

Since the truly critical issue is relative military capabilities, major attention has been devoted to comparisons of the size of Soviet and American military budgets. The prevalent estimate seems to be that, with Soviet output not yet half as large as ours, the Soviet military budget "in real terms" is about as large as ours. Obviously, this implies that the share of GNP devoted to military uses is twice as large in the USSR as in the United States. In some estimates, the Soviet relative effort is even larger: according to Adlai Stevenson, "It is said that the Soviet defense effort takes about 25 per cent of the national income as against 10 per cent in this country."[12]

For all its apparent internal consistency, this set of relations is just poor arithmetic. I have already noted that to obtain an over-all GNP ratio of around 1:2 requires the averaging of separate comparisons in dollars and rubles. Assuming that the other relations cited are also derived from an account representing the geometric average of separate ruble and dollar comparisons, suppose we convert geometric average comparisons of defense and total GNP into absolute dollar comparisons. The results are shown in Table 3, using Bornstein's data for 1955 for illustration.

[12] "Putting First Things First," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 200.

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TABLE 3

	US billion $ (1)	*Geometric average ratio, USSR to US (2)*	*USSR billion $ (2) x (1) (3)*
Defense	38.4	.843	32.4
GNP	397.5	.378	150.3

Taking the US dollar values and multiplying them by USSR-to-US geometric average ratios, we obtain column (3), USSR values in dollars. Defense accounts for 10 per cent of US GNP of $397.5 billion, but 22 per cent of the Soviet GNP of $150.3 billion. It is in these terms that it appears the USSR is devoting more than twice as much of its national product to defense as does the United States. However, if we attempt the same procedure for all components of GNP, we will encounter an embarrassing discrepancy between the sum of USSR GNP components converted in this fashion and the converted value of *total* GNP, as shown in Table 4. The sum of column (3) elements in this table is

TABLE 4

	US billion $ (1)	*Geometric average ratio, USSR to US (2)*	*USSR billion $ (2) x (1) (3)*
Consumption	269.7	.285	76.9
Investment	77.2	.577	44.5
Defense	38.4	.843	32.4
Administration	12.1	1.523	18.4
GNP	397.5*	.378	?

* Slight discrepancy between total and sum of components due to rounding.

172.2; but 37.8 per cent of 397.5 is 150.3. The impasse is clear.

Thus, it is entirely improper to compare US and USSR shares of GNP allocated for component uses when the USSR elements in the comparison represent an average percentage of corresponding US values. Once more the average of separate ruble and dollar comparisons has proved an unreliable guide, this time leading into an arithmetic dead-end.

On occasion it appears that the arithmetic fallacies of such a procedure are at least dimly perceived, though loyalty to the average ratio for total GNP is unwavering. The resulting need to avoid the arithmetic

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impasse just described can lead to an economic defense which is dangerously misleading. A case in point is an Intelligence Information Brief of the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research and Analysis, entitled "US Versus Soviet Spending for Major GNP Categories" (February 24, 1959). After estimating the value of Soviet defense expenditures in 1957 in US prices as $40 billion, or about the same as US national security outlays, the document continues: "While the cost of the Soviet defense apparatus is 40 billion dollars, it would be a mistake to conclude that the USSR devotes 23 percent of its GNP of about 175 billion dollars (at 1957 US prices) to defense for it obtains at a lower cost what in American prices is worth 40 billion dollars. The Soviet armament industry is the most efficient among Soviet industries, and Soviet soldiers live more modestly than US soldiers. In other words, the Soviet military establishment requires fewer resources to produce the same destructive power as its American counterpart. While the Soviet national product is only 40 percent as large as that of the US (440 billion dollars), the share of defense in the totals is not much higher in the USSR than in the US."

From what has been said previously, it is evident that the State Department's estimate of USSR GNP in 1957 as 40 per cent of ours is also the average of separate ruble and dollar comparisons of total GNP. The new element here is the explicit step of taking 40 per cent of US GNP, obtaining a sum of 175 billion dollars, and calling that sum Soviet GNP at 1957 US prices. Of course, it is nothing of the sort. The process of obtaining the average of ruble and dollar comparisons means that the prices in which Soviet quantities are being valued are neither dollar nor ruble but "something in between." Since there exists no economy with a set of relative prices corresponding to "something in between" US and Soviet prices, the estimate of Soviet GNP as 175 billion dollars should be expressed in an equally imaginary currency unit. Certainly, the latter has no business masquerading as a dollar.

The authors of the Brief are aware that "it would be a mistake to conclude that the USSR devotes 23 percent of its GNP of about 175 billion dollars . . . to defense." However, they apparently fail to recognize the true reason—the incompatibility of their USSR GNP figure, derived from US GNP in dollars, by applying an average USSR-to-US-GNP ratio, and the estimate of Soviet defense outlays, obtained by dollar-price valuation of Soviet quantities. Instead, the authors attempt to resolve the dilemma by reference to differences in the efficiency of resource utilization.

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If the Soviet defense package costs 40 billion dollars in American prices, what does it mean to say that the package was obtained at a lower cost? Less in terms of rubles? Ambiguity here is the result of a basic misunderstanding of the meaning of the values compared. Contrary to what is clearly asserted in the quoted passage, it is not true that equivalent volumes of destructive power are being compared.[13] Since the Soviet defense package differs significantly from the US defense package in the amounts and proportions allocated to personnel, hardware, and so forth, the identity of the dollar-value tags on the two packages tells us only that, when resources are valued as in the United States, the two packages represent equivalent volumes of resources used. The structure of resource use will, of course, be different for the two packages. With no other information provided, we know nothing of the comparative destructive power of the Soviet and US defense expenditures. If personnel are expensive in dollars but cheap in rubles, and if hardware is, conversely, expensive in rubles but cheap in dollars, valuing US and Soviet defense expenditures in rubles is likely to show US outlays perceptibly larger than Soviet outlays because of relatively heavier emphasis on ruble-expensive hardware in the US program than in the Soviet program. If this is the case, the ruble comparison would indicate that, when resources are valued as in the USSR, the US defense package is a heavier absolute resource drain than the Soviet. Again, destructive power is neither relevant to nor implied in this comparison.

It is clear that comparisons of structure and components of GNP in the two countries must be framed in a consistent set of accounts—dollar or ruble, but not a mixture of both. It is equally clear, however, that we shall again be faced with a substantial divergence in the results. If Soviet GNP, in dollar terms, is *not* less than half but almost two-thirds as large as ours, near-identity of the absolute outlays in defense (when measured in dollars) must mean that the relative burden is not much more than 50 per cent larger in the USSR than in the United States, rather than twice as large, as is commonly believed. On the other hand, a switch to ruble valuation would show that Soviet defense outlays were three times as large a relative burden as American defense expenditures.

To express the purpose of the comparison as an attempt to compare the relative burden of defense outlays in the two countries suggests, however, that valuing both GNP's in dollars or rubles is begging the

[13] This point is explicitly recognized at an earlier point in the Brief, only to be ignored in the passage under discussion.

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question. If relative prices in the USSR were the same as in the United States, the economic burden of Soviet defense expenditures, defined in terms of the share of GNP, would be measured by a dollar valuation. But relative prices are not the same, and we could certainly balk at measuring the burden of US defense outlays in terms of ruble relative prices.[14] It would seem sensible to measure the relative burden of expenditures in each country in terms of its own price pattern—its own scheme of scarcities and preferences.

IV

A reliable source reports seeing a desk sign in the Pentagon warning the staff, "The boss wants a single figure—not a range." Yet despite the policymaker's expressed indignation at the technician's propensity to statistical hedging, the researcher has been able to make his boss understand about such things as the unreliability of data and the uncertainties of forecasting. On the other hand, up to now it has been assumed that, to the uninitiated, the index-number problem must appear abstruse and the concept of two complementary ratios which do not embrace a range as positively occult.

But the game of US-USSR comparisons is too important to be played other than by the rule-book. Is it not time to cease treating the index-number problem as an esoteric possession of the academics, too difficult for the public to comprehend?

Toward that end, we may summarize some of the important rules of the game:

(1) Because of significant differences in the economic structure of the USSR and the United States, comparison of national output or its components must yield divergent measures of the ratio of absolute values. There exists no unique answer. The divergent measures are each equally "true."

(2) The average of the divergent ratios has no intrinsic meaning, and its use as a shorthand summary in lieu of the real ratios is defensible only when the divergence is relatively small, as it is not in the case of US-USSR comparisons.

(3) Apart from the fact of large divergence of the real ratios, the average ratio may not be used to develop absolute USSR values from corresponding US dollar values, especially for structural comparisons.

(4) Although not a clear violation, in the interests of more sensible

[14] Bornstein estimates that, in ruble prices, defense consumed only 4 per cent of the US GNP in 1955. Advocates of larger US defense budgets might be interested in this comparison for public relations purposes.

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determination of the score, the practice of measuring the relative burden of Soviet expenditures on components of GNP in terms of dollars might be forsworn. Efforts are burdensome in terms of one's own system of values, not the other fellow's.

For the sake of public understanding of some of the vital issues of our time, it is urgent that we resume playing by the rules.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

By TALCOTT PARSONS

William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1959, 256 pp. $5.00.

Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday & Company, 1960, 432 pp. $4.95.

THE nearly simultaneous appearance of these two books, by close colleagues in the same university department, constitutes an important landmark in the development of political sociology, and hence in the relations of sociology to political science. Though the books differ in approach, there is a common basis of interest and some overlap in problems and in materials dealt with.

The common focus of interest is on the social conditions which underlie the functioning of modern democratic government both positively and negatively—that is, conditions on which its successful functioning depends and conversely which tend to undermine it; namely, those associated with "mass" society and its possible relation to totalitarianism. The primary concern is with the entrusting of political power to the free electoral process, and the conditions under which this is compatible with stability. Interest is, understandably, centered on the American case, but both books systematically mobilize comparative material in such a way as to give a perspective which could not be attained from the study of one political system alone.

Another important feature of both books is that, though by no means for the first time, they make extensive use of data from public opinion polls as well as analysis of voting statistics and they are couched in comparative terms. Whatever cautions need to be entered with respect to the use of the former class of data, there is no doubt that their addition to the materials used in older types of political analysis has meant a great enrichment of the field. In particular, it has become possible to check by direct evidence many points which without such data would have to remain speculative.

This review will not, however, be primarily concerned with the authors' use of data, but rather with the theoretical frameworks in which their analyses are set and the relation of these to their empirical conclusions. Though different, these theoretical frameworks are closely related and can appropriately be treated together. Perhaps the most

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important common central theme is that of the relation of social stratification to political structure and process, to the allocation of power and the conditions of its use, including the problem of stability. This concern with stratification is more explicit and central in Professor Lipset's book and this is one main reason for dealing with it before Professor Kornhauser's, the other being that Kornhauser is chiefly concerned with the direct exposition of a theoretical scheme, rather than with empirical generalization more nearly for its own sake, as is the case with Lipset.

I

Lipset's primary problem statement concerns a major phase of the failure of the Marxian predictions with respect to the development of Western industrial society. The prediction in question was that with industrial development there would be a progressive accentuation of the division of society into the two classes of bourgeoisie and proletariat in terms of their anchorage in the relations of production, and with this a progressive sharpening of the class struggle until the final revolutionary overturn, defined specifically as the transfer of power from one to the other, took place. It was thus held that, as a function of the development both of the objective situation and of class consciousness, there would be a progressive increase in the radical political militancy of the working classes.

Lipset's central empirical generalization is that in the political field the trend has been in precisely the opposite direction, and that this attenuation of working-class political militancy has been a direct function of the level of industrial advancement of the society—in particular, though by no means exclusively, of the standard of living attained by the masses of the population. Militancy, as evidenced by the propensity to vote for radical parties of the left, Lipset holds to be characteristic of the working classes of societies in the initial stages of industrialization, becoming progressively less so as economic development proceeds. Thus the United States has never had a strong Socialist, to say nothing of Communist, party. In such economically advanced countries as Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, the Socialist movements have become progressively less radical with time. In Europe it is the economically retarded (in a relative sense) major countries like France, and still more Italy, which have had strong Communist parties, and on the whole their strength has been waning with increasing prosperity and economic development. Somewhat the same is true of the West German Social Democratic Party. Indeed,

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both in Britain and in West Germany there have, since Lipset's book went to press, been crises in the Socialist ranks over the remaining elements of militancy, particularly with respect to the historically central tenet of the nationalization of industry, with the majorities in those parties retreating drastically from the historic position.

Lipset presents what is, to my knowledge, the most extensive comparative documentation of this fundamental trend which has yet become available. The general case appears to be unanswerable. It is an empirical state of affairs which raises theoretical problems of the first magnitude regarding an adequate conceptual scheme in terms of which to interpret the trends of modern industrial society, political and otherwise. Lipset himself does not attempt extensive abstract analysis even to the point of setting up formal classifications, but at the level of empirical generalization he introduces evidence on a number of questions which point in an interpretive direction.

It is, I think, legitimate to impute to him an undogmatic Marxian frame of reference as a point of departure. The essential components of this frame of reference seem to be three. The first is the paramount importance of a hierarchically ordered system of social stratification such that "status groups" (roughly in Max Weber's sense) have a ranking in this scale. It is not altogether clear to what extent the stratification system is necessarily bifurcated, but there seems to be a tendency to think in terms of "upper" and "lower," a tendency which is of course implicit in the idea of hierarchy itself.

The second point is the close relation between the social stratification system and that of political decision-making and power of the society as a whole. This indeed seems to be a main source of the bifurcation tendency of Marxian thought. There is an element of truth here in that a certain polarization is in fact inherent in political structures of a sufficiently differentiated type, since there has to be some concentration of power for effective decision-making, and there tends to be a structural division between those who do and who do not have "access" to this decision-making power, or who can or cannot claim in some sense to be represented by its primary holders.

The third Marxian tenet concerns the economy in a relatively concrete sense. This in turn has two main aspects. First, the output of the economy is the primary bone of contention—in consumption terms for the different classes, on the one hand, and, on the other, in that wealth is a primary, though by no means the only, ingredient of political power. The other aspect, however, concerns the structure of the economy itself. Here the idea of the two-class system in which

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status and power position are fused is extended to the level of the unit of production, the firm, and a simple dichotomy between owners and workers is postulated. The main political system of the society then is regarded as a macrocosm of the structure of the firm; the primary common feature is the principle of a diffuse, generalized polarization of interests.

One further point of interest here is that this broad pattern of polarization is to be found not only in "capitalist" society, but also and more generally in the precapitalist—in the Marxian sense, "feudal"—background where an aristocracy or "ruling class" has on the basis of "traditional status" played the part of the capitalistic bourgeoisie. It is of course also postulated that a group will tend to follow its "interests"; hence those holding high status and power will try to retain them, those of low status and power will try to overthrow their superiors. Let me repeat: this frame of reference is not explicitly stated by Lipset, but I have formulated it as an aid to interpreting his contribution.

Lipset's primary empirical concerns are with manifestations of attitudes. But the main interest of his results lies not in the light they throw on whether groups tend to follow their self-interest, but rather in that thrown on the structure of the situation in which they are placed. Both factors are, however, involved.

The essential question for purposes of this review concerns the existence of politically visible phenomena or factors which do not fit this paradigm of polarized dichotomy in the structure of the society. Lipset presents evidence on four such cases which in turn fall into two pairs, though he does not point this out. The simpler pair concerns the problem of "authoritarianism," which is dealt with in the two different categories of working-class authoritarianism (chap. iv) and the distribution of fascist tendencies in the social structure. The second concerns what, in a sense, is the obverse problem of the relevance of normative order and cultural factors which are independent of class interest. This problem area comes out in the treatment of the phenomenon of "civil rights" liberalism and in that of the politics of the intellectuals.

It is part of Marxian "rationalism" that the exercise of authority is interpreted primarily as an expression of "interests" in a situation involving interest in and feasibility of coercive control over others. Therefore it seems to be entirely "natural" that a ruling group should show authoritarian tendencies since it is in a position to be authoritarian and it has a vested interest in maintaining that position. Those

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in a disadvantaged power position, however, would be regarded as almost completely immune from that tendency. The liberalism that is found among the upper groups is thus treated by Marxians as an ideological cloak for their real interests which will be dropped as soon as the "chips are down," while the lower groups are by definition "fighters for freedom" whose anti-authoritarianism is held to be ingrained.

The first empirical problem then is whether in fact lower-class groups are thus immune to the alleged extent. There is one primary context where the problem may be said to be concealed by the fact that lower-class interest has been structurally aligned with opposition to the older authoritarian vested interests—namely, in the field of welfare and openness of opportunity, which is of course the field in which equalitarian values are most prominent. In this field, as Lipset shows, the lower groups on a class basis line up on the left, though not necessarily the radical left. On other issues, however, in the general field of "civil liberties" Lipset adduces much evidence that the upper-status groups are considerably more liberal than the lower—but more of this presently.

The authoritarian component of communism has of course long raised questions about the liberal attitudes of allegedly lower-class movements. What Lipset does is to broaden the basis of these doubts by showing the large amount of lower-class participation in a variety of other types of illiberal movements. The most striking case is participation in fascist and fascist-like movements. Working-class people have been by no means alone in such movements, and usually not predominant, but the evidence of their considerable and broadly uncoerced participation is unmistakable and there is at least one case, Perónism in Argentina, of primacy of labor support. These fascist movements, however, shade into such forms of "populism" as that of McCarthy. Two other important areas are cited by Lipset—namely, the prevalence of ethnic and religious prejudice, including rigid exclusionist practices, among working-class groups, and the prevalence of types of religion where the level of tolerance is very low.

These findings, mainly in the political context, are related to a general picture of lower-class culture and social structure which is gaining in definiteness through sociological research. It includes actual disadvantagedness and reactive resistance to the valuation of educational and occupational achievement and of "middle-class" standards generally, greater general dependency on and expectation of subjection to authority, and lower levels of differentiatedness of roles and hence participation in variegated interests and activities. Hence the impetus

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for a major political overturn in a crisis situation may well come from the reactive, grievance-expressing, mass activation of lower-class groups. That, however, they should as such be the primary bearers of the development of an increasingly "liberal" social and political order seems to be a position difficult to defend.

However, the general "upgrading" of the lower classes in education, occupation, and standard of living attendant on successful industrial development seems to be a major factor in their diminishing political militancy and their propensity to authoritarianism; they are better integrated in the society.

The most important empirical point made by Lipset about fascism is its structural nonspecificity. Though there is important evidence of the special susceptibility to fascist appeals of various groups in the middle classes, the broad picture is that recruits have come from all levels of the social structure. The social center of gravity has differed according to which groups were under the requisite kinds of pressure. The strong association of fascism with militant defensive nationalism also argues against the thesis of structural specificity internal to the society.

The Marxian view, of course, is that fascism is essentially the last-ditch defense of a beleaguered bourgeoisie who, under the pressure of the threat of working-class power, have thrown off the cloak of liberalism and become explicitly authoritarian and power-oriented. It is of course difficult to reconcile this view with the "mass" movement aspects of fascism, an aspect which Lipset treats rather incidentally but which becomes much more prominent in Kornhauser.

The main conclusion at this point which I think is fully justified by Lipset's data is that the distribution of authoritarian attitudes fails to meet Marxian expectations; the working class should be the least authoritarian, and fascism as the extreme case should clearly be a defensive bourgeois phenomenon not widely distributed through the social structure. If this discrepancy exists, then perhaps it should extend from authoritarian*ism* to the structure of authority itself.

This indeed may be said to be the theme of the next exception to the Marxian pattern which is documented by Lipset, the "civil rights" liberalism of the upper-status groups. Actually the "syndrome" is broader than civil rights; while including race relations as a particularly prominent example in the contemporary American scene, Lipset also mentions foreign affairs. Furthermore, he notes that this form of liberalism tends to focus in the better-established, "older" elements of the upper groups and is not so prominent in the *nouveau riche* elements; also

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it is found more in the cosmopolitan urban centers, less in the smaller cities and the towns. In the American case, there has been no clear location by political party, but a kind of oscillation between the two major parties. Such "liberals" have been prominent in the "left" wing of the Republican Party and have led such movements of revolt as Theodore Roosevelt's in 1912. They have also played a prominent part among the more conservative Democrats. There is clearly an association not only with higher educational attainment, but with its more socially and intellectually elite sources; a Dean Acheson educated at Groton, Yale, and Harvard Law School is a symbol. Lipset compares these American elements with the English Tory democrats and reformers. In an earlier American era, such elements were particularly prominent in the Abolitionist movement.

Though Lipset does not deal with it directly, the central problem that arises here concerns the ways in which institutionalized values and norms, though not having an immediately massive effect, exercise a persistent and, in the long run, very important influence on the political process, as well as on other processes in the society. These are groups which have strongly institutionalized the normative culture of the society. On the whole, they have tended to take the doctrines embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights more seriously than have others. In terms of the content of social considerations underlying political issues, there is clearly no sharp line between this syndrome and that of "economic" liberalism. This upper group has not only on the whole promoted the rights of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, but rather generally has tended to foster the idea of equality of opportunity. One of the most important contexts in which this has happened has of course been education and, closely associated with that, science, research, and "cultural" interests more generally. On strictly distributional problems, and on that of the power of trade unions, the record is more complex, with much ambivalence; at the very least, however, it can be said that these elements have by and large stayed aloof from the more violent forms of opposition to these tendencies of change. Also they have not tended to oppose progressive taxation.

In terms of social composition there have perhaps tended to be three main overlapping but partially independent groups. Certainly the older, more aristocratic lineages have been prominent, perhaps above all in such cities as Boston and Philadelphia. On an occupational basis, however, a particularly prominent part has been played by lawyers, and next by the higher levels of the financial world—especially, in a decisive period, investment bankers. Both these occupational groups occupy

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semi-fiduciary positions in the social structure which in their institutional role-definitions are somewhat removed from the more direct expectations of guidance by financial self-interest—perhaps the bankers less so, but still very appreciably.

Of course, for a system which has prospered, it can always be argued after the fact that it was to the "interest" of these groups to act this way, because the outcome has been the maintenance of their advantageous position. But, to take the example of foreign affairs, in the broad struggle since the time of World War I in favor of larger American participation in responsible leadership in world affairs, it has been by no means self-evident that simple American national interest, or the internal interest of the upper social groups, would be benefited by such a policy rather than by one of nationalistic isolationism. Certainly on the political scene the groups favoring the latter course have been vocal and powerful enough. It seems to me that the ordinary doctrine of interest is quite inadequate to explain either the development of a division *within* the "power elite" over such an issue or the nature of the forces which have tipped the balance in one direction. To say that American national interest required it is to beg the question. If this be true for the case of foreign relations, it is reasonable to suppose it is also true for the matters of internal politics which are at issue. A particularly good example is the active encouragement and financial support of higher education, which does not seem comprehensible without a valuation of learning, of the higher types of technical competence and, not least, of the importance of education in the general context of equality of opportunity.[1]

These considerations lead into the fourth context discussed by Lipset in which the Marxian class pattern fails to fit—namely, the politics of the intellectuals, particularly the American. The essential point is that politically the intellectuals stand well to the left of most other groups of comparable social prestige and even income. Above all, there is a strong tendency for them to avoid political identification with the business groups.

There are of course difficult problems in defining the scope of the category "intellectual." Its core, however, is composed of persons who occupationally concern themselves with intellectual things—above all,

[1] Thus it is well known that, at least until very recently, the main government of Harvard University has been in the hands of "solid men of Boston." Harvard has certainly done its share in the education of their sons and the sons of others like them, but its function certainly has not been confined to that, as witness the steadily declining proportion of private-school boys admitted to Harvard College. These "upper-uppers" have promoted not simply a device for consolidating their own power and social position, but a national university in the broadest sense.

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the sciences and the arts. The academic profession is increasingly coming to occupy the central place, but the non-academic artist or writer certainly belongs there. There is then a shading-off into the groups who are primarily concerned with the application of generalized intellectual traditions in practical affairs—that is, the applied professions like law, medicine, engineering, and the like. Here it is important that political "leftism" attenuates rapidly as one moves into these applied fields—of the three mentioned, the case of engineering is the most striking.

Lipset makes the important point that the higher prestige of European intellectuals, which is often nostalgically cited by their American counterparts, is mainly a function of their membership in a generally elite class; the typical "scholar" has also been a "gentleman" in the technical social class sense. With the greater differentiation of American social structure this is not nearly so true here, and intellectuals have to stand on their own feet in terms of the evaluation of what they do.

There is, presumably, a relative deprivation aspect of this situation, which, however, probably reflects a process of rise in relative status and influence. Undoubtedly also—a fact which Lipset fails to mention—until very recently academic salaries have gone through a considerable period of substantial decline relative to the incomes of other groups with which academics compare themselves—a good example being the medical profession. It seems to me, however, that these factors at this level of interest need not be the sole or even predominant factors explaining the phenomenon. It seems rather that intellectuals as a group should be expected to share the same order of commitments to the main normative culture that is true of the "civil rights" liberalism of some other upper groups; but, if anything, in accentuated form, since they are not subject to certain pragmatic pressures which operate on others, particularly in the business world.

In addition, however, it seems to be in the nature of the case that intellectuals should lean toward a kind of "activism" on the American political scene. Many of their functions are deeply involved in the main line of development of the society, particularly the development of scientific knowledge and its applications. On the other hand, their functions by and large are not financially self-supporting in the business sense, and they have in general much to gain from a broad trend toward the expansion of the functions and responsibilities of government. It seems to me—a point Lipset does not make—that it is over the question of political activism in this sense that the main line of division between the two major parties in the United States runs. Both

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in terms of values and of interests, then, it is reasonable that intellectuals should lean to the activistic side, which in our circumstances is the Democratic. In this case, the two sets of factors seem to operate in the same direction, whereas this is at least less obviously so for upper-class non-economic liberalism.

To sum up then, seen in the perspective of the relation between social stratification and political alignments, Lipset's central finding of the attenuation of working-class militancy, plus the four special cases which have been reviewed, necessitate a drastic revision of the Marxian view of the relation between social stratification and a polarized political power system which has served as a point of reference—both, as it seems, for Lipset and for this reviewer. First, if by authoritarianism is meant a low order of toleration of the interests and opinions of outgroups and a propensity to use a position of power to suppress opposition with relatively little regard for normative constraints, then the primary locus of persistent authoritarianism is to be found not in the groups closest to the centers of political power, but in those far from them—the working class. Very broadly, it seems to be fairly clear that persistent authoritarianism is not a positive but an inverse function of social status. This fact has been masked by the identification of "liberalism" with the general concern for amelioration of the situation of the lower social groups. Furthermore fascism, as one at least of the most extreme forms of authoritarianism of our age, has been shown to be not a specific reaction of threatened power-holders, but a much more diffuse phenomenon involving threatened and insecure groups in all parts of the society. It is not an exception to the generalization about working-class authoritarianism, because it is a type of extremism associated with the pressures of relatively *specific* social strains.[2]

The other side of the coin, then, is the evidence of the importance of institutionalized values and norms in the upper groups that cause at least some of their members to act in terms understandable not as expressions of their "interests" alone, but as promoting the interests of the social system as a whole, and often, as in the case of discriminated-against minorities, of groups with which they are not identified. The liberalism of certain upper groups generally and of intellectuals in particular has been interpreted in these terms.

Thus to a point the tables are turned on the Marxian pattern, a pattern which, it may be noted, in certain respects coincides with the traditions of our own general "tough-minded realism." But, beyond

[2] On McCarthyism in this connection, see Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, Glencoe, Ill., 1960, ch. 7, "Social Strains in America."

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this, there is a set of problems concerning aspects of the structure of the society which do not fit into the strict hierarchical mold in whichever version. These concern the modes and levels of *qualitative* structural differentiation which has been going on, and its bearing on the political system in relation to the structure of political support and the conditions of its stability. These problems, however, are closer to the concern of Kornhauser than of Lipset, and raising them constitutes a convenient transition to consideration of *The Politics of Mass Society*.

II

Kornhauser, as his title suggests, builds his analysis around the problem of "mass society" in its political aspect. This, however, is seen in terms of a three-way contrast with "communal," "totalitarian," and "pluralist" societies, so that his basic conceptual scheme is a classification of four ideal types. Again, in common with Lipset, Kornhauser is much concerned with the relation between "elite" or power-holding elements and the great majority of the population.

His central point of reference is clearly communal society, which is characterized by an ascriptive fixity, which means that elites are "non-accessible"—not in the sense of mobility, but in that there is no opportunity for selection among alternatives of political leadership—and, on the other hand, the masses of the population are not "available" in the sense of their support being open to mobilization by a leadership element. By this criterion mass society is the complete antithesis, in that elites are accessible and masses are available, whereas in totalitarian society a non-accessible elite stands over against an available mass, and in pluralist society it is the other way around. Stable modern democracy is identified broadly with the pluralist type.

The central problem is thus the nature and consequences of the release of political leadership from ascriptive bonds, on the one hand, and of support from such bonds, on the other. Despite the logical device of the fourfold table, Kornhauser's types are not fully symmetrical. This is due to a difference in the meaning of the conceptions of both accessibility and non-accessibility and of availability and its opposite in each of the two cases to which each concept applies. Let us develop this point a bit.

The typical case of non-accessibility of the elite in communal society is that of the ascriptive two-class system, which is the Marxian "feudal" case, where political leadership is one of the primary functions ascribed to a diffusely superior upper class and any alternative is unthinkable.

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In the totalitarian case, on the other hand, a leadership group has *assumed* a monopoly of power, attempting to legitimize it ideologically, but specifically it uses its power to crush opposition, an operation which would be unnecessary in a communal society. The common feature is of course that the follower is deprived of any alternative of leadership; he must accept the given with what grace he can—the alternative is revolutionary action. With reference then to the availability of the majority, in the communal case unavailability is a matter of the ascription of loyalty not merely to a constitutional structure, but to the particular holders of operative authority. In the pluralist case, on the other hand, unavailability is grounded in a realistic boundness to predominantly voluntary groupings, though of course the individual is formally free to shift his political allegiance. The point is that for realistic reasons only a relatively small minority is likely to do so over a short period. Conversely, the availability of supporters in the mass situation is a case of indeterminancy of political orientation, so that a leadership magnet can, as it were, line the "iron filings" up in almost any direction; whereas in the totalitarian case they are lined up by the regime without having access to any alternative. Whatever the role of voluntary commitment to totalitarian regimes, it is *also* realistically dangerous to resist.

In approaching the problems underlying this interesting combination of symmetry and asymmetry, it is illuminating to consider the similarities and differences between the political and the economic cases. We may take labor (in the economist's factor-of-production sense) as roughly parallel to political support, and business entrepreneurship as parallel to political leadership. On both sides of the contract of employment, we can go back to an ascriptive situation where work was done predominantly in ascriptive units—first kinship, and then feudal dependency relationships and the like. In this case, the role of worker was not discriminable from general membership in the ascriptive unit, nor that of employer from lineage head or other superior ascriptive position. The famous "alienation of labor" then is the *differentiation* of the labor or occupational role from the kinship matrix. The "worker"—a category which includes all levels of competence and responsibility—can be employed by any one of a range of employing units through a labor market, and the consumption needs of the residential unit met through money purchases from the earnings of its employed members. Similarly, on the employing side, work is not done just by workers who are ascribed members of the organization; the employer can select them, but also must offer inducements.

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All three of the non-communal cases dealt with by Kornhauser represent varying kinds and degrees of "alienation" of political support or leadership from ascription. Now arises the question of polarization of the system which was discussed in connection with the Lipset book. Clearly, in the case that Kornhauser is mainly thinking of, the communal society is polarized. So also is the totalitarian, but on a different basis. The essential meaning of availability here seems to be that in the population there are no allegiances which can successfully compete with loyalty to the leadership element that monopolizes the control of the political apparatus. This means that the *whole society* must become polarized on this basis, but in a way that is in a sense the obverse of communal polarization. In the latter case, the political polarization was simply an expression of the diffuse hierarchical differentiation of the society. Here the political polarization requires, for its maintenance, that the ordering of the society in every vital respect should follow the lines of its political ordering. It is, that is to say, intolerable for there to be differentiated structural elements in the society which are in a serious sense independent of the political leadership currently in power.

Neither of the other two cases is polarized in either of these two senses. The case of mass society is the one which is maximally unstructured on both sides of the leadership-support relationship, and the consequence, as Kornhauser makes clear, is great instability and a susceptibility to totalitarian ventures. Indeed, it can confidently be said that totalitarian regimes have typically been preceded by the presence of mass publics, and by competitive situations on the leadership side where new leadership elements could easily emerge.

The fourth case, that of pluralism, is the one of particular interest here, and I should like to attempt to carry its analysis a little farther than Kornhauser does. It is striking that the criterion of unavailability is applied by Kornhauser only to the support side. Considering for present purposes only that aspect of support (or its antithesis, opposition) which operates through voting, it is crucial, as noted, that in this case we are dealing with an *enfranchised* electorate who can, legally and realistically, allocate their votes to the candidates of their choice—granting, of course, that few candidates have realistic chances of election. The franchise here is an aspect of political "alienation" from ascription which is parallel to the worker's freedom to choose between jobs. This feature of course characterizes both mass and pluralist cases. Hence the relative stability of the pluralist case, as contrasted with the

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instability of the mass case, must be due to a factor of *order* operating in the former which is lacking in the latter.

Kornhauser—rightly, I think—lays the principal stress on the system of criss-crossing, voluntary, associative memberships of the population in a variegated set of associational groupings which are mutually independent of each other. The same individual is often a member of a number of such associations, which may have different political predilections, on a majority basis at any rate. The predominant characteristic of such groupings is solidarity, which tends, but not rigidly, to express itself in a common political orientation.

Kornhauser does not, however, go as far into the sociology of these groups as one might wish, particularly the shading-off between voluntary associations and other types of groupings. Thus trade unions and professional associations clearly belong in that class. But the employing organization ordinarily does not. Yet, since the individual has a choice of jobs through a labor market which is formally free and realistically relatively so, there is the same order of voluntary solidarity in this field. The same is true to a degree of a good many religious denominations. But the politically significant groups, as studies of voting behavior have shown,[3] include such semi-ascriptive groups as the nuclear family, and various ascriptive ones like the ethnic and the regional. The essential point is that the whole system of solidary groupings is so differentiated and variegated that it cannot be pressed into a single hierarchy under a monolithic leadership—indeed, in a "liberal" system, it is specifically exempted from severe pressure in this direction. The greatest contrast is with the complete system of hierarchically controlled organizations which are designed to mobilize loyalty to the regime in totalitarian societies—e.g., trade unions, youth groups, and so forth—and the corresponding, more or less drastic, suppression of all groups independent of this hierarchical system.

Solidary groupings in this sense provide the main political anchorage of most of the electorate in pluralist societies, and for the most part this anchorage is stable. As a system it could not, however, be sufficiently adaptive if this stability were not balanced by an element of fluidity. In Kornhauser's terms, this is quite literally a "mass" component of people ready to *shift* their political allegiance. As voting studies have shown, these typically are "cross-pressured" people who are not given a clear direction by their main solidary allegiances. They tend to be "apathetic," but it can be shown that they are susceptible

[3] Cf. Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting*, Chicago, 1954.

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of mobilization by typical "mass" movements, such as McCarthyism.[4]

The question of what prevents this mobilization most of the time leads to what, to me, is the most serious omission in Kornhauser's account of the pluralist system. Just as the non-elite in this case is only relatively unavailable, so the elite is only relatively accessible. By this I mean that the voter does not by any means have unlimited choice of leadership, but is confronted with a rather definitely structured choice, the structure of which of course consists in the party system. Realistically he has a serious choice only between the candidates of major parties. The party system is a system of *order* on the leadership side which is complementary to the solidary groupings on the electorate side; it is misleading to suggest that there is order on one side and not on the other. "Mass" movements as a serious threat to political stability presuppose a sufficient mass element among the public who are available for mobilization, but also sufficient weakness in the institutionalized party system so that leaders who are "out of line" can either successfully set up a new competing party, as Hitler did, or capture control of one of the major parties, as some thought McCarthy might do.

The evidence, which cannot be reviewed here, suggests that at this leadership level a particular type of polarization is a kind of norm, as it seems to be in political systems quite generally—namely, of course, the two-party system. But the difference between the pluralist two-party system and either communal or totalitarian polarization is that the former is a polarization within a more generally differentiated society. The political system is itself a differentiated subsystem of the whole, and hence its polarization does not permeate the structure as a whole, but remains confined to a specialized sphere. One consequence is that political opponents can be friends, colleagues, and status equals in other respects; their political difference has a specifically limited influence on their general relationship.

In the political field the polarization, which is in fact an aspect of a more general state of differentiation, revolves about the "private" nexus of associational groups, which politically function as "interest groups," on the one hand, and as political parties, on the other. This makes it clear that political parties are not just "ordinary" voluntary associations, but occupy a special structural position as the primary mobilizers of political support.

It is also clear that the pluralist system could not function without

[4] On this point and the general functioning of the American electoral system, cf. my paper, "'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Political System," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959.

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another component of order—namely, the constitutional. The most important aspect of this is a set of *procedural* rules which define legitimate occupancy of office; of these in turn, probably the most important is the imposition on a party in office that has suffered electoral defeat of the obligation peacefully and with good grace to relinquish power to its opponents. The difficulty of institutionalizing such an obligation is made plain by trying to imagine a totalitarian party accepting it. Here it should be remembered that the party in office clearly has control of the principal instrumentalities of coercion of the modern state, and that the voluntary relinquishment of this control is a tremendous renunciation.

The constitutional component in the political order is of course associated with the legal component in the more general societal order. In a modern society, law is the primary framework defining the boundaries and other normative relations among the principal differentiated structural elements. Here the *independence* of the legal system from current political interests and struggles is a primary fact; in the American case, this is protected, on the one hand, by constitutional definitions of the limitations of the powers of government, and, on the other hand, by the operations of the courts, the relatively independent judiciary, and not least by the private legal profession. In certain respects the independent legal system has, in pluralist societies, taken the place of the diffusely institutionalized stratification system in the communal type. This is above all true in defining the boundaries between the legitimate exercise of the powers of political leadership, and the "rights" of private sectors of the social structure.

There are, however, important differences. The first is the very fundamental one of the emancipation from ascription on both sides. The second is the "shunting" of the inherent hierarchical polarization of political relationships into a defined and limited area so that other structural parts of the society either need not be hierarchically organized or polarized at all, or, if they are, the bases of this organization need not be the same as in the political area. The consequence is that the political elite, though overlapping with elites in other respects, becomes relatively specialized; there is no *single* "power elite" in the society. The totalitarian case is of course the striking antithesis here, since the political elite cannot tolerate acceding elite position to others on any other basis than loyal membership in its own group.

Differentiation of the type suggested here clearly implies, as a condition of stability, corresponding mechanisms of integration. The existence of the type of legal system referred to, including of course commitment

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to its maintenance on the part of most important groups, is in my opinion the most fundamental component of these integrative mechanisms, though it by no means stands alone. One of the most decisive arguments against the "interest" theory of the functioning of such a society is the difficulty of accounting for either the development or the maintenance of such a legal system without reference to what has been called above the institutionalization of values.

It would be tempting to try to carry these lines of analysis still farther, but limitations of space forbid. Perhaps they have been carried far enough to suggest a direction in which it would be fruitful to attempt to go beyond the analytical levels reached by either Lipset or Kornhauser. In my opinion, the great merit of their books is that they have contributed significantly both to the development of a solid empirical base for such analysis and to the classification of the theoretical problems involved in interpreting their data. Of the two, Lipset covers the wider range of problems. One could, however, have wished that he had attempted to go farther and employed greater rigor in fitting the material into a theoretical frame; indeed, it is my opinion that, had he more seriously attempted to do this, the result would have been a substantially better book—which is not to disparage its great merits in its present form. Kornhauser confines his attention to a considerably narrower range, but achieves great clarity and theoretical rigor in analyzing certain aspects of this range. In general, my position has not been critical so much of what he has done, as of the fact that he did not do more.

In any case, these two books are clear harbingers of great promise for the synthesis of materials and perspectives from political science and sociology in dealing with this type of subject matter.

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PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY AND FOREIGN POLICY*

By HERBERT McCLOSKY

Bjørn Christiansen, *Attitudes Towards Foreign Affairs as a Function of Personality*, Oslo, Oslo University Press, 1959, 282 pp. N. kr. 15.

AS a reading of this journal will attest, the search for greater rigor and precision in the social sciences, and for ways of replacing intuitive and anecdotal approaches with more systematic ones, has spread to the study of international politics. This preoccupation has understandably intensified the quest for new ways to conceptualize, organize, and analyze the data with which international studies are concerned. To the familiar political notions—power, national interest, ideology, imperialism—there have recently been added from sociology, mathematics, and economics such analytical constructs and approaches as group process, decision-making, structural-functional requisite analysis, game theory applications, systems analysis, communication networks, equilibrium theory, and others. Although less has so far been heard from the psychologists, the appearance of the book under review indicates that they too believe they have something to offer and that more will be heard from them in the future. The author, however, does not pretend to be offering a grand unifying theory or a single way of conceptualizing all international behavior. He restricts his study to the effects of personality on attitudes toward foreign policy and, even further, to the attitudes of citizens rather than leaders. Thus, he avoids the stratosphere in favor of a solid tradition of experimental research which, if still crude in certain respects, has stimulated a considerable number of empirical inquiries and produced a respectable body of findings.

Precisely what might be gained by applying personality studies to international politics will be considered at a later point. It would facilitate that discussion, however, if we were to turn, first, to the book that is the occasion for this essay.

I

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in Oslo, and his book reflects the training and interests of a psychologist. A technical monograph rather than a work addressed to the general reader, it focuses mainly on personality and other psychological variables rather than on politics or foreign policy as such. Its underlying assumption is that foreign policy is, in part at least, a function of public attitudes; its principal hypothesis is that attitudes about foreign affairs are significantly related to personality. Attitudes toward foreign policy are treated throughout as dependent variables—as consequences of personality functioning in the context of other social influences. No effort is made to consider such attitudes for their political importance or for their actual influence on foreign policy or diplomatic decisions. Nor does the author systematically concern himself with questions of how policy decisions are made or to what degree other factors (group, national tradition, propaganda, etc.) are strategic in the formation of attitudes. Instead the focus is deliberately narrowed to the question: How strongly and in what ways does personality determine attitudes toward foreign policy? The author defends his limited perspective by explaining that, while he recognizes the importance of other factors, he wanted "to undertake a psychological study exclusively." The intention, in short, was to concentrate on a single but fundamental aspect of the problem of attitude formation in foreign affairs, rather than to try to handle all the variables that might conceivably affect it.

Unlike many other investigators, Christiansen is not satisfied merely to assume that the attitudes formed toward outgroups in domestic affairs carry over or are expressed in the same way in the field of foreign affairs. He attempts, instead, to deal directly with actual beliefs about foreign policy. Thus, for example, by way of investigating whether personality impulses are generalized and expressed at different levels of experience, he has constructed two parallel scales, one designed to measure response toward "everyday situations," the other, toward "international situations." The latter is, of course, his key dimension, the dependent variable whose relation to personality is the main focus of this study.

The measure of attitudes toward "international situations" is a 40-item scale, each item of which required the subject to respond to some hypothetical international incident involving Norwegian national interests (the exclusion of Norwegian tourists from Finland, demands by the United States to station troops on Norwegian territory, demands by the USSR to have access to ice-free Norwegian ports, etc.). By his choice of solutions to each of these conflicts, the respondent could be scored as threat-oriented or problem-oriented, and as prone to blame

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his own or other countries for international difficulties. His answers were further broken down according to whether he was favorably or unfavorably disposed toward the Soviet Union or the West. The "everyday situations" scale resembles the "international situations" scale in all respects, except that the incidents or conflicts it presents are of the daily, ordinary, and personal variety. In addition to these scales, the study employed verbal and projective personality and attitude tests for measuring such factors as aggression, frustration, nationalism, personal insecurity, and psychodynamic conflicts.

In an effort to keep constant as many conditions as possible, these measures were administered to a fairly homogeneous sample of 167 young men (average age, 23) who had applied to the Norwegian military and naval academies. The sample was, of course, in no sense representative of the general population, which, as the author admits, limits his ability to generalize from the findings.

The book is in two sections. Part One elaborates a series of hypotheses advanced by various scholars to explain the social-psychological origins of international attitudes. These hypotheses include: the *Generalization Hypothesis*, which holds that a person reacts in essentially the same way to conflict situations in, for example, "the everyday, the professional, and the international spheres." The *Latency Hypothesis*, derived from Freud and developed by other psychoanalytically oriented investigators, places major emphasis on the "non-manifest layers of personality," on unconscious motivations, and on the belief that attitudes toward outgroups and toward one's own nation arise to a large extent from deep inner tendencies, inhibitions, and repressed impulses. The *Frustration Hypothesis* attempts to broaden the *Latency Hypothesis* in the belief that aggressive tendencies toward others—in international as well as personal affairs—are consequences of external as well as internal frustrations. The *Insecurity Hypothesis* holds that personal insecurity may lead to exaggerated and hostile responses in international and other political spheres. The *Nationalism Hypothesis* relates chauvinism to aggressive attitudes toward outgroups, to patterns of family life and "early Oedipal conflicts," the attitude toward the nation being a surrogate for a "stereotyped idealization of parents." The *Knowledge Hypothesis* holds simply that an increase in knowledge about one's own and other nations leads to increased international understanding; and the *Channelization Hypothesis* asserts that the effect of individual personality traits on attitudes is modified by other traits, including knowledge of and experience in foreign affairs.

Part Two contains the empirical data which bear on these hypotheses.

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By directly ascertaining the personality attributes, the everyday responses, and the international attitudes of his subjects, Christiansen is able to test each hypothesis directly, without having to rely upon secondary analyses or *post hoc* interpretations.

Not all the hypotheses are confirmed by the research findings. No connection was found, for example, between attitudes toward foreign affairs, on the one side, and personal security or knowledge of international politics, on the other. Nor were the correlations significant between patriotism and "everyday reaction patterns." Christiansen does claim empirical support, however, for the *Generalization Hypothesis*, the *Latency Hypothesis*, and the *Nationalism Hypothesis*. A person's attitudes toward foreign affairs appear to be related to psychodynamic conflicts as well as to the way he reacts to everyday frustrations. The author concludes that the data show a clear connection between "destructive" international attitudes and certain personality characteristics. These attitudes "do not represent any isolated aspect of the individual personality, but are linked with other dynamic and cognitive aspects" (pp. 236-37).

I am concerned here less with the specific findings of this research than with its over-all contribution and shortcomings, and its significance for future investigations of this type. On the demerit side, many students of international affairs will doubtless feel that the study pays less attention to international politics than it should. Little attention is given to specific attitudes toward particular countries or foreign policies, or to the finer distinctions in opinion that develop toward particular situations or events. All the attitudes considered (aggression, ethnocentrism, nationalism, etc.) are extremely broad and general, although many of the questions actually encountered in the field of foreign affairs are unusually subtle and complex. The usefulness of the study, therefore, is to this extent reduced. In studies of this kind, the choice of concepts, one suspects, is inevitably (and unfortunately) influenced by what the psychologist is familiar with and what he has already learned to measure. As a result, far greater sophistication is shown on the psychological and technical sides of the study than on the political side.

One cannot help wishing, in addition, that the author had chosen to pay at least some attention to group membership and other sociological factors. Although omitting them from a "purely psychological" study is pardonable, it is regrettably true that the influence of personality on the formation of attitudes can adequately be assessed only by placing it in its group context. Similarly, one will far better understand the

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role of personality if one views it against the prevailing political and military background of the country from which the sample is drawn. The study of personality, in short, will be considerably enhanced if one can say something about its manner of interacting with other important determinants.

It must be said, to the author's credit, that few of these criticisms will be new to him, for he has himself volunteered many of them and acknowledged their cogency. That he has not gone beyond a narrow concern with personality is unfortunate, but defensible. One should not charge him with failing to do what he has specifically chosen not to do. The dimensions with which he is working are, to be sure, extremely general and often crude, but this is inevitable at the present early stage of research in this area. More subtle and refined attitude and personality dimensions are bound to be developed as findings accumulate and as advances are made in the science of measuring behavior.

Although he has deliberately narrowed the scope of his investigation, Christiansen is by no means deceived into believing that personality can, by itself, entirely account for attitudes or behavior in international affairs. Nor does he suggest that its influence is superior to that of many other variables which should be taken into account, or that it functions in pure fashion, independent of context. He is entirely aware of the "incomplete and fragmentary" nature of our present information in this field and of our need for "new theoretical speculation and . . . for further systematic conceptual clarification combined with experimental investigation" (p. 242).

Despite the book's shortcomings, then, one must credit the author with a good deal of methodological and intellectual sophistication, a passion for rigor and precise measurement, a solid grounding in the theoretical as well as the technical sides of psychology, a breadth of curiosity, and a willingness to consider dispassionately a number of alternative beliefs about the nature and etiology of human behavior. The book contains a valuable review of the literature and a useful résumé of the theories about attitude formation. In subjecting questions of personality and foreign policy to the test of careful, systematic, and rigorous procedures, Christiansen has contributed not only to our information but to our knowledge of the methods available for testing propositions in this field. Future investigators are bound to be in his debt.

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II

At this point one can begin to detect the mutterings of the skeptical reader. Granted, he says, that personality is an interesting concept on which technically elegant research can be done, and that psychology has progressed remarkably in devising ways for measuring personality and attitudes, what does all this have to do with the study of foreign policy? Is there any point in trying to equate purely personal and often idiosyncratic traits with large-scale national attitudes or policies? Might it not be more fruitful to concentrate attention on the familiar concepts of international politics—power, national interest, international conflicts, imperialism, ideology, etc.—rather than to busy ourselves with what may prove to be minor or extraneous variables?

Let it be granted at once that, for the study of international politics, personality is a limited concept, applicable in some contexts, irrelevant in others. For certain problems, however, I believe it to be not only useful but indispensable. For example, if public attitudes are proper elements in the study of foreign policy, and if such attitudes arise partly from personality predispositions, as the available research suggests, then there is at least a *prima facie* case for taking personality variables into account. Belief, conformity, deviation, consensus, ways of perceiving and organizing experience, likes and dislikes, affection and hostility—all these enter into the formation of political and international attitudes and all are to some extent products of psychological states. They cannot satisfactorily be explained without reference to psychological concepts. By considering personality wherever it seems appropriate to so do, we may succeed in adding an entirely new dimension to our understanding of foreign policy formation. It seems to me equally plain that the more variance we can account for by reference to personality, the easier it becomes to make a proper assessment of other factors that interest the investigator. Knowing, for example, that power or economic interest or military goals or group values are in some measure modified by personality factors increases our understanding of these variables as well.

An even stronger case can be made out for studying personality if one is dealing with extreme movements or the nations they dominate. Can one hope to explain the politics of Nazism or Bolshevism—and therefore the foreign policies of Germany and the USSR—without taking account of the psychological impulses by which such parties are governed? The behavior of these and other totalitarian movements is in significant measure a function of their millennial visions, their

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messianic drive to conquer the world and to remake mankind, their xenophobia, their militant and hostile spirit, and their intellectual inflexibility. Failure to take account of the psychological factors that lie behind these characteristics (paranoia, rigidity, hostility, authoritarianism, etc.) would make it impossible to understand the nature or motivations of these "true believers." One has great difficulty, for example, explaining present-day Soviet foreign policy on the purely political or economic grounds of rational self-interest, territorial integrity, imperialism, geopolitical necessity, or even, in fact, external military danger. If these alone were involved, there would be little to stand in the way of a peaceful settlement between the USSR and the West. If one is to make sense of the "cold war," one must refer not only to the rational and "objective" elements by which international conflicts are ordinarily explained, but also to the psychological and ideological elements, to fanaticism and "true belief," which seem to me plainly to lie at the heart of the matter. I do not speak here of the personality of this or that individual Soviet leader, for wide personality differences doubtless exist among them. What I refer to is the psychology of the movement itself, or of the modal traits of its dominant members. We should not, of course, conclude from this that all political movements or all organizations active in the formation of foreign policy can be understood in psychological terms. Many organizations are, so to speak, psychologically neutral, no more attractive to people of one personality type than another.

Suppose our skeptical reader now asks: But, considering how little can be done about it, what is the point of taking personality into account anyhow? Political or economic factors can to some extent be dealt with, policies can be modified, concessions can be made, trade agreements can be arranged, treaties can be negotiated, etc. What, however, can we do about personality, which is ingrained and beyond our power to legislate?

One could, I suppose, answer that psychotherapy might be employed to "cure" extreme believers, that personality tests might be used to select diplomats, that we might alter social institutions like the family to reduce frustration and thereby weaken the impulse to aggress against outgroups, or that we might provide better education for our citizens in an effort to improve their international understanding and tolerance. In truth, however, I see no need to fall back upon any of these—to me rather weak—"practical" considerations. The justification for troubling to study personality must ultimately rest on its power to explain important differences in international attitudes and behavior.

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III

Deciding that personality is a construct worth the attention of students of international relations leaves several problems still to be faced and several qualifications still to be entered and considered. One such problem concerns the level of psychological explanation to which the student of international affairs must go in taking personality into account. Must he explore the depths of psychodynamic causality in order to use what psychology has to offer? Will he be forced to commit himself to a specific theory of personality (the Hall and Lindzey book on *Theories of Personality* lists at least a dozen major theories and numerous derivative ones) before he can begin to work? I should say no to both questions. Most psychodynamic theories seem to me too remote from the interests or concerns of international politics to be employed profitably. They tend to be too esoteric and abstract for the political scientist's purposes. Establishing the connection between international political behavior and "primary drives," "oral frustrations," "infantile sexuality," "Oedipal conflicts," or other such notions from depth psychology is not only hard to do but also furnishes answers at too broad a level of generality for the substantive problems he is concerned to explain.

Considering the present stage of the science, a better case can be made, I think, for employing a more eclectic approach, using concepts that are less "fundamental" but that can be more easily related to the types of raw data which the student of international politics is accustomed to collect. Examples of such "intermediate" concepts include hostility, paranoia, psychological rigidity, projection, and ego defense, as well as such socially related psychological states as alienation, anomie, conformity, dominance, pessimism, life satisfaction, and authoritarianism. For the student of political attitudes, it is enough, for the time being, to know that certain personality traits or predispositions are likely to lead, under specifiable conditions, to predictable public attitudes or behaviors. He need not delve deeper to ask *how* the personality predispositions came into being, whether they are genetic or acquired, formed in infancy or in later life, an outgrowth of feeding habits or sexual training. These, after all, are the proper concerns not of the student of international affairs but of the psychologist, who, as a specialist, is far more likely to make sense of them anyhow.

There is also the disadvantage that too firm an acceptance of a single line of psychodynamic explanation may force more structure on the inquiry than is warranted by the present state of the science of per-

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sonality. Most of the existing "theories" of personality must still be classed as "speculations"—brilliant, learned, and often insightful, but essentially intuitive. Some of them are more literary than formal, and all of them lack precision and explicit terminology. Careful scientific work to test their principal claims has been partial, sporadic, and inconclusive. The political investigator who embraces a single theory completely may thus be investing heavily in a set of conceptualizations that will prove, for his purposes, inappropriate, misleading, or wrong. This need not mean, of course, that he should entirely ignore existing theories in the field, for these may help him to generate new hypotheses, furnish him with developed concepts and orientations, and make it possible for him to co-ordinate his work on international subjects with the continuing research in psychology and other social sciences.

Another problem that needs to be faced concerns the interaction of personality with other key variables. Focusing on any single determinant increases the danger of ignoring others of perhaps equal or greater importance. As Christiansen points out, demonstrating that a connection exists between personality and patterns of reacting to international events does not mean that "such characteristics are [in themselves] sufficient to explain attitudes toward foreign affairs" (p. 232). What a nation or its people think about these matters is, after all, also influenced by reference group memberships, level of political awareness, the state of the national economy, the nature and perception of current international crises, the military potential of the nation and its enemies, and the prevailing propaganda line. Personality functions in conjunction with them, varying in importance as they vary. Its influence, thus, is inconstant, a function of time, place, and circumstance. Under appropriate conditions, its power may be much too great to ignore; in another setting, it may be so overweighed by other variables as to count very little at best.

Let us take the example of race prejudice, referred to by Christiansen. Research has shown that race prejudice is an outgrowth of personality, but it is also plain that personality will be less important in determining Negro prejudice in the South than elsewhere in the United States. There (in the South) reference groups exert so much sway over racial matters that the effects of personality are minor; in other places, where racial tolerance is the norm, personality plays a far larger role in the spawning and maintenance of prejudice. In Sparta, where the military spirit was glorified, war might be preferred to peace by citizens of every style and temperament; in Athens, where less violent virtues were honored, this preference might be expressed only by men of fierce

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and destructive natures. From this one might also infer that international acts that are manifestly alike do not necessarily spring from identical needs or impulses. One nation (Nazi Germany will do as an example) may be led into war by the hostile needs of its elite groups, while another may undertake the same war reluctantly, out of necessity or sense of duty, and with no sign of the aggressive or warlike spirit which some believe (erroneously, in my opinion) to be latent in all of us.

The variable role of personality does not set it apart from other concepts with which social scientists have had to deal. Social class, for example, has a powerful effect on opinions and behavior in societies of relatively fixed and sharply stratified classes (e.g., feudalism), but it has a much weaker influence (as research bears out) in a highly mobile, democratic, mass society of the modern type. In international affairs, it is plain that imperialism, national interest, power, or other such presumed motivations do not operate with equal force on all nations or at all times. To assume either a single motivation or a motivation of uniform intensity is to distort the plain facts and to do violence to the inquiry. It is by reason of these facts that controversies over which of several variables is, in the abstract, "most important" or "most powerful" are often meaningless. Without reference to the conditions under which they operate, one cannot decide whether personality is more (or less) important than class, more (or less) powerful than reference group membership, and so on. Obviously, we badly need systematic empirical investigations that will help us to determine under what conditions, and in conjunction with what other factors, personality is most or least likely to register its effects.

We might touch, finally, on the question of when, apart from their interaction with other variables, specific personality needs will give rise to specific outlooks. Even under optimal conditions, people of similar personalities may differ in their response to foreign affairs. Some people, for example, develop so strong an identification with their own nation that a slur against it becomes a threat to their own self-esteem. Others, though possessing the same personality traits, may give little thought to the nation, evince no more than ordinary affection toward it, and be made no more insecure than other people by insults against it. Their ego investment may lie in more private attachments, such as family, friends, or profession. The correlation between personality and attitudes, as this suggests, will always be imperfect, for even the people who are motivated by the same psychological needs are bound to differ in knowledge, interests, experience, or role.

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In general, the available data indicate that extreme attitudes are more likely to be personality-determined than are moderate beliefs. Extreme or deviant opinions may also originate in group life, of course, but the research evidence suggests that they often arise from powerful psychological impulses and that they represent a form of neurotic defense. Thus, it is one thing to be critical of the United Nations, but quite another to perceive it as a Communist trap or as a conspiracy to denude America of her sovereignty. The former will be believed by people whose personality patterns differ little (if at all) from those of the UN's supporters, the latter by people who, in the main, are "acting out" their destructive needs and anxieties. For similar reasons, personality will play more of a role in forming attitudes toward some questions than toward others. Questions that are technical, precise, and fairly free of symbolic or emotive significance (e.g., problems of international finance, assignment of fishing or mineral rights, etc.) are likely to be much less affected by psychological differences than are questions that are more general, that possess strong emotive or symbolic connotations, or that involve the nation's security or self-image (e.g., questions of territorial dismemberment, national independence, violations of historic claims, etc.).

One must be careful, therefore, to avoid assuming that personality and foreign policy attitudes are necessarily related in precisely the way their superficial characteristics suggest. Americans who favored entering the Second World War, for example, were not necessarily more "aggressive" or personally belligerent than were the isolationists who agitated against American intervention. In fact, research carried out at the University of Minnesota since the war shows that persons with strong isolationist beliefs are, in comparison with the general population, significantly more hostile, paranoid, alienated, inflexible, authoritarian, and dissatisfied with their lives. Isolationism may appear on the surface to be the more peaceful and benevolent of the approaches to international politics, but it is a deviant outlook in contemporary American politics, and one that allows for the marshaling and projection of extreme fears, resentments, and personal insecurities. This set of findings does not in any sense disconfirm the general hypothesis that attitudes toward foreign affairs are in some measure a function of personality; it only calls into question the too simple assumptions which underlie some of the speculations in this area. In tracing the course between the personality traits of individuals and a nation's foreign policy, the investigator will encounter many stages, many intervening variables, and, regrettably, many pitfalls.

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DE GAULLE'S MEMOIRS

The Hero as History

By STANLEY HOFFMANN

Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs*, Vol. I: *The Call to Honor*, New York, Viking Press, 1955, 319 pp., $6.00; Vol. II: *Unity*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959, 378 pp., $6.00; Vol. III: *Salvation*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960, 346 pp., $6.00.

Charles de Gaulle, *The Edge of the Sword*, New York, Criterion Books, 1960, 128 pp. $3.50.

I

FEW publications are as fascinating for historians and political scientists as General de Gaulle's three-volume *War Memoirs*. They offer de Gaulle's own version of his role during the war period and his conception of international and domestic politics. The impact of the first two volumes, published in France in 1954 and 1956, contributed to restoring the General's prestige at a time when he seemed lost in the wilderness, after the fiasco of the RPF. The *Memoirs* provide us both with a clue to most of de Gaulle's acts as the founder and head of the Fifth Republic and with a means of assessing the continuity of his leadership over the past twenty years. Finally, the *Memoirs*, like the *Testament* of Richelieu, from whom de Gaulle has learned so much, are essentially a treatise of leadership.

A judgment applied by de Gaulle to Churchill fits the General just as well: he appears as "the great champion of a great enterprise and the great artist of a great history" (I, 58). Indeed, throughout the set of lectures first published in 1931 under the title *The Edge of the Sword*, de Gaulle compares the leader's task to the artist's. "The true leader, like the great artist, is a man with an inborn propensity which can be strengthened and exploited by the exercise of his craft" (p. 58). The portrait of the ideal leader to which this early book is largely devoted resembles the self-portrait that de Gaulle paints in the *Memoirs*. There is the same mixture of romantic and classical elements. The reader of Chateaubriand, Vigny, Bergson, and Barrès emphasizes intuition as the indispensable complement of intelligence; he shows that solitude, frustrations, fights with "the stuffed dummies of the hierarchy" (p. 63), and an impulse to withdraw are the lot of the true leader. The reader of Cardinal de Retz and of Corneille discusses the

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need for the leader to understand himself as well as realities in order to master events—"there is no success save starting from the truth" (III, 102); he stresses the responsibilities which leadership entails. The reader, and frequent quoter, of Shakespeare thrives on times "when danger threatens," for "history in its great moments tolerates in positions of authority only those men capable of directing their own course" (II, 75).

Thus, when the stuffed dummies were blown away by the tempest of June 1940, de Gaulle stepped into such a position without any hesitation, and set for himself a course from which he never departed. Thirteen years later, when he describes his intentions and acts, his account is never contradicted by the documents which he appended to the French edition of the *Memoirs*,[1] and it is presented in words which are always striking and appropriate. (It is too bad—in the case of a man whose authority rests to such a degree on the might, magic, and mystery of words—that the sharp and concise eloquence of his style has been so neatly flattened in the translation of Vols. II and III, and that there should be so many small inaccuracies in it.) The author of *The Edge of the Sword* possessed already the two qualities which he required of leaders: passion and self-confidence. Those qualities had served his prewar ambition: to improve France's security by creating a mechanized *armée de métier*. In June 1940, a new cause appeared: it was too late to tend even to survival; now de Gaulle had to fight for resurrection, reconstruction, and renovation—no less. With each new turn of the war, and every further success of his action, his goals broadened. At first, his double objective was to put the French Empire back into the war and to defend against Allied interference those of its pieces which he had snatched away from Vichy. Later, his purposes were to obtain for France a major role in postwar settlements and to build in exile a strong French state which, transported into liberated France, would preserve her from Communist subversion and could safeguard her future. He speaks of his own rule as a "sort of monarchy" (III, 270); had not his role during the war years been similar to that of the kings of France, in the days when they were trying to unify under their dynasty the countless duchies and counties of feudal France?

It was the scope of de Gaulle's design which led to his clash with, and victory over, poor General Giraud, who confounded national unity

[1] Only Vol. I of the American translation was published in an edition which presents those documents, under separate cover, along with the narrative text. My references to the documents in this article are taken from the French edition (Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires de Guerre*, Paris, Plon, Vol. I: *L'Appel*, 1954; Vol. II: *L'Unité*, 1956; Vol. III: *Le Salut*, 1959).

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and military hierarchy (II, 12) and could not understand that war is politics (II, 163). It was the nature of de Gaulle's design which led to his misunderstanding with Roosevelt, who mistook the General's emphasis on the political essence of his action for petty personal ambition.[2] It is also the scale of de Gaulle's design which explains the perspective of the *Memoirs*: the passionate dialogue between the General and his image of France, the high pitch of his nationalism, the tendency to judge events only from the viewpoint of France's interests. The excesses or distortions which this perspective entailed were merely the consequences of de Gaulle's and France's plight in 1940-1946; one man was trying to recreate a nation and a state wrecked by decadence, defeat, and division. Today, as the leader of a nation which is far more wealthy and assured, and of a state built according to his wishes, de Gaulle's nationalism appears more subdued, and his concern for the world is at least as great as his concern for France. His goals have broadened again—not because he has changed, but because the situation is different. De Gaulle has remained faithful to his own primordial precept: the leader must have "a keen eye for contingencies" (*Edge of the Sword*, p. 80); "in economy, as in politics or strategy, there exists, I believe, no absolute truth. There are only the circumstances" (III, 136).

II

However, if realities have to be reassessed constantly, there is, in de Gaulle's *Memoirs*, a general conception which serves as his map of world affairs and as his breviary for diplomatic action. His view is, in many ways, close to that of the "realist" school of international politics. The nation-state is, and will remain, the basic unit. Indeed, ideologies, despite their pretensions to universality, are essentially temporary cloaks of national ambitions (this was as true of Roosevelt's internationalism as of Stalin's communism, he believes). "Communism will pass. But France will not pass" (I, 269). In such a world, one's power determines one's influence. Therefore, the supreme mistake of a statesman is to "rely on appearances"; this was the error of Mussolini, who, "having tried to grasp too much," finally "had nothing left to hold on to" (III, 197). The cardinal sins of a statesman are to underrate the role of force (especially military) and to subordinate his nation's armies to foreign political goals; this was the crime of Vichy, and the temptation

[2] A long and moving letter sent by de Gaulle to Roosevelt in October 1942 tried to explain the difference between personal or partisan politics and the politics of Free France. This forceful document was left unanswered. The reader may find it in Vol. II of the French edition, pp. 382-85.

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of Giraud. In such a world, national survival and security can best be assured by traditional methods: the balancing of power, coalitions of convergent interests, cabinet diplomacy rather than parliamentary diplomatic posturing, either in its national or in its international varieties (III, 228). De Gaulle's own complicated diplomacy of 1944-1945, which played off the USSR against Great Britain, and demanded guarantees at Germany's expense while looking forward to an association of Western Europe including Germany, had a Bismarckian ring. To complete the resemblance with the "realists," and with nineteenth-century diplomacy, there is in de Gaulle's view a definite hierarchy between the major and the minor powers, and a longing for a concert of the great powers, on whom peace depends.

However, de Gaulle's conception contains many elements which go beyond this familiar sketch. First, he has a sophisticated view of states' purposes: power, he knows, is more often a means than an end. He tends to distinguish two spheres: a sphere of "interests defined in terms of power," such as national security and what he calls *le rang*, and a sphere of idealistic, "unselfish" purposes. In de Gaulle's vision of the world, nations are like peers whom the aristocrats' code of values expects to perform acts of individual prowess, but for the common good. The common good—de Gaulle's broadest unselfish goal—is *la querelle de l'homme*: in 1940-1946, it was the struggle for freedom;[3] today, it is still the fight against totalitarianism, and the new battle against underdevelopment. According to de Gaulle (who sounds in this respect very much like Bernanos) the mechanization and urbanization of modern life have offered tremendous opportunities to totalitarianism, and must be turned to freedom's advantage (III, 105-6; see also I, 570-71, French edn.). Another idealistic end is the restoration of Europe, in which de Gaulle still sees the center of civilization. It is in part because the United States did not object to Russia's domination over Eastern Europe that de Gaulle criticizes Roosevelt—and also because Roosevelt's anticolonialism was weakening Europe at a time when, according to de Gaulle, only a common Western policy toward Africa and Asia could prevent colonial territories from achieving their inevitable independence "against us" (II, 270; III, 242). It is in part because Britain preferred being America's lieutenant to becoming, with France, the guide of Europe that de Gaulle has felt so bitter toward

[3] He condemns Hitler not only because Hitler attacked France, but also because "he based his colossal plan on the strength he attributed to man's baseness. Yet men are made of souls as much as of clay" (III, 198). Similarly, Laval's sin was "to approach matters by their underside" (II, 335).

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England's behavior, then and now (I, 233; II, 58, 253; III, 52).[4] Both those policies seemed to him to constitute treason toward Europe; although his belief in the nation-state prevented him from looking forward to a "supranational" Europe, he was already working toward the "imposing confederation" he mentioned in a recent speech. Thus, the nation may be the basic unit, but it is not an absolute: de Gaulle's concern for transnational ends, his emphasis on France's traditions of the Rights of Man, always made the difference between the nationalism of this deeply Christian General and the integral nationalism of Maurras: *La raison supérieure de l'Europe*[5] is opposed to Germany's destruction. The same belief that "in the long run there is no regime that can hold out against the will of nations" (III, 53) which explains de Gaulle's hope for a future withdrawal of Soviet control from Eastern Europe drove him to accept the idea of self-government and even independence for colonies before most of his compatriots (III, 242; also III, 340, French edn.).

Secondly, in the realm of means—power—there are also original aspects to de Gaulle's thinking. He is acutely aware of the changing nature of power; if the sword remains essential, economic strength is equally important: hence his emphasis on production, planning, public investments, and his own motive for nationalizations, in which he saw primarily an instrument of economic transformation, and only subsidiarily a social reform (III, 110ff.). Moreover, he does not believe that realism requires that one's objectives always be measured by one's present resources. Throughout the war, he acted as if France were still a great power, in order to make of her a great power again. Has de Gaulle thus violated his own precept, and fallen into Mussolini's trap? I do not think so; his conduct was part of a remarkable hortatory policy: in order to get someone to do something, he should be treated as if he had done it already, and complimented for having done so.[6] In this instance, the key to de Gaulle's strategy was his certainty that France's fall could be remedied, and that she would become powerful again—but only if her allies gave her a psychological and material push for a new "climb toward might." De Gaulle's policy was French power by installments.

[4] De Gaulle once defined France as both "integrée à l'Europe" and "étendue sur le monde entier" (II, 516, French edn.).

[5] Translated as "the higher rationality of Europe" (III, 179)!

[6] For instance: in 1940-1942, in order to get the French to resist Vichy, he repeatedly stressed that they all *were* resisting—and since they were, why should France's allies still deal with Vichy instead of with Free France alone? In 1958, in order to get French settlers in Algeria to change their traditional attitudes, he "understood them" to have, on May 13, 1958, expressed their desire to give equal rights to the Moslems.

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Thus, we come to a central concept of de Gaulle: French grandeur. It is by no means the clearest, although it is the most discussed. *Why* he thinks France ought to have "a great national ambition" (III, 101) is clear enough. It is part dogma, part reason. It is a *mystique*, a product of his philosophy of heroic leadership as applied to France, whom he treats as a person—as Michelet did—and of his instinctive feeling that Providence has created France "either for complete successes or for exemplary misfortunes" (I, 3). But it is also a *politique*, for he sees in grandeur both a domestic necessity—a diversion from discord—and an international service: a factor of diplomatic wisdom and responsibility, a contribution to world equilibrium and European restoration. However, *what* he means by grandeur is not so easy to analyze. He never defines it in specific terms, for grandeur is an attitude rather than a policy. More accurately, the policy implications of grandeur vary with the circumstances: they are not today what they were in 1945. Indeed, rigidity is the worst enemy of greatness: it was intellectual, economic, and political rigidity which led to France's decline in the 1930's, as he said repeatedly, and the problem for France was not restoration but renovation.[7] What remains fixed is the command itself: like natural law, grandeur is an imperative with a varying content.

The imperative can be ascertained: grandeur means the opposite of resignation to a passive role in the world. It means a triple determination. First, it implies a will to be an actor, not an object; a player, not a stake. Secondly, it entails a decision to be as ambitious, universal, and inventive an actor as world politics in general and one's power basis in particular allow. Third, it involves the subordination of domestic politics to the primacy of international affairs and to the requirements of status: grandeur implies that the nation must be ready to bear the sacrifices such a policy requires, for there is no right without corresponding duties. Gaullism, which is not an ideology precisely because grandeur is not inextricably tied to any specific policies or forms of power,[8] means this triple determination. As for the ends which grandeur should serve, they are those I have described above: both the selfish and the unselfish ones, since de Gaulle believes in a "natural contract between grandeur and liberty" (III, 345, French edn.).

The concrete historical content of grandeur during the war years can be described by three terms: independence, status, self-respect.

[7] "Se rétablir . . . sous des formes nouvelles" (I, 342, French edn.).

[8] Thus grandeur does not depend on a colonial empire: what should be avoided is both that colonies "cut themselves off" from France, *and* that French forces get bogged down there (III, 253—the translation is bad). This is a crucial clue to his policies since 1958.

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Independence does not mean isolation or autarky, but the avoidance of lasting dependence on any other unit: hence de Gaulle's triple fight against German oppression, British encroachments, and America's "appeal of domination," as he saw it (II, 133); hence also his hostility to military integration, then and now (II, 216, 295; III, 150). Status meant that France's defeat should not cost her any of the diplomatic or territorial positions which she would have kept, had she refused to sign the armistice of 1940. This is why de Gaulle insisted that he would negotiate France's departure from the Levant only after the Liberation, and that France had to set foot in Indochina again before opening talks with local nationalists.

Self-respect was by far the most important and subtle of the three objectives. De Gaulle understood that it was France's image of herself which had been shattered in 1940; that grandeur could be recovered only if France's self-pride were restored; and that she could not receive it as a gift from her allies: she had to win it back through her own actions. Thus, "it was essential to bring back into the war not merely some Frenchmen, but France" (I, 80); he was not interested in merely providing the Allies with French soldiers. But his goal required that Frenchmen should fight on every front, even if they were not wanted by the Allies, or if the battle were hopeless as in Indochina in March 1945, or if the blood of Vichy Frenchmen had to be shed,[9] or if a condition of France's stronger participation in the struggle were a prolongation of the war (III, 31, 159). His goal required that no free Frenchman should owe his authority to an Ally: hence his fear that a victory for Giraud in the power struggle of 1942-1943 would benefit only the Allies, outside France, and the Communists, inside. He insisted on being recognized by the Allies as France's leader only as long as such a measure would have bolstered French morale and will to fight. It was on a rebirth of France's self-respect that the more liberal colonial policy which he deemed necessary depended: only a confident France could really be generous—a precept he has followed since 1958 (II, 138; III, 253-54). Roosevelt's blindness to this fundamental goal, his willingness to deal with Vichyites, his assumption that France was finished, and was anyhow more adequately represented by her easy-going prewar leaders than by this General who "had nothing of a usual Frenchman"[10]—this is what so infuriated de Gaulle. As he told Harry Hopkins,

[9] De Gaulle had committed himself not to fight "against France"; but Vichy, in his eyes, was not France: Vichy was the gravedigger of France's independence, status, and self-respect (I, 95; III, 283-86).

[10] Anne McCormick's remark (III, 659, French edn.).

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in a remarkable dialogue, America's policy, whether it proved right or not, could not but alienate the French (III, 93).

The range of tactics de Gaulle used in order to achieve his triple objective was a formidable one. Dealing with the Allies, as he put it, "limited and alone though I was, and precisely because I was so, I had to climb the heights and never then to come down" (I, 83); or, as he told Churchill, he was "too poor to be able to bow" (I, 243). So he went from *faits accomplis* to threats of resignation and to harsh and effective blackmail whenever his moral or material position was such that the Allies could not but give in (I, 214, 258, 292; II, 294; III, 170, 175ff., 192). He never consented to agreements for agreement's sake and treated his diplomats' fondness for compromise as a professional disease (III, 222; III, 506-7, French edn.). Dealing with his own people, the diversity of his tactics was far greater. He remained thoroughly intransigent toward Vichy; he encouraged the Allies to make Vichy France's plight even worse so as to shock the French away from Petain's dream world (I, 76); he purged Vichyites according to their acts, not according to their intentions (II, 203). But when he had to work with the enemies of Vichy, he showed considerably more flexibility and ambiguity. He got rid of Giraud, as he was determined to do, but by stages (II, 123). He welded the heterogeneous Resistance movements into a reasonably united force. He "wanted the Communists to serve" and got their services. He paid the heavy price of allowing the parties back into the picture in order to broaden his support. He acted as a symbol of unity although it involved compromises and soft-pedaling his constitutional views. He chose Pleven's financial policy as against Mendès-France's in order not to "throw into dangerous convulsions" a "sick and hurt" nation (III, 136). Thus, when survival is not at stake, and when conflicts oppose various interpretations of grandeur but do not threaten the principle itself, de Gaulle acts—then and now—with restraint, prefers cunning to constraint, and strives for unity.

III

For unity is a precondition of grandeur. We come here to de Gaulle's conception of French domestic politics. Just as his view of world affairs raises the question of the meaning of grandeur, his idea of internal affairs poses an equally crucial and complex question: the relation of Frenchmen's wishes to the constant imperative of grandeur.

We get a first approximation of an answer if we study de Gaulle's notion of legitimacy. A legitimate regime is one which, first, preserves

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and promotes French grandeur despite external and internal threats, and, secondly, receives the adherence of the nation for following such a policy (Bayeux speech of 1946, III, 648, French edn.; also III, 24). This is why de Gaulle approves of the Third Republic before the 1930's: not for ideological reasons, but because it increased France's power and role in the world, won the *revanche* over Germany, and served those principles, "freedom, justice, popular sovereignty, without which there is no lasting strength, no solidity, no light" (III, 600, French edn.). For the same reason, he disapproved of Giraud—who could never win "that elementary adherence of the French people without which a government is nothing but a fiction" (II, 90)—and of the Fourth Republic, which fumbled with grandeur.

Both elements of legitimacy are indispensable, but the concern with grandeur is, so to speak, the active principle: de Gaulle never envisaged a *coup d'état* against the Fourth Republic, because of his scrupulous respect for legality,[11] but he never doubted that he incarnated "something primordial, permanent and necessary" and thus was "a kind of capital of sovereignty" which could "remain latent" for a while, but would become effective again when popular support, in an emergency, would hurry back to him (III, 327). Moreover, there are exceptional circumstances when a dictatorship of public safety is justifiable: a great national ambition or the fear of a people in peril (III, 271).[12] Although de Gaulle, suspicious of the fatal and frenzied excesses to which the "great adventure" of dictatorship leads (Bayeux speech; also III, 271), states that no such temporary despotism should be prolonged more than is necessary, there is little doubt that the function of the second element of legitimacy—free institutions—is to provide genuine, untwisted, unplebiscitary ratification of national policy, rather than to initiate and define such policy.

Who defines it then? In the ideal state, which de Gaulle describes in his *Memoirs* (II, 176; III, 273; Bayeux speech) and tried to establish in the Constitution of 1958, it is the chief of state. A national policy means action, not deliberation, and action is the work of "one alone" (II, 179). Therefore no Assembly can be entrusted with policy-making power, as it was during the "game" of French parliamentarianism: "assemblies, beneath their fine speeches, are ruled by the fear of action" (III, 46).[13] Leadership is personal, and de Gaulle hates nothing more than anonymous power: the greatest failing of France's past regimes

[11] The Fourth Republic merely fumbled with grandeur, and it had popular support. Vichy, he thought, betrayed France's interests—hence de Gaulle's revolt.

[12] This whole passage is inadequately translated.

[13] However, he confesses to being fascinated by Assemblies, as was Barrès (III, 117).

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was their fundamental principle: "Let no head show above the trenches of democracy" (III, 294). The chief of state alone is in charge of the national interest, which is not "a juxtaposition of particular interests" (III, 112).[14]

The implications of this statement are huge: for to de Gaulle, as to the revolutionary heirs of Rousseau, parties—at least in France—are not the spokesmen for different versions of the national interest, but the champions of particular interests. His indictment of French parties is detailed and devastating. They are geared to permanent criticism, not to action; dominated by slogans, not by any sense of realities; always ready to put "everything at stake," instead of agreeing on fundamentals. None represents more than a small fraction of opinion: thus, none could govern alone; consequently, an Executive left to parties would be an auction of offices and influence but not of means of action. Finally, French parties have lost their "doctrinal passion" and are thus "shrinking until each . . . [becomes] nothing more than the representation of a category of interests" (III, 272; see also I, 270-71, III, 293, and the Bayeux speech). This is not Britain's case (I, 162-63; see also his Westminster address of April 7, 1960). But it had been France's plight under the Third Republic, which had "floated upon the nation's surface without directing its vital forces" (II, 77). Therefore, according to de Gaulle—just as to Richelieu—the representatives of French "categories" should not be allowed to take over the state. In particular, they should not select the chief of state, or figure in the cabinet as spokesmen for their groups; they might still overthrow cabinets, but their legislative powers would be smaller than in a presidential system (see III, 318-19). Hence de Gaulle's almost complete silence on Resistance politics in his *Memoirs*, his coolness toward the National Council of the Resistance which pretended to speak for the nation, his preference for a "great administrator" instead of a political leader at the head of the Council (III, 185),[15] his determination to seek "no investiture for . . . [his] authority save that which the voice of the people would give . . . [him] directly" (II, 340), and his decision, in August 1944, to go first to the Ministry of War, and only later to the Hotel de Ville of Paris where the Council was waiting.

De Gaulle's distaste for French parties and pressure groups extends to all the "elites," the "notables" from whose ranks the representatives are selected. The elite of France failed at first to follow de Gaulle—all it granted him was "the melancholy homage of its remorse" (I, 22).

[14] My translation. De Gaulle writes "particuliers," the translator writes "private."
[15] The Prime Minister, Michel Debré, fits de Gaulle's description perfectly.

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After the Liberation, it failed to support his battle for grandeur, for France's rank, and for a strong new army (III, 101, 159-60, 222-24, 290). It came between de Gaulle and the people, and finally eliminated him when opinion "no longer delegated anything but parties around... [him]" (III, 308). Therefore, in the ideal state, the relationship must be reversed: it will be the people's role to put pressure on its elites in order to force them to support the chief of state (III, 274).

Thus, the crucial connection in the state must be the link between the people and the head of state, the masses and their guide, as de Gaulle calls them.[16] This link reminds one of the relation between the Legislator and the citizens in the *Social Contract*. The national interest, which intermediate bodies corrupt, resembles the general will, which is not *any* will of all, but the *higher* will of each and all. Similarly de Gaulle distinguishes "France's higher interest" from "something quite different . . . the immediate advantage of the French" (III, 31; see also I, 3). The general will is always right, but the people do not always see the common good. The Legislator helps them discover it; once they have, people will want it. In the same way, de Gaulle believes that if the people are shown France's higher interest, they will freely follow the guide who disclosed it. But Rousseau stressed that the Legislator's only function was to educate the popular will, and had "nothing in common with human empire"; de Gaulle's guide is also chief of state: part Legislator, part Roman dictator, part prince. Rousseau reminded his readers that true Legislators are rare; de Gaulle is indeed a good one (and knows it, and says so), but what about his successors?

IV

Here, we reach two fundamental question marks which de Gaulle's writings and actions have left in many minds. Is the policy of grandeur a realistic one after all? Is the regime de Gaulle has created a viable one? Both questions amount to the same query: does de Gaulle represent a mutation in France's fate, or a transition between the past and a future no one can yet describe, or a mere, if superb, parenthesis which does interrupt for a while trends too deep to be reversed or deflected?

Some criticisms of "grandeur" are based on a misunderstanding of the General. His *mystique* is not a quest for anachronism, a vain nostalgia for past greatness, a fruitless drive for restoration. This misconception pervades Edgar Furniss' recent study,[17] which misses the

[16] Cf. *The Edge of the Sword*: the true leader crystallizes around himself all the "potentialities of faith, hope and devotion of his followers" (p. 31).

[17] Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *France: Troubled Ally*, New York, 1960.

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psychological meaning of de Gaulle's appeals: when he talks to the French about their greatness, then and now, it is in order to get them to adapt to, and to act in, the world as it is, not in order to keep them in a museum of past glories. It is flattery for reform. No leader ever coaxes his people into change by telling them that they are through; as he himself remarks, when problems appear simpler to people, "most likely they are" (III, 13): the work of the statesman in revolutionary times resembles that of Ingmar Bergman's Magician. Of course, de Gaulle's success presupposes that he is right in assuming that renovation will make a new grandeur possible; at this point his critics come up with two other objections which I find unconvincing. It is not true, as Raymond Aron has suggested,[18] that de Gaulle conceives of French greatness exclusively in terms of material power. As for the far more serious charge that grandeur requires at least a material basis of power far beyond French resources,[19] I believe it to be an oversimplification. If there exists a will to devote in priority the nation's resources to the necessary ingredients of power and to the responsibilities of world status (e.g., aid to underdeveloped nations), rather than to purely domestic ends, the resources can be found (within limits, of course: a small French deterrent is one thing, the nuclear protection of France by France alone is quite another—but de Gaulle has never shown any desire to stretch France's commitments out of proportion to France's means). It is a problem of allocation, not of availability of resources.

Thus, a more real question is the persistence of a national will for grandeur. The difference between the advocates of a French "withdrawal into Europe" and the heralds of grandeur is a disagreement about the likelihood of domestic support for a policy which imposes sacrifices on French consumers in return for the pride of relative autonomy in world affairs. Mr. Furniss bets on the former, almost in the same terms as Hopkins and F.D.R. He advises American policymakers not to encourage French delusions of grandeur. He thus would, if followed, bring aid and comfort to all those really antediluvian nationalists of France who tend to blame treacherous allies and a hostile world for all of France's failings. He would upset the very process of adaptation whose speed de Gaulle has so much hastened. Most importantly, he seems to forget that French policy since the war has been dominated by various (to be sure, conflicting) adepts of

[18] See his article, "De la politique de grandeur," in *Preuves*, No. 105 (November 1959), pp. 3-12.

[19] See Furniss, *op.cit.*, p. 492; and also Raymond Aron's searching and complex study of France's postwar problems of adaptation to the modern world, *France: Steadfast and Changing*, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, ch. VI.

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grandeur: "little Frenchmen" have found little support in any party or in the electorate. Professor Aron recognizes that the French will probably continue to prefer "power to business and the ideal to reasonable order."[20] At a time when France's population is rising, when her economic and social order is showing considerable progress, when traditional French values, routines, and protections are being discarded precisely because they were largely responsible for France's decline, there is something of a paradox in asking the nation, so to speak, to give up. Adaptation is the medium between anachronism and resignation, and adaptation is what "grandeur" implies at present. As Aron has also remarked, it was public dissatisfaction with France's status—at a time of considerable prosperity—which killed the Fourth Republic;[21] what had weakened France's role most was not her lack of resources, but the way in which her regime had proceeded with the problem of adaptation.

Fundamentally, then, whether grandeur is a concept for stormy times alone, for rescuing the self-pride of a nation buffeted by "the wind of history," as de Gaulle suggests occasionally (I, 52; III, 203, 233), or whether a "national ambition" can remain a permanent driving force, will depend on the solidity and style of the regime. If this is the crux of the matter, it is also the area where doubts are most profound. For there are three problems which de Gaulle's ideal state does not solve, however much his critique of past regimes may be justified. First, there is the problem of parties. For de Gaulle, they are a necessary evil which can never be turned into a good and useful tool—at least in France. Hence they have to be tolerated, for they represent respectable interests, valid ideas, and genuine divisions—but they must be relegated to a minor role. Now, as Philip Williams and Martin Harrison point out at the close of their admirable, crisp, swift, and witty study of French political events of 1958 and 1959,[22] this means that a conception in which politics was entirely absorbed by the ballet of parties has been replaced by one in which the parties' role has been reduced to almost nothing. Ever since the Revolution, France has oscillated from representative regimes which paralyzed executive power, to regimes which set up a strong executive only by pushing aside the nation's representatives. In all cases, the loser was the electorate—left out of the parliamentary game, or manipulated by a Savior. Today, public assent to the regime is mobilized by a man who acts like a whole political

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[21] Raymond Aron, *France: The New Republic*, New York, 1960, pp. 44-45.
[22] *De Gaulle's Republic*, London, 1960.

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class, and whose authority remains democratic because he preserves public liberties and private rights. But of the four ingredients of democratic power: universal suffrage, an effective Executive, a representative legislature, and a sphere of citizens' rights, the third is seriously crippled and, as Aron stresses in both of his recent books, France has the only Western Constitution which does not give its leaders authority through direct universal suffrage. Tomorrow, public assent runs either the risk of being manufactured by a leader who would cross the line which separates a benevolent monarchy from outright despotism, or the risk of reverting to chaotic parties whose very idleness within the present regime deprives them of any incentive to reform.

Secondly, the problem of French elites is not tackled directly by the regime either. They will not become more concerned for unity and grandeur as long as they do not participate in political affairs. But there is no political class at present: the class which provided its personnel to the Third Republic is dead and has not been replaced. Leaders of business or labor unions, youth movements, industrial and rural *cadres* remain, on the whole, reluctant to enter the political arena, and are certainly not encouraged to do so. Now, despite the brilliant light which a great man is able to project on his people while he is in power, success ultimately depends on elites capable of translating into acts and facts the intentions and decisions of this leader while he lasts, and of making policy when he is gone.

Many observers hope that industrialization will gradually solve those two problems, and bring about a situation in which elites and parties—in France as in other industrial societies—will agree on essentials (so that even the number and weaknesses of French parties will matter less). They hope that by that time France's readaptation to the world—the most divisive issue since the war—will have been completed by the strong, if quaint, institutions of the Fifth Republic.[23] But if the past is any indication, the fading of old ideological issues, economic progress, and a leveling of the standard of living do not necessarily breed political pragmatism. There are other requirements: healthy parties, no ghosts in the historical closets, active local democracy, few extremists, and general acceptance of established institutions; none of these is fulfilled in France. Here is where the third unsolved problem lies: those requirements can hardly be met, and the first two problems solved, if the role of the nation is limited to passive, though free, assent, and to occasional votes—either for the approval of Executive decisions or for the selection of powerless legislators—separated by long stretches in which the

[23] See Aron, *France: The New Republic*, pp. 66-67.

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citizens are merely the spectators and consumers of their political system. Public complacency fosters Executive isolation. Both the permanent plea for unity, as Williams and Harrison remark,[24] and the priority given by de Gaulle to those problems which affect France's world status tend to limit the regime's direct impact on the nation to daily administration, exhortations, and celebrations. The regime cares about production, a prerequisite of grandeur; it worries far less about local self-government, which might weaken central power at first, but would later grow roots for the regime.

The collapse of France's political institutions justifies the Fifth Republic. But the regime is not primarily concerned with turning the temporary shelter of its own institutions into a solid and permanent edifice. There are two reasons for this relative indifference. First, nobody really knows how one goes about recreating, from above, an effective party system, a politically sophisticated elite, and an adult electorate after decades of alienation. Secondly, this is not de Gaulle's main worry. He is a philosopher, a moralist, an artist, and a fine historian (see II, 351-52). He is not a political scientist or a sociologist. He sees international grandeur as a cure for domestic ills; but ultimately grandeur depends on such a cure. To be sure, domestic order and external successes are a powerful incentive to a cure. But are they enough? Will not, ironically, the problems which provoked France's recent crisis be solved long before France's political structure has found a new and lasting equilibrium? In a nation whose Algerian drama looks like the last major substantive issue, the style of politics threatens to remain the deepest and most dangerous problem—precisely because it is inseparable from France's role in the world. In other Western nations also, agreement on ends is being reached, and it is about means that parties fight. But in France there is no agreement yet on the constitutional process through which means should be chosen.

V

De Gaulle has recognized that no man ever fulfills all his ambitions. But our doubts about the future of his work should not dim our appreciation of the man's own greatness. His appeal to the French has little in common with the ebullient worship shown previous "providential men." "De Gaulle has never encouraged a personality cult or even sought to perpetuate his system."[25] He appears as the synthesizer of French traditions: his love for France combines Old Regime features

[24] *Op.cit.*, p. 216.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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and the feelings of nineteenth-century French democrats; his image of France unites a jealous concern for France's uniqueness and for the universality of French values. His own values include both faith and rationality. His desire for grandeur marries past glories to renovation. He reminds his readers of the inspiration patriotism gives to man's actions, but although a world of nation-states is bound to be a world of competing forces, he never describes it in Hobbesian terms, and stresses the virtues of interdependence and association as long as the self-respect of all partners is assured.

Indeed, his fundamental preoccupation with self-respect (which explains his actions of 1940-1946, his return to power, and his cautious steering through the Algerian minefields), his regard for man's freedom, his concern for unity, his desire to lead men to act as they should rather than forcing them to do so—features which coexist with a deep enthusiasm for action and for using all the levers and levels of leadership—remind us that, ultimately, the great political leader is an educator. De Gaulle's *Memoirs* display all the beauties of education through example. His acts reflect both the power and the limits of such pedagogy—the power, for, largely thanks to him, France is redefining her role in the world, and it is not a mean one; the limits, for she may still lack the institutions that make the difference between playing a role well and stumbling through one's part. That the future of France in the world depends on France even more than on the world is a poignant truth de Gaulle has always understood. His impact is, so to speak, delimited by these two final quotes: "No man can substitute himself for a people" (III, 263); and "Since everything eternally begins anew, what I have done will sooner or later be a source of new ardor after I have gone" (III, 329).

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THE CHALLENGE OF COMMUNIST CHINA

By ROBERT C. NORTH

A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia*, New York, Harper & Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1960, 575 pp. $6.95.

I

VIEWING the current world struggle as essentially diatic, Western foreign policy and defense planners over the past decade have tended to focus upon Moscow as the source of all aggressions and the Soviet Union as the principal power which must be deterred from war or overcome by force of arms if a general conflict breaks out. The official and semi-official literature emerging from these assumptions is enormous.

Throughout recent years, however, and particularly during the last few months there has accumulated more and more evidence suggesting that Communist China, with national interests by no means identical with those of the Soviet Union, has developed a self-confidence, an aggressiveness, and a scorn for the destructiveness of nuclear weapons which even the Russians find disturbing. Just as Nikita Khrushchev has issued more and more warnings about the holocaust likely to result from a nuclear or biological conflict, and at a time when he has been boasting that communism can win without a general war, Chinese Communist leaders have been denouncing the concept of a "warless world" as childish fantasy and heaping scorn on "those comrades" who are obsessed with unreasonable fear of modern weapons. Biological techniques and nuclear warheads have not repudiated Lenin, according to the Chinese, and "imperialist wars" remain inevitable—"outside human will"—as long as capitalism exists.

Chinese Communist leaders seem more and more to perceive their country as the power most likely not only to survive but perhaps even to enhance its position through a major nuclear war. At whatever point a conflict reaches the missile and nuclear stage, we infer from Communist statements, the two most technologically advanced powers will concentrate on devastating each other—striking at major technological and military bases. Then, when the smoke and radiation have at least partially drifted off, the Chinese Communists will be in a position to move from six to ten million infantrymen and artillerymen in whatever direction suits them best—provided only that they have had sufficient time, theretofore, to build up their transport.

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How has it come about that makers of foreign policy, defense planners, and the American public at large have been so slow to comprehend the full implications of Chinese Communist developments over the last ten years?

Certainly there is no single answer, but *Communist China and Asia* places the question in sharp perspective and analyzes it against a carefully documented account of the Chinese Communist emergence as a major and dynamic power on the Asian mainland.

Few Americans are as well qualified as the author either to ask the question or to provide an authoritative analysis of the challenge that confronts us. Born in China, Doak Barnett has devoted many years to research and reporting in Asia. In 1949 he was in Peking when the Communists took power, and he lived under their rule for seven months thereafter. Subsequently, he spent several years in Hong Kong, following developments in China with close attention, and he has also traveled widely throughout the various bordering areas from Japan to Southeast Asia and India. Having served as a wartime officer in the United States Marine Corps, as a member of the State Department, and with the American Universities Field Staff, he is now on the staff of the Ford Foundation, with a clear view of what research and training are being done—and not done—in the China area.

Communist China is already one of the most dynamic and dangerous forces at work in the world today, according to Mr. Barnett, and the challenge it raises will soon demand of the United States a far larger commitment of national resources—material, intellectual, and moral—than we have so far even begun to approach. The Chinese mainland is now building its economy at a rate as high or higher than that of any other underdeveloped nation of the world, and its influence is growing steadily throughout Asia. The ground forces of Communist China are now second in size only to those of the Soviet Union, and the growth of the regime, in alliance with the Russians, has fundamentally altered the balance of power in Asia. Already by far the most populous nation in the world, Communist China will have in the neighborhood of a billion people by sometime in the 1980's.

Mr. Barnett believes that there is little basis for hoping that the security problems which Communist China already poses for the United States will become any less serious or urgent in the years ahead. Yet the question of United States policy toward China inspires less debate in our country than any other foreign policy problem, and the newspapers and the general public remain poorly informed. "There is not a single important research center in the United States, outside the

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government," Mr. Barnett asserts, "which is now concentrating its main effort on the study of Communist China" (p. 7).

In the course of engineering "one of the most tremendous and startling revolutions in history," Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues have mobilized the Chinese people into "what may well constitute the most impressive outburst of disciplined human activity ever witnessed" and have thus, in a decade, succeeded in transforming "a weak, fragmented nation into a monolithic, totalitarian state" (p. 4). By virtue of this performance alone, Mr. Barnett believes, Communist China has—and will continue to have—a deeply disturbing effect upon the underdeveloped sectors of the globe.

In seeking explanations for these rapid developments, Mr. Barnett shows how the Chinese Communists have drawn upon four decades of Soviet experience—borrowing, adapting, and refining many Soviet techniques and carefully avoiding a number of major Russian mistakes. Beyond this, he also probes significantly into Chinese history to show the continuities and adjustments of traditional practice as well as the innovations.

To the historian, for example, many aspects of China's resurgence can be viewed as the latest of many periods over the centuries when a powerful, authoritarian government has aroused and harnessed the energies of the people in order to assert China's influence and power over a large part of Asia. The Chinese Communists are themselves acutely aware of their impressive imperial past, and thus Marxist-Leninist-Maoist strategy and tactics reinforce—and, in turn, are reinforced by—ancient pride, arrogance, and expansionist tendencies. Throughout the greater part of the last two thousand years, Chinese rulers have maintained hegemony over large parts of Asia including Korea, Taiwan, Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, Annam, and regions now included in Soviet and Indian territories. China, Mr. Barnett recalls, has almost invariably been expansionist whenever it has enjoyed a strong government, and there is no reason to believe that the immediate future will provide an exception.

Under Communist control, Mr. Barnett believes, the most significant political innovation has been the effective regimentation of the entire vast population from the topmost levels of government down to the remote village and the individual. This control system is concerned, moreover, not only with what the people do, but also with what they think. By means of this apparatus the state controls virtually all the channels through which those who wish to acquire status, prestige,

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and influence—or even just "to get along" successfully—must direct their efforts.

Perhaps the most startling aspects of this total state apparatus are the commune system and the social innovations that are emerging from it. By the end of 1958 virtually all the collective farms of China—more than 700,000 altogether—had been merged into over 26,000 huge communes, and now the system is being pushed into urban areas. Thus the whole Chinese population is being politicized, drawn directly into the state system, and made conscious of national affairs in an unprecedented way. The Communist Party membership, meanwhile, is kept in tight discipline by constant "inner party struggle" which has minimized the necessity for blood purges among the comrades. "The effect of this," Mr. Barnett asserts, "has been to increase greatly Peking's ability to mobilize the mass of people for purposes which it chooses" (p. 18).

The evidence strongly suggests that Communist China may be far more "radical" and revolutionary and aggressive and totalitarian than the Soviet Union is today—or perhaps ever was. One wonders if so total a state has ever before emerged in history. In analyzing the theory behind this extraordinarily effective practice, Mr. Barnett tends to assign more credit to Mao Tse-tung as a creative theoretician than the Chinese leader may deserve. A careful comparison of Chinese Communist texts with Russian sources—even on the role of the peasant—suggests that a large part of "Maoism" is merely a paraphrase of Lenin and of M. N. Roy, the Indian theoretician. What Mao did, by and large, was to explicate the earlier texts and illustrate them with Confucian homilies and barnyard analogies. It is as a master tactician and organizer, perhaps, rather than as a creative theoretician that Mao will be inscribed in history.

It would be a mistake, in any case, to assume that rank-and-file support for the regime is largely forced. Undoubtedly there is considerable discontent, especially among the non-Chinese minorities, but the regime has well-tested devices for channeling the frustrations of its people, and the leaders, by demanding universal participation in state affairs and by encouraging a revivalist atmosphere of movement and expectancy, have gone a long way toward capturing the excitement as well as the energies of the populace.

By these various techniques the Chinese Communist leaders have been trying to transform an essentially preindustrial, agricultural nation into a major industrial country and a great military power. It is doubtful, of course, that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues could have carried

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out their first Five-Year Plan without the credits, equipment, and technical assistance which they received from the Russians. On the other hand, it must be noted that, fundamentally, the Chinese have been paying their own way. The published record, as Mr. Barnett points out, does not reveal a single financial grant from the Soviet Union.

In all these massive efforts the Chinese Communists have not been uniformly successful. Indeed, Mr. Barnett points out a series of failures—bitter resistance from non-Chinese minority groups in Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet, and elsewhere; the failure to meet announced production goals; the inability of the regime to control its exploding population; the strong probability that more production will mean more mouths to feed in a vicious cycle for a long time to come. Nevertheless, the available evidence suggests that Communist China's GNP rose during 1953-1957 by an average rate of 7 to 8 per cent—which is close to double the 4 per cent rate achieved by India between 1951 and 1956. With due allowance for overestimations and false statistics, we may nevertheless expect the Chinese Communists to maintain a comparable growth over the years immediately ahead. It does no good for the non-Communist world to seize on Peking's failures and pretend that the victories do not exist.

At the same time it seems probable that the Chinese will continue to have "colonial problems" with the various non-Chinese minorities, and we may expect to find a "Malthusian counter-revolution" competing with the "industrial revolution" for new resources every step of the way (pp. 55-56). Other underdeveloped countries in Asia and elsewhere will be watching the outcome.

Despite the difficulties facing them, we may expect the Chinese Communists to continue their struggle with energy and persistence. As Mao Tse-tung has put it, "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy entrenched, we harass; enemy exhausted, we attack; enemy retreating, we pursue" (p. 76). This kind of tactical flexibility has undoubtedly had much to do with Chinese Communist successes in a number of spheres.

Now, increasingly, the Peking regime is using economic and political initiative toward Japan, Southeast Asia, and countries as far away as the Middle East and Africa. Mr. Barnett analyzes the various instruments at Communist China's command—contacts with overseas Chinese, economic competition, subversion and armed revolts, technical assistance and financial aid—and shows in considerable detail how each has been used. Communist China, for example, has extended more aid than the Soviet Union to North Korea and North Vietnam. Peking

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has also provided loans or aid of one sort or another to non-Communist countries, including Cambodia, Nepal, Ceylon, Egypt, Laos, Indonesia, and Burma. In the years to come we can expect to see this pattern extended to other parts of the world.

II

Toward the close of his book Mr. Barnett reviews the policies of the United States toward China and lays out a number of alternatives.

Ever since 1950 the central policy of the United States toward Communist China has been one of "limited pressure." Underlying this attitude is a basic assumption that the United States should do everything in its power, while avoiding military conflict, to isolate Communist China diplomatically and prevent or, at a minimum, delay the regime's acceptance into the international community of nations. It is assumed that this policy will weaken Communist China and detract from its prestige and influence. A corollary to this "limited pressure" policy consists of military and economic support for the Nationalist regime and the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait.

It can be argued that this policy does little to lessen military tensions in Asia—and may heighten them. There is a strong risk of war inherent in the approach, and no broad base of international support for it exists or is likely to emerge. Beyond this, the policy is based on "fictions" and on "positions which will probably be subject to steady erosion" over the years to come (p. 470). Finally, and despite all assertions to the contrary, the policy is inflexible and severely limits American possibilities for initiatory action.

Mr. Barnett believes that this American policy of recent years has suffered from having been shaped too largely by military and strategic considerations along China's immediate periphery—and too little by the critical underlying problems of food, population, organization of resources, social and economic inequalities, nationalism, and other wellsprings of frustration from which the military and strategic problems have at least partially arisen.

A great American liability emerging from this policy has been the shutting-off of the United States from access to firsthand information about Communist China. It is no accident that there is so little responsible and systematic research in the United States today concerning the internal dynamics and weaknesses of the Peking regime. It is no accident that so few American scholars are being trained in the Chinese language and in Chinese Communist economics and politics. It is no

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accident that newspapers and journals of opinion are largely restricted to broad and frequently misleading generalities and popular clichés about the functioning of this, the most populous country in the world. If these unfortunate circumstances are due partially to Chinese Communist intransigence, they are also partially American-made. In this connection we ought perhaps to give sober thought to the possibility that it is precisely because Communist China is a hostile, rapidly growing, and threatening state that we have vital reason to seek maximum possible communication with it—at all possible levels. Willfully to cut off knowledge of this sort is almost certainly asking for trouble.

A majority of the responsible critics of current American policy incline toward one or another of the various "two Chinas" concepts. Generally, it is argued that the United States should attempt to achieve a new *status quo* based upon the hard reality of two Chinese regimes and urge the recognition and acceptance of both in the United Nations and the world at large. This approach is usually assumed to include the gradual relaxation of restrictions on trade—excluding strategic goods—attempts to open more channels of unofficial contact and communication, efforts to persuade the Nationalists to evacuate the offshore islands, a multilateral commitment to defend Taiwan and maintain the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, a United States willingness to consider recognition of the Peking regime provided the Chinese Communists indicated an inclination to reciprocate, and an effort to link the seating of Peking in the United Nations with the simultaneous admission of Nationalist China as a new member—conditional upon a Chinese Communist fulfillment of clearly defined requirements concerning Korea.

As a preliminary step, the United States should become accustomed to thinking of Communist China as something other than a huge appendage to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, even today, there is a tendency among Americans to think about the Sino-Soviet relationship in extreme terms. Either the Chinese Communists are viewed as puppets dangling at the end of Russian strings, or there are rumors to the effect that Mao has achieved control over Khrushchev, or someone is hopefully predicting a complete break between the two allies. The probabilities are, however, that Communist China and Soviet Russia are in a far more complex and subtle relationship, with some interests similar, or closely reciprocal, and others embarrassingly divergent.

It should be perfectly clear that Peking and Moscow are linked not only by ideology, but also by many common goals, and inevitably, at this point in history, at least, they derive powerful political support from

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each other. "One of the strongest incentives for Peking and Moscow to keep their partnership intact," according to Mr. Barnett, "is undoubtedly the realization that both the Soviet Union and Communist China would pay a heavy price if they split apart" (p. 381). With a hostile Soviet Union at its frontier, Communist China would find itself surrounded and vulnerable and unable to realize many of its major long-range aims. Conversely, the Soviet Union would find its policies in the non-Western areas of the world seriously compromised or undermined.

These overwhelming reasons for preserving the alliance do not, however, automatically eliminate all the real differences between Moscow and Peking. Many times over the last forty years the Chinese and Russian Communists have found themselves in sharp disagreement over priorities, tactical timing, and the proper methods for achieving their goals. As Chinese Communist power grows, as the regime's interests are projected farther and farther beyond its borders, and as the Soviet Union develops a larger and larger stake in aspects of the *status quo*, we may expect that the two leaderships will find it more and more difficult to co-ordinate their policies—many of which are almost certain to be more or less incompatible. At the present time, for example, it is clear—probably much clearer than when Mr. Barnett was writing his book—that the Chinese and the Russians have very different concepts of the implications of nuclear and biochemical warfare.

In years gone by, the West was seldom sufficiently sophisticated about Sino-Soviet relations or about the Communist movement as a behavior system even to recognize—let alone to take any advantage of—the not-infrequent differences between the Chinese and Russian comrades. Today our slender resources for penetrating and objective studies of Communist China tend only to perpetuate our blindnesses and misperceptions.

Beyond these considerations, where do we go?

Mr. Barnett makes amply clear that there is no easy solution. "What is needed to meet the challenge of Communist China," he asserts, "is, fundamentally, not so much an effective China policy as an effective Asia policy in the broader sense" (pp. 474-75). Inherent here is the need for a commitment to help all of the non-Communist states in the area, whether they are aligned with the West or "non-aligned," in order to build them into strong, viable nations, in order to raise them out of their current instabilities, miseries, and undeniable frustrations.

Even then we shall discover that there is no painless, inexpensive way to meet the challenge, no single formula for altering the nature of

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the regime, or containing it, or making it go away. Mankind, rather, has come to a frightening and fateful turning point in its career, and the future of generations around the world is likely to depend upon the decisions that are made in years immediately ahead—and upon the courage and imagination and ingenuity that can be mustered for making them.

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THE PRESENT AND THE PRESS

By BERNARD C. COHEN

Wilbur Schramm, ed., *One Day in the World's Press: Fourteen Great Newspapers on a Day of Crisis*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1959, 138 pp. $6.95.

I

ANALYZING the role of the press in the process of foreign policy-making raises the same problems as self-analysis: how does one disengage oneself from those experiences that are so utterly familiar that one regards them as normal, standard, given? Reading the daily paper is like looking in the mirror while shaving—we do it so often that after a while all we see is the daily growth of whiskers on the face of history, and we no longer look at the face itself.

But only a moment's reflection is required to put the press into a wholly different—and more objective—context. None of us has direct experience with the whole range of international affairs, whatever that range may be. We may know very small parts of it at first hand, if we are lucky enough to have been participants in or observers of significant events. For most of us most of the time, however, the world at large, the world of foreign policy, reaches us via the media of mass communication, and most importantly the press. For most of us, the political map of the world is drawn by the reporter and the editor, not by the cartographer. (Latin America, for instance, takes up a lot of space on the cartographer's map, but it scarcely exists on the political map delineated by most newspapers in the United States.) And if we do not see a story in the newspapers (or catch it on radio or television), it effectively has not happened, as far as we are concerned.

This is to say, then, that the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling most people what to think *about*. And it follows from this that "the world" looks different to different people, depending not only on their personal interests, but also on the map that is drawn for them by the writers, editors, and publishers of the papers they read. The editor may believe he is only printing the things that people want to read; as Mr. Schramm puts it, in this volume under review, "Newspapers cover the foreign news they feel their readers will consider important and interesting" (p. 138). But he—the editor—is thereby

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putting a claim on their attention, powerfully determining what they will be thinking about until the next wave laps their shore.

The individual obviously co-operates in this process. That is to say, if he wants to (and many do) he can turn his back on the whole business and not think about anything. To say, then, that the press tells people what to think about is to say also that the individual adapts to his newspaper. He knows how to receive signals about importance or salience, and how to interpret them. He learns that an editor has ways of conveying orders of significance; by location, headlines, length of article, or by-line, for instance, the editor is saying, "This is the most important thing that happened today; this is second; this is third" and so on down the line. The reader thus becomes familiar with the priorities held by those who put out his newspaper.

The significance of the reader-editor relationship may be appreciated when a person picks up an unfamiliar newspaper in a strange town. Applying his customary measures of significance, he may flounder immediately, for the signals are likely to be different. Sometimes he can reorder events so that they correspond to the familiar and trusted priorities; it takes no great sophistication, for example, to know that a local housing authority scandal is less important in a foreign policy sense than the political revolution in Turkey which it may have squeezed off the front page. But then he may begin to wonder what else has happened that got squeezed out of the paper completely; in other words, he cannot "trust" the paper—it has no map-making function for him, at least in the short run.

Obviously, the impact of a newspaper on the thinking of the reader is partly a function of time. Repeated exposures help to create congruity between the world as the reader visualizes it and the world as the paper represents it. When the congruity is established, the newspaper becomes as familiar as the face being shaved; we stop examining it, and only look at the "new growth" since yesterday morning.

The impact of a newspaper on the thinking of the reader is also partly a function of alternative sources of communication on the subject of international affairs. The more interested and involved a person is in foreign affairs, the more likely he is to have multiple sources of information; in these circumstances even a familiar newspaper is likely to have fewer map-making functions. But at the politically involved levels of foreign policy-making, where multiple sources of information are most likely to be the rule, the daily press still serves to alert people to political events, and thus to activate, to bring into political play, a "map" it may have had only a marginal hand in drawing.

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II

Wilbur Schramm has made a thin slice into this map-making process of the press on a world-wide basis. He has reproduced, in this volume, the major news columns of fourteen newspapers, in as many countries,[1] as they appeared on November 2, 1956—the day the Soviets began to move back into Hungary, and the British and French were ready to move into Suez after the Israeli invasion had begun. The reader is thus given an impression of how the foreign policy world was brought simultaneously to the attention of readers of these "prestige papers" around the world. Clearly, a single slice such as this cannot be explicitly concerned with the role of the newspaper as the framer of issues—the map-making function; one day's exposure may be suggestive of different patterns in the construction of *Weltanschauungen*, but it can hardly be more than that. Mr. Schramm has made no excessive claims about the utility of his "histological" approach. If anything, he has claimed too little: he has tried to let the newspapers speak for themselves, but without the mediation of some conception of what the newspaper might contribute to the process of foreign policy-making, fourteen newspapers produce, for the most part, a babel. Mr. Schramm poses some questions for the reader to use as a guide "in thinking about the papers in this volume"—e.g., "Who controls what the paper says, and for what purpose is the paper used? . . . What kind of mass communication system does it belong to? Who reads it? What is its focus of attention? And what picture of events does it give" (p. 6)? But these questions are used explicitly "to distinguish these newspapers from each other" (p. 5), not to provide a framework of theory or of generalization that might help to clarify the contribution of the press to foreign policy. "The main experience," Mr. Schramm says, "is to read" (p. 6).[2]

In taking the reader through the pages of these newspapers, Mr. Schramm poses one main, and very interesting, question: did "world attention" (read: newspaper coverage), by shifting to Suez, effectively bury the Hungarian "story," possibly contributing to the Soviet burial of the brief Hungarian revolution? This is one of those fascinating

[1] *Pravda*, Moscow; *Le Monde*, Paris; *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Frankfurt; *Rude Pravo*, Prague; *Dagens Nyheter*, Stockholm; *Borba*, Belgrade; *Al Ahram*, Cairo; *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Peking; *Asahi*, Tokyo; *La Prensa*, Buenos Aires; *The Times of India*, Bombay and Delhi; *The Times*, London; *New York Times*, New York.

[2] But, while reading, the reader should turn the pages with care, lest the book come apart in his hands. This was obviously a costly book to produce, but one wishes that the publishers, having gone this far, had bound the results so that they would have survived more than one reading.

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questions that can be asked forever, but never satisfactorily answered. Least of all can it be answered on the basis of a one-day slice of press coverage. The argument in favor of this proposition seems to rest on the premise that men have only a very limited capacity to think about, or cope with, more than one issue at a time. While this would appear to be an oversimplification—at least when applied to a whole policy-making structure, if not to policy-makers themselves—it is reflected in (and to some extent sustained by) the nearly universal tendency of newspapermen to think in terms of the "big story." In Mr. Schramm's words, "It is a tendency of the news-gathering system to focus its attention on one great series of developments at a time" (p. 3). That is to say, in the world that the newspaper lays at our doorstep every morning and/or evening, there are descending orders of importance attached to stories—priorities which, as noted above, are clearly observable to the customary reader of the paper. There is no doubt, from the material in this book, that newspaper coverage turned almost completely away from Hungary and toward Suez. Of the fourteen newspapers treated, only two, *Trybuna Ludu* and *Dagens Nyheter*, gave the "lead" to Hungary. There is also no doubt that "world attention" shifted to Suez. But what is cause, and what is effect, in this situation?

Are the judgments of the newspapermen the same as the judgments of the rest of us, or do they also help to shape our judgments? Mr. Schramm says that the shift in attention from Hungary to Egypt came about because "the Suez events were a very real threat of world war.... And war between countries is inherently more interesting than revolution in one country . . ." (p. 4). Now, this is *his* definition of the situation. One is entitled to ask, inherently more interesting to whom? And under what circumstances? Whose "news values" are these? Clearly they contain some implicit theories about political significance in the international world that may not be universally shared—or even widely shared if the theories are made explicit. Yet the newspaperman occupies the strategic position of being able to get *his* theory, or his interpretation of everyone else's theories, on the (breakfast) table first—which gives him a clear-cut advantage in shaping the issues that men will think about.

Mr. Schramm points out that by November 2, 1956, the press was generally giving the game to the Hungarians on points. Against the judgment of the reporter, who writes for the moment on the basis of the evidence of the moment, one can (not too unfairly)[3] stack a judg-

[3] Mr. Schramm, in defending the press, supplies a basis for criticizing it: "If the

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ment informed by theories of Soviet behavior. Was it reasonable, on November 2, to assume that the Soviet Union would allow Communist control in Hungary to melt away without making a strenuous effort to reverse the process? The Poles, whose knowledge of Soviet behavior was rather intimate, were not the only ones who did not think so. But that is a secondary point in any case. The important question still is, did the press affect the outcome in Hungary by diverting attention to Suez? Perhaps one can make the question more explicit: what would have been the net effect of more warnings in the world's press, such as appeared in the Swedish *Dagens Nyheter*, that the Soviet Union would crush the Hungarian revolt? Would this have made any difference in the willingness or disposition of the United States, for instance, to take effective countermeasures? Here one has to distinguish carefully between policies and press treatment of them; for, despite the strategic position of the newspaperman, there are still some limits to the power of the press to shape immediate policy by structuring policy thinking. If it was unreasonable to assume, on November 2, that the Soviets would allow Hungary to slip from their grasp, it was equally unreasonable (arguing from comparable bases) to assume, on November 2, that the United States—or any other country—would run any high risks in order to help the Hungarians. In other words, we may be grossly deceiving ourselves in this whole business. It is, basically, an anti-Suez position to argue that the British and French, by drawing attention to Suez, *let* the Russians get away with something in Hungary. The timing of the Suez affair no doubt made it politically easier for the Russians, but that is not the same as saying that it *permitted* them to "get away with it" because men, including policy-makers, were distracted by the threat of war elsewhere.

One may be on equally solid ground in suggesting that, *without* a Suez to draw almost everyone's attention (and not just our own), we might simply have kept the eyes of the whole world fixed on our unwillingness to help the Hungarians in the struggle with the Russians. On the other hand, it is hard to argue really persuasively that, with the whole world watching, America's sins of omission in Hungary would have been more damaging to our national prestige than the Soviet Union's sins of commission there were to her prestige.

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pattern of events seems clearer now than it did on that day, let us not put too much blame on the world press, . . . for the perspective of daily history is very narrow" (p. 4).

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III

The problem of reportorial (and editorial) "news values" in the foreign policy field—put in stark outline by the Hungary-Suez contest—is persistent and disturbing. As far as most newspapermen are concerned, foreign affairs have few special marks to distinguish them from other categories of "news"; that is to say, the same news criteria hold, by and large: Has something happened? Is it new? Different? Does it portend conflict? Does it have a "big name" attached to it? Are other reporters writing or talking about it, too? Does it have "human interest"? Each newsman has his own words to describe what news is ("what the people want to read"), but in most cases they can be assimilated to this list. A reporter's "news sense" is acquired chiefly by exposure to his colleagues' judgments, and to the newspapers themselves, which makes it a self-reinforcing phenomenon (as well as a depressing thought!). Hence the newspaper's unending pursuit of the "big story," be it Suez or anything else, ends up as the pursuit of "news values" that are very high on human interest but rather low on the score of political significance.

This approach to foreign affairs by the press, when combined with the inescapable fact that foreign policy is just one (and for most American newspapers at least, a very small one) of the fields that the paper must cover, leads to another striking feature of press coverage of foreign affairs: its substantive and chronological discontinuity. The political scientist is familiar with the concept of *process*, especially insofar as it implies the dynamic development of political issues in response to changing circumstances and changing forms and sources of influence. But except for two or three newspapers in this country, there is very little evidence in the press of continuous development in foreign policy; instead, one sees only those very few foreign policy events or situations that manage to rise to the top, to break through the curtain of "news values" that keeps most foreign affairs out of the paper. To the extent, then, that a person uses his daily newspaper to keep informed about international affairs, he is led from peak of crisis to peak of crisis without knowledge or understanding of the depths beneath and between. This is by no means the only reason for the lack of public interest or knowledge in foreign affairs, but it should be numbered among the reasons therefor. How good a political map of international issues can a man have in his head if his regular sources of information are spotty and discontinuous—if race trouble in South Africa, for instance, is associated only with an assassination attempt on

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the life of the Prime Minister, and for all practical purposes does not exist otherwise?

The limitations of prevailing "news values" as a standard for judging the adequacy of particular newspapers are suggested by *One Day in the World's Press*. Mr. Schramm invites the reader to compare the coverage and editorial position of the fourteen newspapers with respect to a "checklist" of "important developments in the news which occurred in time to make the papers of November 2" (p. 6). Given the economics of newspaper publishing, no one paper could do equal—or even approximate—justice to all these events of the day; if it could, it would have the material for a more comprehensive "map" of international affairs. Yet even this would suffer from the interpretation widely given to "news values," for Mr. Schramm's large checklist is still responsive almost exclusively to *events* of the day before—to "things that happened": e.g., "The British Labour party fiercely criticized the Eden government." "Hungary asked that its problem be included on the UN agenda." "U.S. presidential election campaign was in last week." "Marshal Badoglio died." (p. 6)—and ignores those on-going domestic and international political developments or trends affecting foreign policy that did not get into the "news" that day because they did not meet the generally accepted standard of what was "news."

If the problem of standardized "news values" is disturbing to the thoughtful reader of American newspapers, it is of course much worse for the reader of Communist-bloc newspapers. It is not simply that there is a common "line" of selection and interpretation that runs through the Communist press. The Soviet-bloc newspapers reproduced by Mr. Schramm—*Pravda, Trybuna Ludu, Rude Pravo*, and *Jen-min Jih-pao*—are sufficiently similar in their basic allocation of space as to suggest the possibility of some measure of centralized editorial decision-making in the Communist press world. Drawing on tables prepared by Mr. Schramm (p. 137), it turns out that *Pravda*, on November 2, devoted 67 per cent of its stories to what Mr. Schramm calls "own country and region." The comparable figure for *Trybuna Ludu* was 65 per cent; for *Rude Pravo*, 68 per cent; for *Jen-min Jih-pao*, 66 per cent. (The other ten papers ranged from 50 to 86 per cent.) This is a striking similarity, but it would obviously take more than a one-day sample to document a proposition of this order.

IV

Mr. Schramm's use of "prestige papers" in this volume raises some additional general problems about the press in a foreign policy context.

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I am not disposed to quarrel with his choice of the "best" papers, if for no other reason than that his choice of which papers to reproduce seems to me to be substantially irrelevant to his own, largely existential, purposes. The "experience of reading" could have been had with almost any set of newspapers that were of comparable levels of sophistication and responsibility.

Mr. Schramm defines the significance of these newspapers in the following way: "These prestige papers are shaped, at least to an important degree, by what the leadership in the country wants to know and wants known. The leadership in the country is shaped, at least to an important degree, by what these papers tell them" (p. 5). And later: ". . . where policy and power are centralized, the prestige press serves to speak for that centralized leadership. Where power and policy making are more widely distributed, the prestige press provides the influential people with the information they need to take effective part in the political and economic processes" (p. 137).

Even a superficial observation of the process of foreign policy-making supports this interpretation of the significance of a few important newspapers; and a more intensive study documents it more carefully. There are a handful of papers in the United States, most of them Eastern metropolitan newspapers, which help to shape the world map of "influential people," and which provide the information which serves as stimuli to particular forms of participation in the foreign policy-making process. This is especially true of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, two newspapers which are read, digested, discussed, and even clipped by nearly everyone in Washington who is interested in the foreign policy arena. These papers are, in effect, an internal system of foreign policy communication in a widely decentralized policy-making structure. These are the channels through which the official participants in the process talk to and debate with one another, reasonably rapidly and in a way that lets interested third parties know what has been said. Without these channels of communication, the process would be vastly different, less efficient, and, no doubt, less "rational" than it now is. Clearly, these are vital institutions—not a "fourth branch of government," but something more nearly like a central nervous system for the whole body politic.[4]

To reaffirm the extraordinary significance of a few newspapers among policy-making officials in Washington, however, is to open up the broader problem of how the press in all its varied forms fits into

[4] Douglass Cater treats the press in this latter fashion, even though he calls his book on government and the press *The Fourth Branch of Government* (Boston, 1959).

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the larger structure of public opinion and policy-making in the foreign policy field. The *New York Times*, and to a lesser extent the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Wall Street Journal*, have, in a country of local and regional newspapers, the status of national newspapers for the policy and opinion "elites."[5] This means that there is a common medium of information and communication to tie together the political and bureaucratic elites at the seat of government, and the opinion elites—interest groups and others—in Washington and in thousands of communities throughout the country. And the awareness that this is the case adds something extra to the consideration given to these papers by policy-making officials.

But below the elite level in the structure of public opinion, there is considerable diversity of exposure to media of communication. This is not necessarily to argue that each newspaper presents a different image of the foreign policy world; on the contrary, the dependence of most newspapers of the second rank (and below) on the wire services for their world-wide—and often national—news coverage imposes a certain amount of standardization. This is true even though each editor may select differently from the flow of words coming over the tickers, and may, as suggested above, apply different orders of priority through the way these stories are handled; and the standardization is furthered by national news magazines and national radio and TV networks. But regardless of the uniformity, or lack of it, that characterizes the exposures of the "attentive public" to the world of foreign policy, it is a safe guess that the foreign policy world that is communicated by the press to the elite groups differs rather substantially from that which is communicated to the attentive and general publics. This is perhaps another way of saying that the differences in foreign affairs coverage between the *New York Times*, chiefly, on the one hand, and most other newspapers, on the other, are so great as to be almost differences in kind.[6] There are significant exceptions to this, of course; there are one or two dozen papers which bring their readers a measure of foreign affairs coverage that, while not comparable to the coverage of the *New York Times*, is markedly superior to that of most other newspapers, even in comparable cities.

[5] This discussion builds on Gabriel A. Almond's analysis of the structure of public opinion on foreign policy, *The American People and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1950.

[6] Figures compiled for the International Press Institute's study of *The Flow of the News* (Zurich, 1953) revealed that during the four weeks of the study, between October 1952 and January 1953, "The *New York Times* carried a daily average of about 32 columns of foreign dateline news stories, including their headlines," while "the average newspaper among the 105 studies printed a little more than four columns a day of foreign dateline stories, including headlines" (p. 22).

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There are obvious dangers lurking in a political process whose participants are differentially exposed to information—dangers that are not by-passed by the cultivation of informal networks of opinion leadership. In every direction we turn, the foreign policy requirements of the coming decade will involve sacrifices that will depend, for their making, on widespread understanding and agreement. There is good reason to be thinking about how to improve the channels through which understanding is created and significant political agreement is mobilized. In the area of the press, the problem is especially acute, since everyone seems to believe that "there can't be two *New York Times*'s." One possibility, if the advertising dilemma that it presents could be solved, might be to make the *New York Times* into a truly national newspaper by printing it in regional editions like the *Wall Street Journal*, so that it would be a realistic alternative morning newspaper for all levels in the policy and opinion structure in most cities throughout the country. This would make it easier for those with intense interest in foreign affairs to satisfy that interest. But there would still remain the general problem—for which this would be a not wholly satisfactory solution—created by press standards which unwittingly but effectively discriminate against foreign affairs in favor of other sorts of affairs.

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